US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO62

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 000062 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
 
E.O. 12958:        DECL:  01/12/14 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, PINR, CE, Political Parties 
SUBJECT:  The ties that don't bind:  Cohabitation 
further strains troubled President/PM relationship 
 
Refs:  Colombo 54, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Since Sri Lanka's cohabitation 
experiment began in December 2001, President Kumaratunga 
and PM Wickremesinghe have been at daggers drawn, with 
relations plunging to new depths of late.  Both sides 
have their complaints against the other and neither 
wears a white hat:  From the President's perspective, 
the PM and his government have shown her little respect. 
The PM, in the meantime, finds the President mercurial 
and impossible to deal with.  Amid their horrible 
personal chemistry hovers the aggravating factor that 
both are scions of political dynasties that have rubbed 
up against each other nastily for decades.  Efforts by 
the U.S. and the international community may help the 
two leaders briefly refocus and act in the national 
interest.  Permanently healing the breach between the 
two sides is not a likely possibility, however, and 
further crises are almost certain to occur.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------ 
Relations hit new Depths 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Since Sri Lanka's cohabitation experiment began 
in December 2001, the relationship between President 
Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and Prime Minister 
Ranil Wickremesinghe has been rocky -- and relations 
have only plunged to new depths of late.  The recent 
downward spiral of action and reaction has included the 
following: 
 
-- President's Takeover of Ministries:  In early 
November 2003, while the Prime Minister was in 
Washington to meet with President Bush, President 
Kumaratunga suddenly took over the Ministries of 
Defense, Interior, and Mass Communications.  She also 
suspended Parliament for a two-week period.  Kumaratunga 
cited the GSL's "ineffective steps...to ensure national 
security" as the key reason behind her actions.  (At the 
time, the President also declared a "state of 
emergency," but several days later her office retracted 
it, saying no emergency had ever been officially 
declared.) 
 
-- Prime Minister's Response:  Countering the 
President's early November actions, the PM rejected her 
explanation of the ministerial takeovers and demanded 
that all three portfolios be returned to government 
control immediately.  From mid-November until mid- 
December, a joint committee composed of representatives 
of both leaders met to try to resolve the situation, but 
it had little success in ending the impasse.  Further 
complicating matters, the PM made an unexpected 
announcement on January 7 that the government could no 
longer take responsibility for the February 2002 
ceasefire agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in light of the President's continuing 
control of the Defense Ministry (see Reftels).  While 
his statement was mischaracterized by some as indicating 
that the GSL was pulling out of the ceasefire accord 
altogether, the PM's statement strengthened domestic and 
international concern that the cohabitation impasse was 
steadily undermining the peace process. 
 
-- Issue of President's Term:  In another recent 
complication, a dispute has arisen as to the exact 
length of President Kumaratunga's term in office.  The 
details are confusing, but the President was sworn into 
office for her second, and final, six-year term in 
December 1999.  Her call for presidential elections in 
the fall of 1999, however, came one year prior to the 
end of her first presidential term (1994-2000).  While 
it was widely assumed that her second term would end in 
late 2005 (six years from the 1999 election), the 
President apparently believes that she is entitled to 
the full six years of both terms (i.e., her current term 
in office would end in late 2006).  The PM and his 
supporters are bound to object strenuously if the 
President actually moves forward and asserts that she 
can serve until late 2006. 
 
-------------------------- 
The President's Complaints 
-------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Aside from the latest tensions, there is a long 
track record of cohabitation friction between the two 
sides.  Both sides have their own detailed list of 
complaints and neither wears a white hat.  From the 
President's perspective, the PM and his government have 
shown little respect for her and her position.  The 
President and her aides have complained, for example, 
that the government has not involved them in the peace 
process with the LTTE although she began the effort when 
she came to power in 1994 and brought the Norwegian 
facilitators in to work on the matter.  The President 
also complains that she was not asked her opinion of the 
ceasefire accord with the LTTE before it was signed. 
Moreover, the GSL never invited a presidential 
representative to participate in the six rounds of peace 
talks with the Tigers that took place from 2002-2003. 
Feeling little ownership of the process, the President 
and her advisors have felt free to attack how it is 
being run, asserting that the Tigers are regularly 
violating the ceasefire accord with impunity even as 
their military forces grow in size and strength. 
Resentful of the international kudos the PM's efforts 
have reaped, the President and her advisers have also 
noted that when his United National Party (UNP) was in 
opposition from 1994-2001 it vociferously criticized the 
President's peace initiatives.  They note -- as if it is 
indelibly burned in their minds -- an instance in August 
2000, for example, when UNP MPs burned copies of the 
President's draft devolution proposal in Parliament (due 
to the UNP's failure to support the draft, it was never 
voted on). 
 
