US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU2500

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 002500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS AND SA/RA, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, NSC FOR 
MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2013 
TAGS: MARR, PARM, PGOV, NP 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: BRIEFING ON ROYAL NEPAL ARMY OPERATIONS FOR 
A/S ROCCA 
 
REF: A. USDAO KATHMANDU IIR 6 867 0028 03 
 
     B. USDAO KATHMANDU IIR 6 867 0029 03 
     C. KATHMANDU 2489 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) On December 17, Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary 
of State for South Asia, received a briefing from Major 
General K.B. Khadka, Director General of Military Operations 
of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA).  The briefing provided an 
overview of the RNA's strategy to combat the Maoist 
insurgency, including unified command structure, the 
formation of Civic Peace and Development Mobilization 
Committees, and plans for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR).  The briefing also touched upon human 
rights and U.S. military assistance.  End Summary. 
 
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Overview of RNA strategy 
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2. (C) The Royal Nepal Army (RNA) is deployed in three 
divisions across Nepal, plus a division in Kathmandu.  The 
RNA is now 72,321 persons strong, an expansion of roughly 40 
percent over the past three years when it employed just 
51,373 persons. The RNA's objectives are to deter and defeat 
the Maoist military capability; protect constitutional 
monarchy and multiparty democracy; create a secure 
environment for elections; and implement policies and 
measures for effective governance.  The RNA's strategy to 
fulfill these objectives include conducting "relentless 
operations" against the Maoists; negotiating with the Maoists 
only once their military capability is reduced considerably 
or if they agree to abide by the current constitution; 
enhancing the credibility of the monarchy; and seeking 
support and cooperation from the people.  In order to defeat 
the Maoists, the RNA has proposed several new concepts, 
including mobilization of security forces under the Unified 
Command Concept, the formation of Civic Peace & Mobilization 
Committees, and the re-integration of Maoists into civilian 
life through the Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) plan. 
 
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Unified Command Concept 
----------------------- 
 
3. (C) According to the RNA, the Unified Command structure is 
designed for the optimal use of Nepal's security forces 
without losing the individuality of each branch.  Under the 
structure, the army is given authority to coordinate and 
direct operations of the civil and armed police forces and 
the National Investigation Department (NID).  General Khadka 
cited the legal provisions that support unified command, 
specifically the Armed Police Force (APF) Act of 2002, which 
states that the APF falls under the RNA's operational control 
when the RNA is mobilized.  Similarly, a decision by King 
Gyanendra in November 2002 mandated that 10,000  civil police 
should be trained and mobilized under the RNA's operational 
control.  The Unified Command structure will remain effective 
for one year with the option to be renewed for six month 
periods.  The Unified Command receives direction from the 
National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister. 
(Note.  The National Security Council is comprised of two 
Ministry of Defense officials, and one senior representative 
from each of the four security branches: the RNA, APF, civil 
police and NID. End Note.) the At the regional and district 
levels, the security forces are overseen by the civil 
administrators, Khadka concluded. 
 
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Civic Peace & Development Mobilization Committees 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4. (C) General Khadka described the government's proposal to 
establish Civic Peace and Development Mobilization Committees 
as pilot projects in 3-4 communities and, if successful, 
could expand them across the country.  The government is 
responding to requests from local citizens who want to 
improve security in their villages, he said.  According to 
the proposal, the government will mobilize the villagers 
defend themselves against the Maoists to disrupt their 
activities with "whatever licensed weapons they have already" 
(mostly 12-bore rifles, according to COAS Thapa). (Note. 
Over the past several years, the government had seized most 
weapons held by local villagers.  It remains to be determined 
how the government plans to return the weapons to their 
original owners.  End Note.)  The Mobilization Committees 
will also receive logistic and training support from the 
army.  The RNA hopes to include retired members of the 
security forces in the organizational structure of the 
committees. 
 
5. (C) According to the organizational flow chart, the 
nearest security base will oversee the Mobilization 
Committee, which will have three sub-committees: a security 
sub-committee comprised of local civilians managing various 
security cells in the VDC area; an advisory sub-committee 
comprised of local security forces; and a coordination 
sub-committee comprised of members of both the security and 
advisory committees.  The flow chart shows that, under the 
national umbrella, local civilians will oversee the 
operations of the Mobilization Committee under the advice of 
the security forces.  According to the RNA, the role of the 
security forces will be to provide information, advice, 
training and reinforcements to the Mobilization Committee. 
 
