US embassy cable - 04AMMAN202

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KING ABDULLAH TELLS CODEL SHAYS U.S. MUST STAY COURSE IN IRAQ, SUPPORT MAJOR STEPS IN MEPP

Identifier: 04AMMAN202
Wikileaks: View 04AMMAN202 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2004-01-08 18:23:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL KPAL IS IZ JO MEPP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, IS, IZ, JO, MEPP 
SUBJECT: KING ABDULLAH TELLS CODEL SHAYS U.S. MUST STAY 
COURSE IN IRAQ, SUPPORT MAJOR STEPS IN MEPP 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for Reasons 1.5 (b), (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) King Abdullah told CODEL Shays January 6 that Jordan 
strongly backs U.S. efforts in Iraq, but warned against 
handing over authority or withdrawing coalition troops 
prematurely.  He expressed concern over terrorists 
infiltrating Jordan's borders, especially along the Saudi 
frontier, saying increased assistance could help mitigate the 
problem.  Both King Abdullah and Queen Rania urged the U.S. 
to provide objective Arabic-language media coverage within 
Iraq and to develop methods to counter pervasive 
anti-Americanism in the region.  The King was gloomy about 
progress in the Arab-Palestinian conflict, criticizing both 
sides and denouncing the Israeli security wall as 
short-sighted.  End Summary. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
2.  (C) CODEL Shays, accompanied by the Ambassador, met with 
King Abdullah and Queen Rania January 6 at the royal family's 
residence in Amman.  The King noted that Jordan fully 
supports U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq and was 
providing training for Iraqis in many different fields.  He 
expressed sharp concern, however, over whether Iraqis would 
be prepared to administer the country if the proposed 
transfer of authority took place this summer.  There are many 
"disconnects" between the different factions in Iraq, some of 
whom have strongly opposing agendas, that have to be resolved 
before full sovereignty is restored to the Iraqi people. 
Premature elections in Iraq could prove disastrous, the King 
argued, and those within the Iraqi Governing Council who were 
pressing for an early transfer of power were likely motivated 
by their own personal agendas and a desire "to be in the 
driver's seat." 
 
3.  (S) The King agreed that Saddam Hussein's capture would 
lead to a gradual decline in attacks from supporters of the 
old regime.  Attacks from Islamic terrorists, however, would 
most likely continue, necessitating the creation of a strong 
intelligence service within Iraq.  According to the King, 
terrorists were still crossing into Iraq from both Syria and 
Saudi Arabia, along with anti-aircraft rockets and other 
weapons.  While the Saudis were finally trying to take some 
action to stem this flow, the King deemed this "too little, 
too late" and worried that Al-Qaida and its allies were 
preparing for "the next level" of attacks both within Iraq 
and elsewhere.  Withdrawal of U.S. forces depended on the 
Iraqis' capability to maintain security in the country. 
Military and security training programs needed time and the 
U.S. had to be "practical" about turning over security 
responsibilities.  The King advised the U.S. to "gradually" 
lessen the number of its forces at the appropriate time to 
lower U.S. visibility and to show its commitment to ending 
the occupation. 
 
--------------- 
BORDER SECURITY 
--------------- 
 
4.  (S) In addition to security inside Iraq, the King 
expressed worries about security along Jordan's borders, 
claiming that terrorists were infiltrating Jordan from Syria. 
 He emphasized special concern for security along Jordan's 
long border with Saudi Arabia.  As Jordanian forces were 
already stretched too thin trying to patrol Jordan's borders 
with the West Bank and Iraq, Jordan simply could not 
adequately cover the Saudi frontier.  The border's rugged 
terrain, including narrow passes hidden from sight, only 
increased the opportunities for people and weapons to be 
smuggled into or through Jordan.  More aircraft and high-tech 
equipment could help increase security, but would not fully 
solve the problem. 
 
------------------------------- 
ARAB MEDIA AND ANTI-AMERICANISM 
------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Queen Rania interjected that the lack of objective 
media outlets was a significant problem in Iraq, as well as 
the rest of the Arab world.  Because the Iraqi public cannot 
readily hear U.S. views or pro-Western Iraqi leaders via the 
media, Iraqis instead rely on biased Arab news channels and 
rumors for their information.  King Abdullah added that Arabs 
were, unfortunately, "infatuated with conspiracy theories" 
and preferred to focus on empty rhetoric, rather than grapple 
with real solutions to complex problems.  In the case of 
Saddam Hussein, far too many Arabs concentrated solely on his 
populist grandstanding against the U.S. instead of asking 
what the dictator had really accomplished for the Iraqi 
people and for Arabs. 
 
6.  (C) The Queen labeled pervasive anti-Americanism "a 
danger" that needed to be effectively countered in "subtle 
ways," including exchange programs and people-to-people 
contact, rather than through propaganda.  She shared her 
vision of an American university in Jordan staffed with U.S. 
professors who would teach American values and be a positive 
source of commentary for the media.  The Queen hoped that 
even Israelis would be attracted to study at such an 
institution. 
 
----------------- 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE 
----------------- 
 
7.  (C) The King stated that both Israel and the Palestinians 
were failing to take the necessary steps to solve the ongoing 
crisis.  While the Palestinians were still struggling to form 
a credible government "with Arafat always lurking in the 
corner," Israel was creating more barriers to peace by 
building its security wall.  Although the wall might be 
attractive to some as a short-term security measure, it was 
very damaging to long-term prospects for peace and, 
therefore, to Israel's long-term security.  Within 5-6 years, 
Palestinians would exceed 50% of the combined population of 
Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, but Israeli actions were at 
odds with this demographic reality.  King Abdullah said that 
he was "not optimistic" about the situation and foresaw only 
efforts at "damage control" in the next six months, with the 
U.S. and others asking both sides to take mere "baby steps" 
to lessen the ongoing violence.  What is really needed are 
bold, major steps for peace. 
 
8.  (C) The King concluded by thanking the CODEL for U.S. 
economic and military assistance.  He characterized Jordan as 
"an island in a sea of chaos," but said that continued 
military aid was "critical" if Jordan was to retain its 
stability while being pulled in so many directions on the 
security/military front (e.g., aiding Iraq's security  and 
stepping up border patrols).  Moreover, Jordan's bold 
economic and social reform program, of which U.S. assistance 
is a central component, "has to succeed."  If the Jordanian 
"experiment" were to fail, the King predicted that 
hard-liners and the "old guard" throughout the region would 
use this as ammunition to resist change. 
 
9.  (U) CODEL Shays did not have an opportunity to clear this 
message. 
 
10.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
GNEHM 

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