US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE39

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, AC, AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD, PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2014 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, LY, CWC 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): OPCW REQUESTS 
CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON LIBYA 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 32 
 
Classified By: Pete Ito, U.S. Delegation to the OPCW.  Reasons: 1.5 (B, 
 D) 
 
This is CWC-4-04. 
 
1.  (C)  Summary:  Brian Hawtin, acting Director General of 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
made a strong pitch for close cooperation with the U.S. and 
UK in ongoing discussions to address Libya's CW program.  He 
concurred on the need to keep the focus on the larger goal of 
ensuring Libya's program is eliminated, and avoiding a 
bureaucratic exercise which impeded progress toward that 
goal.  While the total impact on OPCW resources is not yet 
clear, Hawtin commented that verification and inspection 
requirements concerning Libya may force a reassessment of 
other current obligations.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  In a Jan. 6 conversation which occurred at about the 
time Libya formally requested OPCW technical assistance in 
order to accede to the CW Convention (reftel), Hawtin 
emphasized the importance of staying in close contact with 
the U.S. and U.K. with regard to Libya.  He added that this 
was clearly the view of DG Pfirter, who would return to the 
office on January 19.  Hawtin requested a meeting soon with 
Ambassador Javits and U.K. Ambassador Budd to ensure that all 
parties are working in unison. 
 
3.  (C)  We told Hawtin that we agreed on the importance of 
close and continuing dialogue.  We also stressed the point 
that the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) must not lose sight 
of the bigger picture regarding Libyan activities as it 
pursues the requirements under the Convention and established 
by the TS.  We need to avoid a situation where the focus on 
technical requirements impedes, rather than promotes, 
transparency and full disclosure, as had sometimes occurred 
in our dealings with the Russians on their CW programs. 
Hawtin fully agreed and said this reinforced the need for 
early and complete discussions between the U.S., U.K. and TS 
to ensure we gave a consistent message to the Libyans.  He 
stressed that it would be important to ensure that 
appropriate briefings from Washington and London be provided 
to those members of the TS who would travel to Libya so they 
could do their job properly. 
 
4.  (C)  There was agreement on the assumption the DG would 
want to make a trip to Libya as soon as appropriate, and 
Pfirter would take his cue from how U.S./UK discussions with 
the Libyans would develop.  Hawtin then requested that he be 
kept apprised on the developments concerning the formal 
Libyan steps to inform the UN of its intention to accede to 
the Convention. 
 
5.  (C)  We asked Hawtin whether the responsibilities 
involving Libya would generate a budgetary problem in the 
coming year.  Hawtin began by noting that Horst Reeps, the 
Director of the Verification Division, had already made the 
point that it would be necessary to put the tenure decision 
on hold (at least with regard to the his division) due to 
Libya.  Hawtin's only comment was that while he did not think 
that a freeze on tenure was possible, there may be a reason 
to take a hard look at how many inspectors should be 
separated from service in 2004.  Hawtin shared Reeps' view 
that, depending on what has to be done in Libya, there will 
be a requirement to assess whether other verification and 
inspection activities should be cut so that Libya can be 
squeezed in.  In that regard, Hawtin made a strong pitch for 
immediate implementation of the arrangement for "on-call 
inspectors," as well as further work on more effective 
verification procedures that would reduce costs. 
 
6.  (C)  At this point, Hawtin commented, there is no way to 
know whether any kind of supplemental budget or request for 
voluntary contributions would be required.  Emphasizing that 
the actual destruction of Libyan stocks would not be an OPCW 
responsibility (the arrangement under the CWC is that the 
possessor states pay for destruction), the open questions 
involve verification and inspection requirements for 
production, storage and destruction facilities.  In that 
regard, Hawtin said there was particular interest on where 
the U.S. and UK might want the Libyans to come out on the 
issue of storage facilities. 
 
7.  (C)  Regarding destruction costs, Hawtin provided a 
suggestion, stating that a member of EU HIREP Solana's staff 
had contacted the TS to emphasize the EU's interest in 
contributing to elimination of Libya's WMD programs.  While 
not making any promises, it was clear that there was a 
particular interest conveyed by Solana's staffer in having 
the EU become involved in these important developments, and 
Hawtin suggested the U.S. and/or UK may want to see whether 
the EU would be willing to make a contribution. 
 
8.  (C)  Hawtin noted that while the Verification Branch 
obviously has the lead in working the immediate steps to be 
taken, he had asked External Relations chief Huang Yu to 
focus on what efforts his division would need to make to 
address the impact the Libyan decision would have on other 
countries in the region, as well as on the larger efforts to 
promote states that are not party to the CWC to accede to the 
Convention.  Hawtin added that he has also tasked the Public 
Relations office to see how the OPCW's work on Libya would 
complement the effort to highlight overall OPCW activities 
covering a wide variety of fields.  Hawtin stressed that he 
would obviously appreciate as much assistance and advice as 
possible from the U.S. in these areas. 
 
9.  (U)  Ito sends. 
RUSSEL