4.  (C) The President has also resented the personal 
attacks heaped on her by a group of the PM's ministers. 
These ministers -- G.L. Peiris, Ravi Karunanayake, S.B. 
Dissanayake, and others -- have often hit out at the 
President in abusive ways.  Karunanayake, for example, 
once accused Kumaratunga of bringing a listening device 
into a cabinet meeting and has criticized her face-to- 
face on other occasions.  These ministers have also been 
at the forefront of the drafting of impeachment articles 
against the President on corruption and abuse of power 
charges.  Although these charges have not been brought 
before Parliament (the UNP knows it cannot get the two- 
thirds support needed for passage at this time), the 
President is known to be extremely angry over the whole 
matter.  On the more personal side, Kumaratunga is also 
known to resent that her son, Vimukhthi, was denied 
admission to a prestigious Colombo GSL-controlled high 
school in the early 1990's and that her appeal of the 
matter was rejected by the then-Minister of Education 
Ranil Wickremesinghe. 
 
5.  (C) Another aspect of President Kumaratunga's poor 
relationship with the Prime Minister is the fact that 
she wants to stay involved in politics beyond the limits 
of her term (which, as noted above, is slated to end in 
either two or three years).  As she is unable to run for 
president again (a person can only serve two terms), 
Kumaratunga -- who is only 58 -- is known to be 
seriously thinking about trying to adjust the Sri Lankan 
Constitution to get rid of the executive presidency.  In 
its place, she would return to the pre-1978 system in 
which the prime minister had executive powers.  If this 
was done, the President would then become prime minister 
if her party formed the majority in Parliament.  The PM, 
who like Kumaratunga has spoken out in favor of 
adjusting the Constitution to get rid of the executive 
presidency, knows that the President is considering this 
option.  It is thought that he has no intention, 
however, of supporting any plan to change the 
Constitution because he wants to be (executive) 
president himself.  Not adjusting the Constitution would 
also be convenient for Wickremesinghe because it would 
ease Kumaratunga effectively out of politics, as she 
almost certainly would not want to try to become prime 
minister in the current system dominated by the 
executive presidency.  As the President moves toward the 
end of her term (in late 2005 or late 2006), her desire 
to stay in politics in a dominant role is bound to 
become an increasing bone of contention between her and 
the Prime Minister. 
 
------------------- 
The PM's Complaints 
------------------- 
 
6.  (C) For his part, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe 
finds President Kumaratunga mercurial and impossible to 
deal with.  He and his advisers assert that they have 
gingerly tried to improve cohabitation ties in various 
ways, but have found their entreaties rejected outright 
and sometimes with harsh language.  (The PM is known to 
be upset by the President's semi-regular verbal assaults 
on his government:  She recently characterized the PM's 
desire to take back the Defense Ministry as "a joke," 
for example; In the past, she has also referred to 
members of his government as "donkeys," "dogs," and 
"clowns in a circus.")  They note that the President and 
her advisers have consistently taken a tack critical of 
the peace process, which makes it hard to involve them 
in decision-making on the matter, or to involve them in 
negotiations with the LTTE. 
 
7.  (C) There is also the matter of trust.  Simply put, 
the PM and his team do not trust the President to any 
extent.  There is a feeling that she and her advisers 
will agree to something, only to go back on the deal if 
they believe it is politically expedient.  In making 
these charges, the PM and his advisers assert that the 
President has been working on "an escape hatch," which 
involves aligning her People's Alliance (PA) party with 
the radical Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party.  The 
possibility of a PA-JVP combine makes the UNP doubt that 
Kumaratunga sincerely wants to improve cohabitation 
ties.  There is also a view among many in the UNP that 
the President is out "to get" the 10 or so current UNP 
MPs who defected from her PA party in late 2001 and thus 
precipitated the December 2001 election which the PA 
lost.  These MPs include the outspoken G.L. Peiris and 
S.B. Dissanayake, both of whom Kumaratunga is known to 
loathe.  Finally, the PM is also known to resent deeply 
the poor treatment he believes was meted out to him by 
the President when he was the Leader of the Opposition 
from 1994-2001. 
 
