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| Identifier: | 03SANAA3008 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03SANAA3008 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Sanaa |
| Created: | 2003-12-23 11:00:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PGOV PHUM YM |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 003008 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2013 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, YM SUBJECT: UPDATE ON ROYG HR MINISTER'S INCIDENT AT FRANKFURT AIRPORT REF: SANAA 2890 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 1. (C) As part of Post's investigation into security procedures at Frankfurt Airport affecting official ROYG travelers, DCM met with United Airlines officials on December 18 to explore the incident. Background: When transferring to United Airlines in Frankfurt, the Minister of Human Rights was subject to stringent security checks without regard to her official status, and she chose to not travel to Washington rather than be subject to these checks (reftel). End Background. 2. (C) The DCM met with a United Airlines security official to gain more information about their security policies and practices. The official confirmed that United, along with other U.S.-flag carriers, is subject to TSA guidelines. According to the United official, TSA guidelines include the following: -- CTX screening of all baggage and random computer selection of some bags for physical search; -- Passenger screening at two levels, personal interview and computerized review. For both, travel from Yemen and/or Yemeni citizenship triggers additional scrutiny. This policy of profiling is not random and the United official said that connection (citizenship and/or point of origin/destination) to a Middle East country is a major criteria; -- The computer review selects individuals (including Amcits) traveling to/from the Middle East for additional screening without exception. The computer does not/not take note of whether a given Amcit traveler bears a diplomatic passport or not and the computer has no field for such information to be entered into the system. Likewise, no provision exists for non-American Government officials traveling on diplomatic passports on diplomatic visas (such as the ROYG Minister of Human Rights) to be identified. -- When the computer selects an individual, a security employee has no discretion to exempt the selected traveler. 3. (C) Pol/Econ Deputy met with Minister al-Suswa December 22 to inform her of the DCM's findings. She said she appreciated Post looking into the procedures and understood why they were in place security-wise. She added, however, that she already turned down an invitation from Northwestern University because she did not want to "be humiliated" by traveling on U.S.-flag airlines. She noted that it did not make sense for security officials to spend extensive time on official government travelers on diplomatic missions when there were "bad guys" to catch. 4. (C) Comment: Post confirms that these procedures apply to all travelers from certain countries. Embassy personnel have also received increased scrutiny, including extensive questioning and other search procedures. End Comment. HULL
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