Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 03THEHAGUE3175 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03THEHAGUE3175 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy The Hague |
| Created: | 2003-12-24 10:07:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PARM PREL CWC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 003175 SIPDIS STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR CHUPA WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2013 TAGS: PARM, PREL, CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 24 REF: THE HAGUE 2944 (NOTAL) Classified By: Pete Ito, U.S. Delegation to the OPCW. Reasons: 1.5 (B, D) This is CWC-138-03. --------------------------------------------- ------ TOUR D'HORIZON WITH CHINESE AND KOREAN COUNTERPARTS --------------------------------------------- ------ 1. (U) Deloffs exchanged views with Chinese counterparts Yu Dunhai and Dai Huaicheng on OPCW activities, nonproliferation issues, and CW destruction over lunch on December 23. Separate conversations with Korean First Secretary Lee Sang Soo and others covered much of the same ground. 2. (U) The Chinese said they share the Western Group's desire to increase the efficiency of Executive Council activities. Yu voiced support for reducing the number of EC sessions, working the agenda in advance to decide which issues are ripe for decision, and considering ways to encourage consensus-building -- such as pressuring States Parties to explain their objections clearly and early when they do not join consensus, to allow those objections to be addressed and overcome. We agreed that there was widespread support for those ideas, but pointed out that ECs were useful not only for the decisions and recommendations they produced, but also for prompting the Secretariat and States Parties to focus attention on the OPCW agenda and maintain momentum that might otherwise be lost. Deloffs also summarized for the Chinese some of the other proposals that had emerged from the WEOG's discussions with Secretariat officials (see paras 9-12). 3. (U) Yu, a member of the Advisory Board on Administrative and Financial issues (ABAF), voiced support for expansion of the Working Capital Fund to improve cash flow problems associated with Article IV and V inspections. He commented that in informal consultations on the subject some delegations had called for stronger incentives for possessor states to make timely repayment for Article IV and V inspection expenses. We assured Yu that the USG also wanted to find a structural solution to Article IV/V payments and was studying the ABAF proposal, but wanted to ensure that a higher cap on the WCF was justified and that this solution would not violate the principle that surplus funds should be returned to States Parties. The ROK's Lee, another ABAF participant, also expressed support for the WCF proposal. 4. (U) Asked for views on how best to move forward on Article XI, Yu said the U.S. should work with Iran to address its determination to introduce an International Cooperation Committee and to circumvent the AG process, but agreed that these issues should not be allowed to block progress on the broader goals of Article XI. Noting that the facilitator might soon step down, Yu said that he and his Chinese colleagues were reluctant to serve as facilitators due to language difficulties, commenting that good facilitators often have mastery of the language (noting Matthews on Article VII as an example). 5. (U) On Universality, Lee told us that the ROK would consult with Japanese and Chinese counterparts about their views on Regional or Sub-Regional Points of Contact, but no meeting has yet been set up. So far, neither Beijing nor Seoul has responded to their delegations or the TS on serving as POC. From our soundings, it appears that both want to go slow on the DPRK but are interested in playing a helpful, but informal role in Southeast Asia. So far, only the Japanese seem likely to take on the formal role of POC. Meanwhile, on December 19, the TS notified SPs that an informal meeting on the Universality Action Plan will be held on January 13 (not January 8, as earlier proposed) to discuss activities the POCs may undertake. (The note was faxed to AC/CB.) --------------------------- LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, AND PSI --------------------------- 6. (C) Lee praised the U.S. role in obtaining Libya's commitment to rid itself of WMD. He has been instructed to seek further details from us and from OPCW about what is known of the Libyan CW program, and specifically any connection it may have with North Korea. He added that his Ministry has been briefed by AmEmbassy Seoul on the issue (State 345870) and was seeking further details. The Chinese, for their part, reiterated support for Libya's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 7. (C) Asked what approaches the PRC had made to North Korea on proliferation, Yu said that that China had raised accession to the CWC with the DPRK two years previously, but since the nuclear issue was again looming larger on the regional and bilateral agenda, the PRC did not consider it a propitious time to raise the CW issue. Asked whether the PRC supported the Proliferation Security Initiative, Dai confessed that the Chinese still had "some concerns" about PSI. We responded to specific questions about the countries involved and the nature of the initiative, drawing on standing guidance. The following day, we provided them with a non-paper (drawn from State 333924) and a subsequent Press Release from the Department on PSI developments. 8. (U) On nonproliferation and export controls, Dunhai explained that the PRC's recently-released nonproliferation paper was the result of years of work by a new generation of administrative staff at the Foreign Ministry, who were more "forward-leaning and progressive" than longer-serving members of the Chinese bureaucracy. Dai acknowledged that although export controls had been administratively put in place, End-User Certificates and border and port verifications were proving difficult to implement. He insisted that China is committed to staying in step with Australia Group (AG) material and technology transfer controls. -------------------------- MORE EFFICIENT EC MEETINGS -------------------------- 9. (U) On Dec. 16, Director for Policy Making Organs Sylwin Gizowski hosted a gathering of some 15 delegations to discuss improvements to the work of the Executive Council, a topic he had addressed earlier with the WEOG (REF). Gizowski emphasized that he wanted input on broader issues regarding how the EC should organize its work for the year, as well as concrete measures to improve efficiency at EC sessions. On the latter issue, Gizowski readily admitted that the work of the Technical Secretariat in providing documents in a timely manner was not acceptable, and pledged that it would work to do better. 10. (U) With regard to broader ideas, the Swiss delegate said there should be consideration of whether more EC meetings necessarily would lead to more efficiency or productivity. The U.S. Del representative emphasized that EC sessions were key events that drove decisions. However, there was general agreement on the need to better structure work for EC meetings. For instance, there seemed to be general agreement that it would be beneficial to have the EC (at the beginning of the year or the beginning of an EC Presidency) lay out the specific issues that would be targeted for decision at specific EC sessions. While the German delegate questioned whether such deadlines would be realistic, the consensus seemed to be that it would focus attention and energy. Even if the deadlines slipped due to a lack of consensus, at least the effort would have been optimized. The current process of simply rolling all unresolved topics over to the next EC only ensured that there was no prioritization of work. 11. (U) In an interesting exchange, the U.S. and Russian delegation members acknowledged that it would be beneficial to coordinate closely with the Chairman to avoid the time-consuming ritual of publicly deferring items for later in the EC session on which there was disagreement. Gizowski and others noted that this would certainly be a good idea and would be appreciated by other delegations. He added, however, that delegates had told him that the discussion at EC-35 on U.S. (Aberdeen) and Russian facilities was one of the most interesting and useful exchanges at recent EC sessions. Gizowski and others thought that selection of appropriate topics for such full briefing and discussion might be worthwhile for future EC sessions. 12. (U) Finally, there was also discussion, but no clear consensus, on the idea of changing the term of the EC Chairmanship so that it is in sync with the Conference Chairmanship. Gizowski concluded by commenting that the effort to make EC sessions more productive would remain a continuing work in progress, and said the TS would welcome comments and suggestions from delegations on measures to improve efficiency. 13. (U) Ito sends. RUSSEL
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04