US embassy cable - 03THEHAGUE3175

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 24

Identifier: 03THEHAGUE3175
Wikileaks: View 03THEHAGUE3175 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2003-12-24 10:07:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PARM PREL CWC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 003175 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR CHUPA 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2013 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, CWC 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 24 
 
REF: THE HAGUE 2944 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Pete Ito, U.S. Delegation to the OPCW.  Reasons: 1.5 (B, 
 D) 
 
This is CWC-138-03. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
TOUR D'HORIZON WITH CHINESE AND KOREAN COUNTERPARTS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
1. (U) Deloffs exchanged views with Chinese counterparts Yu 
Dunhai and Dai Huaicheng on OPCW activities, nonproliferation 
issues, and CW destruction over lunch on December 23. 
Separate conversations with Korean First Secretary Lee Sang 
Soo and others covered much of the same ground. 
 
2. (U) The Chinese said they share the Western Group's desire 
to increase the efficiency of Executive Council activities. 
Yu voiced support for reducing the number of EC sessions, 
working the agenda in advance to decide which issues are ripe 
for decision, and considering ways to encourage 
consensus-building -- such as pressuring States Parties to 
explain their objections clearly and early when they do not 
join consensus, to allow those objections to be addressed and 
overcome.  We agreed that there was widespread support for 
those ideas, but pointed out that ECs were useful not only 
for the decisions and recommendations they produced, but also 
for prompting the Secretariat and States Parties to focus 
attention on the OPCW agenda and maintain momentum that might 
otherwise be lost.  Deloffs also summarized for the Chinese 
some of the other proposals that had emerged from the WEOG's 
discussions with Secretariat officials (see paras 9-12). 
 
3. (U) Yu, a member of the Advisory Board on Administrative 
and Financial issues (ABAF), voiced support for expansion of 
the Working Capital Fund to improve cash flow problems 
associated with Article IV and V inspections.  He commented 
that in informal consultations on the subject some 
delegations had called for stronger incentives for possessor 
states to make timely repayment for Article IV and V 
inspection expenses.  We assured Yu that the USG also wanted 
to find a structural solution to Article IV/V payments and 
was studying the ABAF proposal, but wanted to ensure that a 
higher cap on the WCF was justified and that this solution 
would not violate the principle that surplus funds should be 
returned to States Parties.  The ROK's Lee, another ABAF 
participant, also expressed support for the WCF proposal. 
 
4. (U) Asked for views on how best to move forward on Article 
XI, Yu said the U.S. should work with Iran to address its 
determination to introduce an International Cooperation 
Committee and to circumvent the AG process, but agreed that 
these issues should not be allowed to block progress on the 
broader goals of Article XI.  Noting that the facilitator 
might soon step down, Yu said that he and his Chinese 
colleagues were reluctant to serve as facilitators due to 
language difficulties, commenting that good facilitators 
often have mastery of the language (noting Matthews on 
Article VII as an example). 
 
5. (U) On Universality, Lee told us that the ROK would 
consult with Japanese and Chinese counterparts about their 
views on Regional or Sub-Regional Points of Contact, but no 
meeting has yet been set up.  So far, neither Beijing nor 
Seoul has responded to their delegations or the TS on serving 
as POC.  From our soundings, it appears that both want to go 
slow on the DPRK but are interested in playing a helpful, but 
informal role in Southeast Asia.  So far, only the Japanese 
seem likely to take on the formal role of POC.  Meanwhile, on 
December 19, the TS notified SPs that an informal meeting on 
the Universality Action Plan will be held on January 13 (not 
January 8, as earlier proposed) to discuss activities the 
POCs may undertake.  (The note was faxed to AC/CB.) 
 
