US embassy cable - 03SANAA3008

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UPDATE ON ROYG HR MINISTER'S INCIDENT AT FRANKFURT AIRPORT

Identifier: 03SANAA3008
Wikileaks: View 03SANAA3008 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2003-12-23 11:00:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PHUM YM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 003008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, YM 
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON ROYG HR MINISTER'S INCIDENT AT FRANKFURT 
AIRPORT 
 
REF: SANAA 2890 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C)  As part of Post's investigation into security 
procedures at Frankfurt Airport affecting official ROYG 
travelers, DCM met with United Airlines officials on December 
18 to explore the incident.  Background:  When transferring 
to United Airlines in Frankfurt, the Minister of Human Rights 
was subject to stringent security checks without regard to 
her official status, and she chose to not travel to 
Washington rather than be subject to these checks (reftel). 
End Background. 
 
2.  (C)  The DCM met with a United Airlines security official 
to gain more information about their security policies and 
practices.  The official confirmed that United, along with 
other U.S.-flag carriers, is subject to TSA guidelines. 
According to the United official, TSA guidelines include the 
following: 
 
-- CTX screening of all baggage and random computer selection 
of some bags for physical search; 
 
--  Passenger screening at two levels, personal interview and 
computerized review.  For both, travel from Yemen and/or 
Yemeni citizenship triggers additional scrutiny.  This policy 
of profiling is not random and the United official said that 
connection (citizenship and/or point of origin/destination) 
to a Middle East country is a major criteria; 
 
--  The computer review selects individuals (including 
Amcits) traveling to/from the Middle East for additional 
screening without exception.  The computer does not/not take 
note of whether a given Amcit traveler bears a diplomatic 
passport or not and the computer has no field for such 
information to be entered into the system.  Likewise, no 
provision exists for non-American Government officials 
traveling on diplomatic passports on diplomatic visas (such 
as the ROYG Minister of Human Rights) to be identified. 
 
--  When the computer selects an individual, a security 
employee has no discretion to exempt the selected traveler. 
 
3.  (C)  Pol/Econ Deputy met with Minister al-Suswa December 
22 to inform her of the DCM's findings.  She said she 
appreciated Post looking into the procedures and understood 
why they were in place security-wise.  She added, however, 
that she already turned down an invitation from Northwestern 
University because she did not want to "be humiliated" by 
traveling on U.S.-flag airlines.  She noted that it did not 
make sense for security officials to spend extensive time on 
official government travelers on diplomatic missions when 
there were "bad guys" to catch. 
 
4.  (C)  Comment:  Post confirms that these procedures apply 
to all travelers from certain countries.  Embassy personnel 
have also received increased scrutiny, including extensive 
questioning and other search procedures.  End Comment. 
HULL 

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