US embassy cable - 04ANKARA5

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPTION 1.6 X5, X6 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH LNO AT CENTCOM: GOT WANTS USG TO NEGOTIATE 
WITH QATARIS 
 
 
(U)  Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch.  Reason 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
 
1. (U) This is an action request.  See paras 4 and 5. 
 
 
2. (C) On December 24, MFA Deputy DirGen for the Americas 
Suna Ilicak raised with polmilcouns Turkey's need for a SOFA 
with Qatar to place a liaison officer (LNO) at the CENTCOM 
forward headquarters there.  (Note:  Turkey is withdrawing 
its general officer from Tampa but will leave a colonel in 
charge of the small LNO office there.  In early December, 
VCJCS General Pace and Turkish General Staff (TGS) Deputy 
Chief General Basbug agreed that a general officer serving as 
LNO in Qatar would be useful.)  Ilicak recalled Turkey's 
failed attempt to negotiate a SOFA with Qatar during the 
early days of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.  At 
that time, the Qataris were "rigid" and unwilling to 
negotiate reasonably.  The sample SOFA that the Qataris 
provided CENTCOM for third countries to sign in order to 
station LNOs in Doha (which we had earlier provided to MFA 
and TGS) "was not a real SOFA," she said.  (Comment:  She was 
referring to the document's requirement that foreign military 
personnel abide by Qatari law and submit to Qatari courts.) 
Given its past experience and that the sample document was 
not an acceptable basis for negotiation, Turkey was not 
inclined to approach the Qataris to establish a SOFA again. 
Instead, "if the US finds a Turkish LNO in Doha useful," the 
USG should get for Turkey the same arrangements that it has 
for its own personnel, she said.  In response to questions, 
Ilicak confirmed that the GOT had not seen our agreement with 
Qatar, but was confident that if the USG could accept it, it 
would be acceptable to TGS. 
 
 
3. (C) Polmilcouns observed that LNOs were useful to both the 
sending and receiving sides and asked whether TGS and the GOT 
saw it as in their own interests to have an LNO in Doha. 
Ilicak explained that Turkey wants an LNO there, but TGS 
informed MFA that "it is not of critical importance to us." 
Polmilcouns noted that this SOFA would be a bilateral 
document between Turkey and Qatar; while the US would help as 
it could, it was appropriate for Turkey to take the lead. 
Ilicak responded that senior MFA officials had decided not to 
repeat the frustrating experience they had last time and 
reiterated her request that the US get the Qataris to agree 
to a similar arrangement as that governing the US military 
presence. 
 
 
4. (C) Action request: We believe it is unreasonable for us 
to do more for Turkey than we have done for other allies 
regarding SOFA arrangements in Qatar.  If we have not made 
arrangements for other countries, we should not for Turkey. 
If we have, then we should.  Embassy requests guidance on 
this point. 
 
 
5. (C) If we are not prepared to take the lead with the 
Qatari, then we should consider elevating the Turks access to 
CJTF-7 in Baghdad to the equivalent of a coalition member. 
Turkey already has troops on the ground in Afghanistan and 
coalition participant-level access to CENTCOM for OEF, but 
because we could not accept Turkey's stabilization force 
troop offer in October, it is not a participant in OIF. 
According the Turkish liaison officers in Baghdad greater 
access to CJTF-7 might help allay some Turkish suspicions 
about our complicity with Kurdish ambitions for autonomy (or 
more) in the north and reassure Ankara that we are not 
playing favorites among ethnic groups in Iraq. 
EDELMAN