--------------------------- 
LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, AND PSI 
--------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Lee praised the U.S. role in obtaining Libya's 
commitment to rid itself of WMD.  He has been instructed to 
seek further details from us and from OPCW about what is 
known of the Libyan CW program, and specifically any 
connection it may have with North Korea.  He added that his 
Ministry has been briefed by AmEmbassy Seoul on the issue 
(State 345870) and was seeking further details.  The Chinese, 
for their part, reiterated support for Libya's accession to 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
 
7. (C) Asked what approaches the PRC had made to North Korea 
on proliferation, Yu said that that China had raised 
accession to the CWC with the DPRK two years previously, but 
since the nuclear issue was again looming larger on the 
regional and bilateral agenda, the PRC did not consider it a 
propitious time to raise the CW issue.  Asked whether the PRC 
supported the Proliferation Security Initiative, Dai 
confessed that the Chinese still had "some concerns" about 
PSI.  We responded to specific questions about the countries 
involved and the nature of the initiative, drawing on 
standing guidance.  The following day, we provided them with 
a non-paper (drawn from State 333924) and a subsequent Press 
Release from the Department on PSI developments. 
 
8. (U) On nonproliferation and export controls, Dunhai 
explained that the PRC's recently-released nonproliferation 
paper was the result of years of work by a new generation of 
administrative staff at the Foreign Ministry, who were more 
"forward-leaning and progressive" than longer-serving members 
of the Chinese bureaucracy.  Dai acknowledged that although 
export controls had been administratively put in place, 
End-User Certificates and border and port verifications were 
proving difficult to implement.  He insisted that China is 
committed to staying in step with Australia Group (AG) 
material and technology transfer controls. 
 
-------------------------- 
MORE EFFICIENT EC MEETINGS 
-------------------------- 
 
9.  (U) On Dec. 16, Director for Policy Making Organs Sylwin 
Gizowski hosted a gathering of some 15 delegations to discuss 
improvements to the work of the Executive Council, a topic he 
had addressed earlier with the WEOG (REF).  Gizowski 
emphasized that he wanted input on broader issues regarding 
how the EC should organize its work for the year, as well as 
concrete measures to improve efficiency at EC sessions.  On 
the latter issue, Gizowski readily admitted that the work of 
the Technical Secretariat in providing documents in a timely 
manner was not acceptable, and pledged that it would work to 
do better. 
 
10.  (U) With regard to broader ideas, the Swiss delegate 
said there should be consideration of whether more EC 
meetings necessarily would lead to more efficiency or 
productivity.  The U.S. Del representative emphasized that EC 
sessions were key events that drove decisions.  However, 
there was general agreement on the need to better structure 
work for EC meetings.  For instance, there seemed to be 
general agreement that it would be beneficial to have the EC 
(at the beginning of the year or the beginning of an EC 
Presidency) lay out the specific issues that would be 
targeted for decision at specific EC sessions.  While the 
German delegate questioned whether such deadlines would be 
realistic, the consensus seemed to be that it would focus 
attention and energy.  Even if the deadlines slipped due to a 
lack of consensus, at least the effort would have been 
optimized.  The current process of simply rolling all 
unresolved topics over to the next EC only ensured that there 
was no prioritization of work. 
 
11.  (U) In an interesting exchange, the U.S. and Russian 
delegation members acknowledged that it would be beneficial 
to coordinate closely with the Chairman to avoid the 
time-consuming ritual of publicly deferring items for later 
in the EC session on which there was disagreement.  Gizowski 
and others noted that this would certainly be a good idea and 
would be appreciated by other delegations.  He added, 
however, that delegates had told him that the discussion at 
EC-35 on U.S. (Aberdeen) and Russian facilities was one of 
the most interesting and useful exchanges at recent EC 
sessions.  Gizowski and others thought that selection of 
appropriate topics for such full briefing and discussion 
might be worthwhile for future EC sessions. 
 
12.  (U) Finally, there was also discussion, but no clear 
consensus, on the idea of changing the term of the EC 
Chairmanship so that it is in sync with the Conference 
Chairmanship.  Gizowski concluded by commenting that the 
effort to make EC sessions more productive would remain a 
continuing work in progress, and said the TS would welcome 
comments and suggestions from delegations on measures to 
improve efficiency. 
 
13.  (U) Ito sends. 
RUSSEL 

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