US embassy cable - 04KUWAIT143

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000143 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP 
CAIRO PLS PASS TO A/S BURNS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, ETRD, PHUM, PGOV, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) SCENESETTER FOR NEA A/S BURNS'S VISIT 
 
REF: A. 03 KUWAIT 5539 
     B. KUWAIT 69 
 
Classified By: CDA FRANK URBANCIC; REASON:  1.4 (D) 
 
1.  (C) Welcome back to Kuwait.  We are requesting meetings 
for you with Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed, Foreign 
Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed Sabah al-Salem, and Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defense Shaykh Jaber Mubarak 
al-Hamad al-Sabah, for the afternoon of January 14.  Given 
your later arrival, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed 
us today, January 13, that an evening meeting with the 
Foreign Minister is likely, and that a meeting with the 
Defense Minister is not possible.  We are checking on the 
Prime Minister's availability now.  We have canceled Charge's 
reception, in order to make time for Dr. Mohammed. 
 
2.  (C) There have been significant changes since your last 
visit in June:  Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed, who had been de facto 
head of government due to the Crown Prince's permanent 
incapacitation, was promoted to Prime Minister in July 
following regularly-scheduled National Assembly elections. 
The regime was much criticized for vote-buying and for 
condoning illegal tribal primaries; independents made gains 
at the expense of both the liberals and the largest organized 
bloc of Islamists, which has ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Kuwaiti political discourse is much more inward-focused now 
that we have removed the existential threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein's regime.  Shaykh Sabah's stated agenda includes 
economic reform (a TIFA will be signed when USTR's schedule 
permits) and steps towards political rights for women, who 
now can neither vote nor run for national office. 
 
2.  (C)  On Iraq, the GOK remains one of our most committed 
and optimistic allies.  It knows it needs us to succeed at 
least as much as we do, and it trusts our ability and 
determination more than most.  The capture of Saddam Hussein 
and the agreed timetable for restoration of Iraqi sovereignty 
bolstered Kuwait's sense of vindication for siding with us. 
The GOK has close and cordial ties with the Iraqi Governing 
Council and Ministers, and helped them gain acceptance in the 
Arab League and OIC.  Kuwait says it has spent about a 
billion dollars already in support of Iraq and has another 
half-billion to go. 
 
3.  (S) That's the good news.  The downside is that the 
Kuwaitis feel taken for granted.  Some of this is inevitable: 
 
 
- We are a huge country with more global responsibilities 
than any other, and our top officials only have 24 hours in 
their day.  It will never be possible to give this small 
country as much attention as it craves.  Shaykh Sabah's 
successful trip to Washington in September did much to soothe 
feelings hurt by the President's decision not to include 
Kuwait in his visit to the region. 
 
- Our way of fighting a war is massive and expensive. 
Kuwaitis know it gets results, so they let us do things our 
way, but it is exhausting and costly to them: 
 
-- as the main launching pad for OIF, Kuwait turned over more 
than half its landmass to us in the run-up to the invasion, 
and allowed us extensive use of scarce facilities (e.g. 
airport, ports), to the detriment of its own economy; 
 
-- it has borne hundreds of millions of dollars-worth of 
costs ostensibly in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, much 
of it Assistance-In-Kind (AIK) fuel for our forces (currently 
running at USD1.2 million per day). 
 
-- our requirements for security support, especially before 
and during major combat operations in Iraq, stretched Kuwaiti 
capabilities beyond sustainable limits. 
 
-- we are beginning our largest troop rotation since Vietnam, 
which will last nearly half a year. 
 
4.  (C) Several bilateral irritants need to be addressed: 
 
- AIK Fuel:  The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces has 
repeatedly indicated that he cannot afford to continue 
providing the current level of support, and has cut back on 
participation in military exercises and training.  The 
Minister of Finance sent the Embassy a letter seeking 
reimbursement of nearly USD 85 million for fuel provided to 
our forces since the declared end of major combat operations. 
 We have asked that the bill be nullified because Shaykh 
Sabah had assured Ambassador Jones the fuel aid would 
continue.  Dr. Mohammed has requested that we engage in an 
inter-agency dialogue on our strategic cooperation in the 
near future.  The GOK has given us two weeks from January 10 
to begin an interagency discussion on where we go from here. 
- Humanitarian Fuel:  The GOK and a private Kuwaiti company, 
Altanmia, spent millions in order to be able to provide large 
quantities of refined fuels to Iraq through a KBR contract. 
The quantities actually ordered have been much smaller, and 
Kuwait has been accused in the newsmedia of overcharging 
because similar products were being delivered through Turkey 
at much lower prices.  (The fact is -- and our U.S. 
contractor acknowledged this in a press release -- that there 
are practical reasons for the apparent discrepancies in the 
price fuel from Kuwait:  the route is longer and so dangerous 
that the truck convoys require coalition security escorts; 
these are not always available, which leads to delays that 
increase costs; the download points in Iraq lack adequate 
equipment, which adds to the delays; Kuwait is a net importer 
of refined fuels and has had to buy on the spot market at 
times to meet demand.  Reftels) 
 
- Kuwait Airways Aircrew:  The Transportation Security 
Administration has informed Kuwait Airways that six of its 
aircrew members are no longer permitted to fly to/from the 
US, but provided no justification.  Some of the individuals 
named hold positions of conspicuous trust: one is the Amir's 
co-pilot, another once flew former President Bush back to the 
US; another is the brother of a State Security officer.  If 
we have a reason for believing these individuals pose a 
threat, the GOK would like to know what it is. 
 
