US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS36

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/ERA, T, AC, NP, NP/PPC (CHRIS MURRAY) 
NSC FOR SUSAN KOCH 
OSD FOR STEVEN SCHLEIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, KNNP, PINS, UNSC, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU ADOPTS NEW NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 14 
 
     B. 03 USNATO 124 
     C. 03 BRUSSELS 5520 
     D. REIDHEAD-MURRAY ET. AL. E-MAIL 12/05/03 
     E. 03 BRUSSELS 4518 
     F. 03 BRUSSELS 4424 
     G. 03 BRUSSELS 4143 
     H. 03 BRUSSELS 3263 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary and Comment 
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1. (U) SUMMARY: EU heads of state and government adopted an 
"EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMD" at their December 
12-13 Summit in Brussels.  The strategy expands and 
integrates the various pieces of the EU's existing 
nonproliferation policies -- notably the nonproliferation 
Principles and Action Plan adopted at the June 2003 
Thessaloniki EU Summit (ref H).  The strategy calls for the 
integration and strengthening of EU instruments, including 
export controls, CTR programs, external leverage over third 
countries (including aid and trade), interdiction, and 
"coercive measures" as a last resort.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) COMMENT: But the EU is not yet able to answer the 
tough question of when and under what conditions it would 
resort to the use of force.  EU member states do not want to 
limit their options, nor are they ready to stray too far from 
the comforting legitimacy of the UNSC.  That said, the EU 
nonproliferation strategy represents an energetic commitment 
from a major global partner to cooperate on countering the 
development and spread of WMD.  We should welcome the overall 
commitment, work together where we find common ground, and 
engage on points of disagreement.  END COMMENT. 
 
(Note: EU documents mentioned in this cable are available at 
http://ue.eu.int/en/summ.htm) 
 
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Effective Multilateralism: 
Keeping the Baby, Tossing the Bathwater 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) The cornerstone of the EU's nonproliferation strategy 
is "effective multilateralism," a concept discussed at length 
in the European Security Strategy (refs A, F, G).  Developed 
partly in response to perceptions of increasing U.S. 
unilateralism, the EU's concept of effective multilateralism 
envisions shoring up the existing nonproliferation regime and 
strengthening the role of the UNSC in nonproliferation. 
While Europeans largely share our view of the threat posed by 
WMD (Eurobarometer polling in 2002 found that over 70% of EU 
citizens fear WMD proliferation.), and agree that the 
existing regime is unacceptably flawed, they fear the U.S. 
intends to dismantle it altogether, effectively throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater.  To hedge against that outcome, 
the EU has become increasingly keen on reforming 
international institutions and security regimes to make them 
more effective. 
 
4. (U) To make the multilateral treaty regime work, the 
nonproliferation strategy commits the EU to strengthening 
compliance, enforcement, and detectability of violations, and 
to work toward criminalizing state violations, presumably 
under the UNSC.  The strategy calls on the EU to strengthen 
verification mechanisms, and to create new ones where needed, 
and says "the EU is prepared to enhance, as appropriate, its 
political, financial and technical support for agencies in 
charge of verification." 
 
5. (SBU) Parallel with these efforts, the EU will "pursue the 
implementation and universalization of the... NPT, the IAEA 
Safeguard agreements and protocols additional to them, the 
CWC, the BTWC, the HCOC, and the early entry into force of 
the CTBT."  Reflecting the importance the EU places on 
multilateralism -- and on presenting a united EU front in 
international fora -- EU FMs adopted a Common Position on 
universalizing and reinforcing multilateral nonproliferation 
agreements at the November 17 Council meeting, one month 
before adopting the strategy that would formally call for it 
(ref D).  The Common Position outlines in general terms how 
the EU intends, largely through diplomatic action, to go 
about strengthening and universalizing the above agreements. 
It is designed to "serve as a yardstick in the negotiations 
of EU positions in international fora," and as such, 
represents the positions we should expect from the EU in all 
relevant international organizations and in U.S.-EU 
consultations. 
 
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Regional Stability: They Just Need More Help 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The EU strategy describes regional insecurity as the 
underlying cause of WMD proliferation, and says "the EU will 
foster regional security arrangements and regional arms 
control and disarmament processes" to address the problem. 
(Note: The EU is generally supportive of the concept of 
regional Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NFZs), especially in the 
Middle East and Mediterrannean Basin.)  While also 
acknowledging "there can never be any justification for 
proliferation," the strategy overall paints a picture of 
proliferation as an understandable, if regrettable, result of 
"real and legitimate security concerns."  The strategy makes 
reference to the utility of both positive and negative 
security assurances, but leaves little doubt that the EU is 
more comfortable with the former than the latter. 
 
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Conditioning EU Relations on Nonproliferation Commitments 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
7. (C) Notwithstanding the EU preference for carrots over 
sticks, the EU has recently toughened in a positive way by 
endorsing the principle of conditionality in external 
relations (ref D).  On November 17, EU FMs adopted a policy 
requiring inclusion of a "nonproliferation clause" in all EU 
agreements with third countries.  The clause will be 
considered an "essential" element of agreements, meaning that 
it conditions the political and economic-commercial benefits 
under the agreement as a whole on satisfactory adherence to 
international nonproliferation norms.  Failure by any party 
to uphold its obligations under the clause could result in 
punitive action, including as a last resort suspension or 
termination of the agreement as a whole.  (It is not yet 
clear whether or how this conditionality principle will be 
applied to countries like Israel, Pakistan or India.)  Syria, 
whose association agreement with the EU was concluded in 
December, is the first country to sign the clause (ref C). 
 