6. (C) General Khadka explained that the government would 
like to downplay the defense aspect of this pilot program 
because of recent criticism in the press and from members of 
civil society that Nepal is becoming increasingly 
militarized.  He indicated that only three or four committees 
would be established as pilot projects.  If successful, these 
could be expanded nation-wide.  Chief of Army Staff Pyar Jung 
Thapa specified that the RNA is considering establishment of 
three committees: two in the eastern division and one in 
Lamjung District in the central division.  In all cases, he 
said, the local citizens want to participate actively in 
their own defense against the insurgents.  COAS Thapa noted 
that similar efforts in Thailand and Peru were successful. 
"We don't want to create right-wing militias, but the RNA 
cannot be everywhere at once," he concluded. (Note.  This 
briefing supports information received previously and 
reported Ref A.  End Note.) 
 
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Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) The objective of the Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) campaign is "to obtain peacefully weapons 
from armed Maoists and encourage them to live a peaceful 
life."  To attain this objective, the RNA's strategy is to 
provide monetary compensation to Maoists who surrender their 
weapons; ensure physical security and grant amnesty to those 
that surrender; and provide economic security and job 
opportunities.  The DDR program will be managed by a Central 
Directive Committee, which will oversee local screening 
committees and rehabilitation center administration 
committees.  The first rehabilitation center will be 
established in Tanahu District in central Nepal.  The 
government hopes to use both national and donor resources to 
manage the program.  Specifically, national resources will 
fund the weapon exchange program and provide for a local 
security base.  The government will seek funding from the 
international community to operate programs in the 
rehabilitation center, such as skill development training and 
income generation schemes.  (A similar briefing was provided 
earlier and reported Ref B.  Unclass details on DDR provided 
Ref C.) 
 
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Human Rights 
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8. (C) General Khadka noted that the RNA has established a 
human rights cell to investigate allegations of human rights 
abuse by soldiers.  Each of the three division headquarters 
has one officer responsible for disseminating information 
about human rights and investigating alleged abuses.  Those 
individuals found to have committed rights abuses have been 
reprimanded, he said.  (Note.  In the summary of 17 cases of 
alleged human rights abuses given to A/S Rocca, three of the 
cases are pending; five were determined not to be abuses; and 
in nine cases the soldier responsible was punished, two of 
which were for killings.  The punishments ranged from 
sentences of 7 years imprisonment to 4 months; in two cases, 
the court martial is ongoing, and in one case the punishment 
was unspecified.  End Note.)  Khadka claimed that RNA 
soldiers have committed no acts of torture, no rapes and no 
extra-judicial killings, although collateral damage may have 
occurred.  He also noted that ICRC has been invited to visit 
prisoners in the army camps.  Khadka complained that there is 
a "large hue and cry" when small RNA transgressions occur, 
but no outrage when the Maoists commit atrocities.  He 
expressed concern that the Nepali media and some in the 
international community have "turned a blind eye" to Maoist 
abuses. 
 
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USG Assistance 
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9. (C) Khadka expressed gratitude on behalf of the RNA for 
U.S. assistance in providing weapons, equipment and training. 
 He noted that the RNA hopes for further assistance through 
the FMF program in all three areas.  Specifically, the RNA 
needs helicopters to help improve its mobility in Nepal's 
rugged terrain, he said.  Surveillance training and equipment 
to track down Maoist political leaders, FM radio interception 
capability, support for DDR and rebuilding damaged 
infrastructures were also identified as funding needs. 
Khadka concluded his remarks by noting that a political 
solution is preferable to a military campaign.  "The ball is 
now in the Maoists' court," he said. 
 
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Comment 
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10. (C) The Government of Nepal, with the Royal Nepal Army, 
has initiated three programs to assist its counter-insurgency 
effort: the Unified Command structure, Civic Peace and 
Mobilization Committees, and DDR.  Through these programs, 
the government aims to improve coordination within the 
security forces, establish defensive postures through 
mobilization committees in areas where the RNA does not have 
a permanent presence, and encourage Maoists to leave the 
insurgency and reintegrate into society.  It is too early, 
however, to conclude whether these programs will be 
successful.  Khadka's complaint that the RNA has come under 
increasing attack recently from the press and local and 
international human rights groups for alleged abuses is 
accurate.  Whether the negative publicity is the result, as 
the RNA claims, of a Maoist-fueled campaign to discredit the 
army, or is a worrisome trend in the RNA's ability to uphold 
human rights standards, remains to be seen.  Five allegations 
of extra-judicial killings have arisen.  The RNA has 
indicated it intends to investigate them.  Post will examine 
these allegations and report septel.  End Comment. 
 
 
MALINOWSKI