--------------------------- 
Abysmal Personal Chemistry 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Another factor aggravating the situation is the 
fact that President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister 
Wickremesinghe share abysmal personal chemistry.  It is 
hard to imagine two individuals who are less alike -- 
and, in this case, opposites do not attract.  The 
President is an outgoing person of rapidly shifting 
moods.  She has great charisma and charm when she turns 
it on, and is excellent on the stump.  By contrast, the 
PM is a technocrat and an excellent "inside" politician, 
and, in personality, is phlegmatic.  He appears shy and 
sometimes uncomfortable in public settings.  Unlike the 
President, he does not thrive on political 
confrontation.  The few photos of the two leaders 
together underscore their acute discomfort with each 
other:  in many photos, for example, the two are 
actively leaning away from each other and grimacing as 
if they cannot bear the sight of the other.  Although 
political rivals can sometimes transcend day-to-day 
tensions and develop warm personal ties in Sri Lankan 
society, there is no record of Kumaratunga and 
Wickremesinghe socializing with each other in any 
manner. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Scions of Battling Political Dynasties 
-------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) In some ways, the tensions between the two 
leaders were written in the stars (as this astrology- 
loving society would have it).  The fact is that the two 
were virtually born to dislike the other given that they 
are both the scions of Sri Lanka's two great political 
dynasties.  Kumaratunga, for example, is very conscious 
that both her father and mother were prime ministers 
(S.W.R.D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike), and that her 
family tree includes major Sri Lankan figures going back 
generations.  The PM, on the other hand, is related to 
D.S. and Dudley Senanayake, and John Kotelawala, the 
country's first three prime ministers, and also to 
President Jayewardene, who led the country from 1977-88. 
To put it mildly, these two clans have been at each 
other's throats for decades.  Examples of brutal 
political infighting between the two clans are legion: 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike and her allies, for example, 
played hard ball with Dudley Senanayake and Jayewardene, 
the then-leaders of the UNP, after she twice won 
elections in the 1960s and 1970s.  Settling scores years 
later, Jayewardene pushed through a bill in the early 
1980s that stripped Sirimavo Bandaranaike of her civil 
rights (they were later restored).  Against this 
backdrop, it is clear that Kumaratunga and 
Wickremesinghe -- who have known each other since they 
were children -- are simply acting in conformity with 
the long-standing familial rivalry.  Lending substance 
to this, is the fact that Kumaratunga, Wickremesinghe 
(to a lesser extent), and their advisers will launch 
into detailed history lessons -- as if the events took 
place yesterday -- of how the other side did wrong on 
this or that issue, thus proving how malicious they are. 
 
----------------------------------- 
COMMENT:  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. 
----------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) As noted, neither side wears a white hat.  Both 
Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe have done things that 
have served to spoil their relationship and they are 
both responsible for the fact that ties are at their 
nadir now.  Efforts by the U.S. and the international 
community may help the two leaders briefly refocus and 
act in the national interest, however.  Such 
ameliorative efforts have had some limited success in 
restraining the two sides from acting on their worst 
impulses in the past and they need to continue now. 
That said, while it may be possible for the 
international community to help ease passing crises, 
outside efforts almost certainly cannot heal the deep 
breach between the two sides (which exist even in the 
face of the national threat from the terrorist LTTE). 
Too much water has passed underneath the bridge to 
expect any long-term easing in the tensions.  Moreover, 
with both leaders relatively young (Kumaratunga at 58 
and Wickremesinghe at 54) prospects are that the tense 
situation that now prevails could go on for years. 
Indeed, given the family linkages, it is very possible 
-- if depressing to think about -- that the 
Kumaratunga/Wickremesinghe conflict could well be passed 
on to the next generation of Sri Lankan leaders, just as 
the conflict was passed on to them.   END COMMENT. 
 
11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD