US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO11

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000011 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  01-05-14 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, CE, IN, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Ambassador delivers Secretary Powell's letter 
to President Kumaratunga 
 
Refs:  (A) 03 Colombo 2200 
 
-      (B) 03 State 348254 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Ambassador delivered Secretary Powell's 
letter to President Kumaratunga on Jan 2.  Ambassador 
urged President to seek solution to the ongoing 
political crisis so that the peace process could resume 
and the economy get back on track.  President said she 
had gone as far as she could go in offering to make PM 
Wickremesinghe the Minister for National Security and to 
give to him all Defense matters relating to the peace 
process.  Ambassador stressed need for bold political 
decision, and President eventually conceded that she 
might have some new ideas to propose.  Separately, 
Indian High Commissioner told Ambassador he believes 
Prime Minister Wickremesinghe is now standing in way of 
a solution, and hard-line UNP Commerce Minister 
Karunanayake told Ambassador he was advising PM to stick 
it to the President in the New Year.  We believe a 
solution is in sight, but both sides -- including the PM 
-- will need to show flexibility and boldness.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador called on President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga (CBK) on Friday, January 2 to deliver letter 
from Secretary Powell (Ref B).  (Ambassador had 
delivered the Secretary's similar letter to Prime 
Minister Wickremesinghe on Wednesday, Dec 31 - see Ref 
A.)  Ambassador began by praising the recent strong 
statement by the President on religious tolerance and 
the actions she took to ensure that there was no 
violence following the funeral of a controversial 
Buddhist monk on Christmas Eve.  He also thanked the 
President for seeing him on the eve of her departure for 
the SAARC summit in Islamabad. Ambassador then handed 
over letter.  After CBK read the letter, Ambassador 
noted that the Secretary had recently had surgery, and 
the fact that he had signed this letter on Christmas Eve 
showed the importance of this issue for the United 
States.  Ambassador urged the President to look for ways 
to work with PM Wickremesinghe so that the peace process 
could resume and the economy, which was suffering from 
the prolonged political uncertainty, could get back on 
track.  Reprising a theme from the statement issued by 
the Department following a meeting between Deputy 
Secretary Armitage and Minister Moragoda, Ambassador 
 
SIPDIS 
said it was necessary to clarify responsibilities so 
that the peace process could resume. 
 
3.  (C) President asked that Ambassador convey her 
thanks to the Secretary for his letter and to wish him a 
speedy recovery.  She said that she had gone as far as 
she could go in trying to compromise with the PM. 
First, she said, she offered him a Government of 
National Unity, which he turned down.  Then, she offered 
to make him Minister of National Security and to turn 
over to him (to "gazette" to him, in Sri Lankan 
parlance) all portions of the Defense portfolio relating 
to the peace process.  "I made that offer against my 
better judgment," she said, "and against the advice of 
my legal advisers."  The PM had told her he could not 
conduct the peace negotiations under those conditions, 
but she did not see why.  She had done it when she was 
Prime Minister and a UNP President held the Defense 
Ministry. 
 
4.  (C) In the meantime, she said, the LTTE had 
contacted her several times to tell her that they were 
willing to negotiate with her.  She had not risen to 
that bait, she said, as she saw it as an attempt to 
divide the government side. 
 
5.  (C) Ambassador said that the PM had told him that he 
was willing to compromise with her, and that he was not 
insisting that she have "only the brass plate," i.e., 
keep the title of Defense Minister but without any 
responsibilities.  Ambassador said he believed the two 
sides had come a long way, perhaps 80 percent of the 
distance towards an agreement--it was that last 20 
percent which was holding them back.  The President said 
that she could not just accept a "supervisory" role on 
Defense without any real responsibilities.  She said 
again that she was trying hard, but that "legally and 
politically," it was hard for her to go further. 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador then recalled that at the beginning 
of the conversation, he had mentioned the bold steps she 
had taken to deal with the threat of religious strife. 
He also noted that the SAARC summit, which she was about 
to attend, held great promise because of the bold steps 
taken by Indian and Pakistani leaders.  Similar bold 
steps, he said, were needed here to solve the political 
crisis.  The President then said that "I might have a 
few new ideas" to present to the other side." 
Ambassador encouraged her to do so, and the meeting 
ended. 
 
INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER DISTURBED 
---------------------------------- 
7.  (C) Ambassador also spoke Jan 2 to Indian High 
Commissioner Sen, who has been working this issue 
actively with the PM and the President.  Without any 
prompting, Sen said, "The technical means of squaring 
the circle are available.  The problem is that Ranil 
does not want just that much - he wants everything.  She 
(the President) is willing to compromise, the problem 
now is his objection to accepting any piecemeal 
solution."  Sen explained that he thought the President 
was now looking for a way out in offering to delegate a 
number of Defense matters to the PM, but that the PM was 
trying to get everything.  Sen said that he thought 
Indian External Affairs Minister Sinha and Prime 
Minister Vajpayee might raise the issue with the 
President at the SAARC summit. 
 
UNP HARDLINER LOOKING FOR CONFRONTATION 
--------------------------------------- 
8.  (C) Ambassador also had a short telephone 
conversation Jan 2 with Trade Minister, and UNP hard- 
liner, Ravi Karunanayake.  Ravi said that the government 
would take "harder steps in 2004."  We were giving 
things away to the President in 2003, he said.  "I have 
told the PM we should call her bluff and challenge her," 
he said.  The Ambassador said that he hoped there would 
be a resolution of the problem without going to 
elections. 
 
LETTERS GO PUBLIC 
----------------- 
9.  (C) Ambassador told both PM and President that we 
did not intend to release the letters, but that they 
could do so if they wanted to.  It is not clear if the 
actual texts of the letters were given out, but the 
existence of the letters and the Ambassador's delivery 
of them were front page news in all papers over the 
weekend and elicited reams of commentary.  Details of 
commentary are contained in Septels. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
10.  (C) We believe that there is still an opportunity 
for a solution, but that if there is to be one, it will 
have to involve some real division of responsibilities 
on Defense.  From our last conversation with the PM, it 
is not clear if he is willing to go there.  He wants to 
let the President keep the title ("the brass nameplate") 
as well as a general supervisory role.  The President 
was remarkably candid on one fact -- she feels that 
politically she cannot accept such a deal, that this 
would be akin to asking her to sign her own political 
death warrant.  If the PM is willing to give her 
something, he may get a deal.  If he follows the advice 
of hardliners like Ravi K. and insists on the entire 
package for himself, the result will almost certainly be 
continued deadlock and eventually elections -- which 
will solve nothing and probably exacerbate the situation 
by resulting in a strengthened JVP and pro-LTTE Tamil 
National Alliance.  END COMMENT. 
 
11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD