US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO2200

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  12/31/13 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, CE, NO, JA, EU, IN, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  AMBASSADOR DELIVERS SECRETARY'S LETTER TO PRIME 
MINISTER 
 
REF:  STATE 348253 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Ambassador delivered letter from the 
Secretary to the Prime Minister on Dec 31. PM was 
 
SIPDIS 
appreciative of the statement issued by the Department 
following Moragoda meeting with the Deputy Secretary. 
Ambassador told the PM that a similar letter would be 
delivered to the President on Friday Jan 2. Prime Minister 
was appreciative and understood that real target of the 
letters was President Kumaratunga.  PM said the President 
needed to decide whether she wanted to ally with the JVP 
and go for elections or seek an accommodation with the 
UNP.  PM said he was willing to give her a face-saving way 
out if she decided to work with him.  PM thought Indian 
idea of regional commands was probably not workable. 
President's office is upset about spin some press is 
putting on the Department statement.  END SUMMARY 
 
Secretary's Letter Delivered 
 
SIPDIS 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Ambassador called on Prime Minister 
Wickremasinghe on Dec 31 to deliver letter from Secretary 
Powell (reftel).  The Department statement following the 
meeting between Milinda Moragoda and the Deputy Secretary 
had been front-page news in the Sri Lankan press that 
morning, and PM expressed his appreciation for the 
statement.  He saw that it was clearly directed at 
President Kumaratunga. After reading the Secretary's 
letter, the PM said that it was fine.  Ambassador said 
that a similar but not identical letter was going to the 
President.  The PM understood, he believed, that we felt 
we needed to send letters to both of them, since the 
letters called for them both to work to solve the crisis, 
but that it was really the President we were pointing at. 
PM smiled and said he understood completely. 
 
3.  (C) Ambassador asked if any progress was being made on 
an agreement with the President. PM said that the 
President did not seem to know what she wanted to do: did 
she want an alliance with the Sinhalese-chauvinist JVP 
party and an election, or did she want to make a deal on 
the three Ministries with him and his UNP party and get on 
with the peace process?  She simply needed to make up her 
mind.  PM said that if she decided to work with him, he 
could find a way for her to save face.  She could keep the 
Defense Minister title, and he would take over operational 
control of the military as Minister of National Security, 
even though he would rather have someone else take over 
that job.  She could have input into overall defense 
matters and the peace process through a National Security 
Council.  Ambassador said that he had told the President 
several times that this was a political problem, not a 
legal one, and needed a political solution.  PM said this 
was exactly the right tack. 
 
Indian Suggestions 
------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Ambassador asked if there was any hope in the idea 
reportedly being floated by Indian High Commissioner Sen 
of the creation of a regional command or commands which 
would come under the Prime Minister. PM said he did not 
think this would go anywhere, and even if he liked it, he 
did not think the Service Chiefs would accept it. 
 
Making Letter Public 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The PM asked if we intended to make the letters to 
him and the President public, and Ambassador said we did 
not.  PM asked if he could make the letter to him public, 
and Ambassador replied that since he was the recipient, 
that was his decision.  Ambassador suggested, however, 
that if the PM were to do so, he wait until after the 
Ambassador had delivered the similar letter to the 
President on Friday Jan 2.  The PM agreed and said he 
would probably release the letter on Monday. 
 
President's Office Calls 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) President's media adviser Harim Peiris called 
Ambassador first thing Wednesday morning after stories 
about Department statement had appeared in the morning 
newspapers. (Two of the three major English dailies 
carried the statement essentially without comment.  One 
daily which is close to the PM, however, carried an AFP 
story which stated that "the State Department implicitly 
criticised President Kumaratunga who triggered the crisis 
during a visit to Washington last month by Prime Minister 
Wickremasinghe.")  Peiris said that the statement seemed 
fine to the President and to him, but they were upset by 
the AFP story.  Peiris wondered if we could issue a 
correction to AFP. Ambassador replied that we were not in 
the habit of commenting on interpretations by news 
agencies, and that if anyone asked us, we would tell them 
to read the statement, which spoke for itself. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (C) The PM seemed relaxed, buoyed up by our 
reassurances that we understood clearly where the fault 
for the current crisis lay.  His stated willingness to 
help the President save face is welcome, but he did not 
seem to have any new ideas on how to move forward.  From 
the Presidential side, we are sure that the President 
knows full well whom the Department statement is directed 
toward.  As noted above, Ambassador will see her and 
deliver the Secretary's letter on Friday Jan 2.  He 
expects to hear from her at that time her current line 
that there is no political crisis and that the peace talks 
have been suspended anyway since April, long before the 
current dispute.  The answer to that, of course, is that 
the talks were set to resume under Norwegian facilitation 
in December -- until her takeover of the Ministries 
stopped things in their tracks.  Ambassador will emphasize 
to her, as the Department statement said, the need for a 
political resolution which will bring about a 
clarification of responsibilities so that the peace 
negotiations can resume. 
 
LUNSTEAD