US embassy cable - 03AMMAN8450

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008450 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2013 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, ECON, IS, IZ, SY, JO 
SUBJECT: GOJ OFFICIALS ON ARAB ECONOMIC REFORM, PEACE 
PROCESS, IRAQ, AND RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND ISRAEL 
 
REF: AMMAN 08242 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W Gnehm for Reason 
1.5 (b), (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1. (C) NEA DAS Satterfield and Ambassador met 
separately December 19 with Planning Minister Awadallah 
and Foreign Minister Muasher.  Discussion covered the 
Aqaba "workshop," Abu Ala'a and the peace process, Iraq 
and Syria, Article 98 negotiations, and Jordan-Israel 
relations.  End Summary. 
 
AQABA "WORKSHOP" 
 
2.  (C) Planning Minister Bassam Awadallah briefed DAS 
Satterfield, Ambassador & EconCouns on the results of 
the just completed workshop in Aqaba organized by the 
Jordanians to discuss reform in the Arab world. 
Awadallah noted the difficulties in both organizing and 
in conducting the meeting, which was held under the 
umbrella of the "Arab Business Council."  In the end, 
despite the difficulties, there was agreement on a 
"working draft" and on the principle of a follow-on 
meeting.  He said King Abdullah was an engaged 
participant, attending lunch and dinner.  The "working 
draft" is to be discussed next on the margins of the 
January World Economic Forum in Davos.  The goal is for 
formal adoption and public release of a document at 
Davos, to begin a process favoring genuine reform. 
Awadallah offered to provide us with the text.  He said 
Rima Khalaf made an important contribution with her 
excellent presentation on socio-economic issues. 
 
3.  (C) The "working draft" addresses economic, 
governance, and political reform.  According to 
Awadallah, the Egyptians and Saudis were forthcoming on 
the economic agenda, but not on the 
political/governance side  hich he had to "push down 
their throats."  He acknowledged having softened some 
points to accommodate them to reach an agreement.  The 
Egyptian attendees, all close to Gamal Mubarak, did not 
have a reformist mindset, in Awadallah's estimation. 
He seemed to lament the absence of Mahmoud Mohieldin, a 
reformer reputedly close to Gamal and a key 
interlocutor on the workshop, who traveled instead to 
Morocco because of a prior commitment.  Although 
Foreign Minister Muasher thought his absence was both a 
surprise and a negative signal, Awadallah put forward a 
more benign spin, saying Mohieldin had always said his 
prior commitment in Morocco took precedence. 
 
4.  (C) Satterfield stressed that the Egyptians were 
key to the success of this initiative.  He suggested 
that the group think about ways to engage the G-8. 
Awadallah agreed, but said that the Saudis, who were 
also key, were reluctant partners.  Saudi suspicions 
about U.S. intentions vis-`-vis Saudi Arabia were a 
factor, with even such pro-Western figures and Aqaba 
participants as Abdullah Salih Kamel, Amer Dabbagh, 
Fahd Mubarak and Lubna Olayan all asserting that the 
U.S. had written off Saudi Arabia and decided to get 
its oil elsewhere.  If the U.S. is serious about reform 
in Saudi Arabia, Awadallah suggested working more 
closely with such people. 
 
5.  (C) Muasher commented on the reluctance of both the 
Egyptian and Gulf participants to make commitments; 
they kept stressing that they were only formulating a 
"working draft," and did not want any publicity for the 
workshop or the draft.  The Gulf Arabs demanded 
avoidance of such words as "democracy."  Muasher added 
that the "working draft" described the process as one 
that will result in principles of reform, and itself be 
a product of agreement by all in principle, points 
reached only after heated debate.  Muasher also said 
the Egyptians were insistent that there be no specific 
reference to a follow-on meeting in Egypt even though 
they understood such a meeting was possible. 
 
 
PEACE PROCESS 
 
6.  (C) Muasher was pessimistic about the opportunity 
for progress between Israelis and the Palestinians, and 
urged the U.S. to press Abu Ala'a to be more active; 
his passivity was not bringing results.  Muasher was 
convinced that Abu Ala'a:  a) would not act on 
security; and b) discounts American and Israeli 
seriousness of purpose, claiming the U.S. wants him to 
act on an article of faith.  Muasher said Abu Ala'a 
seeks a direct deal with Israel, in part because of 
Egyptian sugarcoating  ugarcoating which has misled 
Arafat into thinking the U.S. view of him is softening. 
Muasher characterized the current U.S. approach as one 
of encouraging "baby steps," but feared it would lead 
nowhere or even to further deterioration.  For example, 
Sharon was moving in the wrong direction; the "security 
fence" looked to be the death of the two-state 
solution; and the creation of new facts on the ground 
could make the President's timeline of 2005 obsolete. 
He called for stronger U.S. re-engagement; Jordan can 
help deliver the message, he said, but only the U.S. 
can make things happen. 
 
 
IRAQ 
 
7.  (C) Satterfield and Muasher discussed the need for 
more focused efforts to draw the Iraqi Sunni community 
into the governing process in Iraq.  Muasher offered to 
share a Jordanian document now in preparation and to 
contribute to the evolving U.S. strategy. 
 
 
SYRIA 
 
8.  (C) Muasher described King Abdullah's souring mood 
toward Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.  Despite the 
King's repeated efforts to develop strong personal 
bonds, including by traveling to Syria, Asad had failed 
to reciprocate.  During the recent up tic in hostile 
Jordanian-Syrian rhetoric (reftel), the King was not in 
an apologetic mood, although Muasher made several 
conciliatory statements.  Internally, Syria remained in 
the grip of the old guard, according to Muasher  n 
old guard that is not taking Washington's verbal 
warnings seriously, necessitating stronger action to 
induce change in behavior. 
 
ARTICLE 98 
 
9.  (C) Muasher reaffirmed that the Article 98 
negotiations involved existential issues for Jordan. 
He said Jordan will sign an agreement upon resolution 
of the two outstanding issues, and expected progress 
when the two sides resumed talks in New York early next 
month. 
 
 
JORDANIAN PRISONERS IN ISRAEL 
 
10.  (C) Muasher described the state of play on the 
release of Jordanian prisoners and the issue of the 
return of Jordan's Ambassador to Israel.  Although he 
maintained the two issues were not linked, Muasher 
seemed to contradict himself.  He indicated that Jordan 
could return an Ambassador before the physical release 
of the four prisoners it regards as of critical 
importance, but only after Israel agreed to their later 
release.  He also indicated that Israel had agreed on 
releasing 20-25 of the 30-35 names on the list, but 
that the Israeli security services, according to 
Foreign Minister Shalom, balked at releasing these four 
prisoners as a first step.  Muasher claimed that the 
release of the four had become a "national issue," 
making progress impossible without their release. 
(COMMENT:  Jordanian MFA press releases are largely 
responsible for drawing national attention to this 
issue.  End Comment.)  Muasher complained, as he has 
previously, that Hizballah, in its prisoner release 
talks with Israel, was getting better treatment than 
Jordan. 
 
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GNEHM