8. (SBU) The conditionality policy is intended to apply both 
to future and existing "mixed agreements" (i.e. involving a 
combination of member state and Community competencies) with 
third countries.  In the case of existing agreements, 
amendments will be sought to include a nonproliferation 
clause.  Most meaningful EU agreements with third countries, 
including all framework agreements such as Trade and 
Cooperation Agreements (TCA) and Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCA), fall into the mixed category. 
Commission-only agreements are omitted from the new policy 
because EU treaties bar the Commission from including 
political clauses in Community-only agreements with third 
countries (i.e. for development assistance).  EU FMs 
therefore asked the Commission to look for ways -- read, 
legal loopholes -- to also link Community assistance programs 
to nonproliferation. 
 
9. (SBU) The EU's nonproliferation clause for inclusion in 
third country agreements reads: 
 
"Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
The Parties consider that the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and their means of delivery, both to state 
and non-state actors, represents one of the most serious 
threats to international stability and security.  The Parties 
therefore agree to co-operate and to contribute to countering 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery through full compliance with and national 
implementation of their existing obligations under 
international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and 
agreements and other relevant international obligations.  The 
Parties agree that this provision constitutes an essential 
element of this agreement. 
 
The parties furthermore agree to cooperate and to contribute 
to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery by: 
 
-- taking steps to ratify, or accede to, as appropriate, and 
fully implement all other relevant international instruments; 
-- the establishment of an effective system of national 
export controls, controlling the export as well as transit of 
WMD related goods, including a WMD end-use control on dual 
use technologies and containing effective sanctions for 
breaches of export controls. 
 
The Parties agree to establish a regular political dialogue 
that will accompany and consolidate these elements." 
 
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Working with Partners 
--------------------- 
 
10. (C) The new strategy highlights the EU's nonproliferation 
partnerships with the U.S., Russia, Japan, Canada and NATO. 
With regard to the latter, the document says, "The EU will 
ensure, in particular, exchange of information and analysis 
with NATO, within the agreed framework arrangements."  Recent 
interest in enhanced EU-NATO cooperation on proliferation and 
terrorism -- sparked on the EU side by Council DG Robert 
Cooper, and on the NATO side by former SYG Robertson -- 
reflect the growing European desire to better coordinate 
continental and allied approaches to dealing with post-Cold 
War threats.  USEU and USNATO view this as a positive step 
which, despite initial French reluctance (ref. B), promises 
to improve strategic cooperation between the two 
organizations.  We will begin work soon on a joint NATO-EU 
security statement, hopefully for agreement at the June 2004 
NATO and EU Summits. 
 
11. (SBU) On cooperation with other, less capable partners in 
the fight against proliferation, the strategy says the EU 
should offer "a program aimed at assisting these countries in 
improving their procedures, including the enactment and 
enforcement of implementing penal legislation."  It adds that 
such assistance should be conducted in a confidence-building, 
"collaborative spirit."  The strategy leaves unsaid how or 
whether this sort of (Community-only) assistance would be 
related to the EU's new conditionality policy. 
 
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U.S.-EU Cooperation 
------------------- 
 
12. (C) The strategy notes that EU cooperation with the U.S., 
above all other partnerships, is necessary for the successful 
outcome of the fight against proliferation.  The U.S. 
warrants its own point among the list of actionable items in 
the strategy's third chapter, where, under the heading 
"Cooperating closely with the United States and other key 
partners," it says the EU will work at "Ensuring adequate 
follow up to the EU-US declaration on non-proliferation 
issued at the June 2003 summit."  This is welcome text, and 
reflects the determination of HiRep Solana's new WMD Rep, 
Annalisa Giannella, to breathe renewed energy into the EU's 
collaboration with the U.S. on nonproliferation initiatives. 
We will continue to work with Giannella and others to ensure 
that implementation of the joint summit statement remains a 
matter of priority for the EU (progress will be reported 
septel). 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Actionable Measures Include New Support for Interdiction 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
13. (U) The strategy's third chapter reorganizes and updates 
the EU's 22-point nonproliferation Action Plan, adopted along 
with the nonproliferation Principles at the June 2003 
Thessaloniki Summit.  As such, it supercedes the Action Plan 
and is now the document of record for the EU's actionable 
nonproliferation objectives. 
 
14. (U) Billed as a "living action plan," the third chapter 
will be updated every six months, and implementation will be 
monitored by a proliferation monitoring center, to be housed 
in the Council Secretariat.  Once operational, the monitoring 
center will also be responsible for collecting information 
and intelligence, in collaboration with the EU Situation 
Center. 
15. (U) The third chapter is divided into four priority 
areas, linked to the EU's strategic objectives: Rendering 
multilateralism more effective by acting resolutely against 
proliferators; Promoting a stable international and regional 
environment; Cooperating closely with the United States and 
other key partners; and Developing the necessary structures 
within the Union.  It contains several items not previously 
included in the Action Plan, such as the point on U.S.-EU 
collaboration mentioned in para 12 above. 
 
16. (C) The other notable new entries fall under a 
sub-category titled, "Strengthening identification, control 
and interception of illegal trafficking."  New language says 
the EU will consider "measures aimed at the identification, 
control and interception of illegal shipments," and will 
"support international initiatives" aimed at the same.  These 
new points seem aimed mostly at the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), to which eight EU member and acceding 
states belong as founding partners.  The EU supports the PSI, 
has sought an institutional role for itself in the 
initiative, and sent Council and Commission staffers to PSI 
meetings in Paris and London as members of the Italian 
(then-EU Presidency) delegation (ref E).  While the EU bid 
for some form of PSI inclusion appears to have abated for the 
time being, the EU's new nonproliferation strategy makes 
clear that overall EU support for interdiction of illegal 
shipments is growing.  We expect the Council Secretariat and 
Commission to spend considerable energy in 2004 examining 
ways the EU can contribute to this expanding area of 
international counter-proliferation activity. 
 
Foster