- Border:  At this writing, we have concluded negotiations 
for an MOU between the US military and the GOK regarding 
procedures at crossing points on the Iraqi border.  Already, 
interim procedures put in place have resulted in the 
successful interdiction of contraband.  Implementation of the 
full MOU will further assuage Kuwaiti fears of smuggling 
associated with coalition convoys.  A signing ceremony at the 
border will occur late in January.  The full deployment of 
the planned equipment and facilities will top USD 15 million 
and provide a state-of-the-art border control regime.  We 
plan to offer this as a model for use by other states 
bordering Iraq. 
 
- Contractor Entry:  At the beginning of Eid al-Fitr, airport 
immigration officials briefly stopped allowing CPA 
contractors to enter the country on their DOD Common Access 
Card (CAC), insisting they present a passport and visa (the 
legal requirement and the procedure in force before the 
build-up to OIF).  Because the GOK has not required -- or 
been equipped to require -- that personnel transiting to/from 
Iraq be stamped in/out every time, it has no way of knowing 
how big a problem there may be of contractors living in 
Kuwait without proper documentation.  In close coordination 
with CFLCC, we are very close to finalizing a  strategy for 
negotiating sustainable procedures with the GOK.  This is 
another achievement that you can justifiably highlight in 
your meetings. 
 
- Compensation:  The GOK understands that, in the face of 
opposition within the UNSC, we defended the principle of 
Iraqi responsibility to pay compensation for the destruction 
and plunder of its 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait.  That said, 
UNSCR 1483 reduced the UN Compensation Commission's take of 
Iraqi oil revenue from 25 percent to 5 percent.  Public 
opinion tends not to understand our constructive role, and 
therefore to see the GOK as too feckless to get us to respect 
its interests. 
 
- Cargo/Port:  CFLCC has become aware that some cargo has sat 
at the airport for months, and it has addressed the issue. 
The US military and the Embassy are actively engaged with the 
GOK and the Kuwaiti private sector to secure US access to 
Kuwaiti ports while causing the least amount of disruption to 
commercial operations.  A steering committee that includes 
the Kuwait Ports Authority, the Public Authority for 
Industry, Kuwaiti companies active in the port, the Embassy, 
and the US military, meets every two to three weeks to 
discuss longer-term plans for port access.  The US military 
meets with the harbormaster and Kuwaiti companies each week 
to review berth schedules and to ensure that US access to 
pier space is not unduly harming commercial interests. 
However, the relative lack of port facilities in Kuwait -- 
combined with the current troop rotation, US plans to remain 
in Kuwait in the longer term, and the anticipated increase in 
commercial port activity associated with the booming Kuwaiti 
economy and Iraqi reconstruction -- signals that port access 
issues will become more contentious.  One company has already 
alleged that the military has caused it to lose money by 
denying it pier access, although the U.S. military refutes 
that allegation. 
 
5. (C) Iraqi Debt:  Presidential Envoy Baker plans to come 
January 20-21.  The Kuwaitis will be interested in what he 
has to say, but on debt (and compensation), they want to be 
the ones to make any concession -- they do not want us or 
anybody else to make it for them -- and they do not want to 
take any action until there is a sovereign Iraqi government 
to negotiate with, and they want to work within the framework 
of the Paris Club. 
 
6. (C) TIP:  Thanks to the Secretary's mention of 
Trafficking-In-Persons concerns when he received the current 
Foreign Minister last April, the GOK showed just enough 
commitment to fighting abuses to stay off Tier 3 in 2003. 
However, at most levels the GOK still does not really believe 
it has a trafficking problem, because those we are most 
concerned about (female domestic servants) are not brought to 
Kuwait under false pretenses, and existing law theoretically 
affords them some protection.  We continue to try to drive 
home the message that they need to take this matter seriously 
-- as others in the GCC are doing -- or face embarrassment. 
A word from you would help. 
 
7.  (C) MEPI:  It would be useful for you to encourage your 
interlocutors to seize the opportunity of partnership with us 
to promote reform, and ask them where they see the greatest 
scope for help from us. 
 
8.  (C) ARTICLE 98:  Kuwait signed on June 18 during U/S 
Bolton's visit.  After FM Dr. Mohammed told Ambassador Jones 
that he saw no need for parliamentary ratification, the 
agreement was submitted to the National Assembly, where it 
remains.  (NB:  Kuwait has not acknowledged publicly having 
signed such an agreement with us, so we treat the existence 
of the agreement as classified.) 
URBANCIC