US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU2491

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 002491 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PREL, NP, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  SA A/S ROCCA'S MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL 
PARTY LEADERS 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 2298 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) In separate meetings with leaders of four political 
parties on December 18, Assistant Secretary for South Asian 
Affairs Christina Rocca, accompanied by Ambassador 
Malinowski, urged the need for reconciliation between the 
King and estranged political parties.  With the exception of 
the Nepali Congress, each of the party leaders agreed that a 
rapprochement remains possible--with the head of the royalist 
National Democratic Party appearing the most optimistic--but 
that the King must take the initiative.  Each contended that 
security has deteriorated since the King dismissed the last 
elected Prime Minister in October 2002, and expressed concern 
at reports of increased violence and human rights violations. 
 No one committed to participating in the local and general 
elections announced by the Prime Minister last June. 
According to the leader of the Communist Party of Nepal - 
United Marxist Leninist (UML), the Maoists believe that they 
have the synpathy of most of the international 
community--minus the Americans.  End summary. 
 
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KING MUST MAKE THE FIRST MOVE 
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2.  (C) In a series of separate meetings with leaders of four 
political parties on December 18, Assistant Secretary for 
South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca pressed the need for 
reconciliation and greater understanding between the parties 
and the King.  All of the party representatives agreed on the 
importance of greater political unity against the Maoists, 
but each indicated that the initiative must come from the 
King himself.  Accompanied by the Ambassador and Pol/Econ 
Chief, A/S Rocca met with Nepali Congress (Democratic) 
President and former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba; 
Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (UML) 
General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal (who returned early from 
a trip to Bangkok in order to meet A/S Rocca); National 
Democratic Party (also known by its Nepali acronym RPP) 
Chairman Pashupati SJB Rana; and Nepali Congress (NC) General 
Secretary Sushil Koirala.  Koirala was accompanied by Nepali 
 
SIPDIS 
Congress Central Committee member and former Finance Minister 
Dr. Ram Sharan Mahat.  The pair were representing NC 
President and former Prime Minister G.P. Koirala, who was out 
of town. 
 
3.  (C)  With all interlocutors, A/S Rocca underscored USG 
concern at the precarious condition of democracy in Nepal. 
Without political rapprochment between the parties and the 
Palace, a political settlement with the Maoists is unlikely, 
she cautioned.  The present stalemate has grave implications 
for stability, democracy, and prospects for peace, she said. 
The USG, as a friendly nation with Nepal's best interests at 
heart, wants to encourage the parties and Palace to unite in 
consensus against the Maoist threat. 
 
4.  (C)  Nepali Congress (Democratic) President Deuba told 
A/S Rocca that he believes that the political parties are 
willing to reconcile with the King, but are awaiting an 
initial gesture from the Palace.  He proposed giving the King 
three options: either establish an all-party government; 
reinstate the former Parliament; or reinstate Deuba as Prime 
Minister.  In order to approach the King, however, the 
parties must be able to "read his mind," Deuba concluded 
glumly.  When asked for his views of the elections announced 
by Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa, Deuba replied that he 
would neither oppose or support the polls.  While blasting 
the King as "anti-democratic," UML General Secretary Nepal 
indicated some scope for greater understanding between his 
party and the Palace. 
 
5.  (C)  RPP Chairman Rana said that his party had decided to 
call for PM (and RPP member) Thapa's resignation because it 
disagreed with his "focus on a military solution" to the 
insurgency and because he had not consulted with the party 
before announcing elections.  The party's move has been a 
"catalyst" to move the King to consider replacing Thapa, Rana 
claimed, noting that the monarch, beginning with "some 
political heavyweights from the past" (the partyless 
Panchayat regime), has already started meeting political 
leaders.  The King will likely begin meeting mainstream party 
leaders by the following week, Rana suggested.  (Note: 
Representatives of each of the other three parties said that 
they had not been in direct contact with the King since June. 
 End note.)  The leaders of the three largest political 
parties, however, have to realize that they must make 
compromises in the interests of reconciliation, Rana noted, 
including curbing their own individual desires to be 
appointed Prime Minister in Thapa's stead.  Nepali Congress 
representatives Koirala and Mahat appeared the most 
inflexible, charging that the King "doesn't seem interested 
in reconciliation" and declaring that in the absence of 
evidence of a "voluntary initiative" from the King, "we must 
take to the streets."  Noting that none of the current 
Cabinet had succeeded in winning a seat in the last 
Parliamentary elections, Koirala and Mahat charged that any 
elections held under the current government would surely be 
rigged.  Mahat urged the USG to consider withholding some 
assistance to the GON to increase pressure on the King to 
restore democracy. 
 
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SECURITY SITUATION GRIMMER 
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6.  (C) All interlocutors agreed that the security situation 
had deteriorated since the King dismissed then-Prime Minister 
Deuba in October 2002.  Deuba contrasted his own record 
during the 13 months of his tenure--passing important 
legislation to control corruption, to expand women's 
inheritance rights, and to set up commissions to promote the 
rights of women and members of the lower castes--with the 
lackluster records of the two governments of PMs Chand and 
Thapa, whom the King had appointed with a specific mandate to 
hold elections and restore stability.  During his time as PM, 
the Maoists were active in only 30 districts, Deuba charged; 
since his dismissal their influence has spread to all 75. 
When he traveled as PM to the EU to seek support against the 
Maoists, he gained it, he declared; now, citing human rights 
concerns and the suspension of democracy, the EU has grown 
more critical of the government.  UML General Secretary Nepal 
described the human rights situation as "alarming," asserting 
that the Army's heavy-handedness will only succeed in driving 
more people away from the government.  There is no evidence 
to support Royal Nepal Army (RNA) leadership claims it has 
weakened the Maoists, Nepal averred.  Instead, the Maoists' 
ever-expanding presence in the countryside has limited the 
RNA to patrolling only in and around district headquarters. 
The Maoists, on the other hand, feel bolder.  Citing his 
November 20 discussion in Lucknow with Maoist leader 
Prachanda (Reftel), Nepal said that the Maoists believe they 
are winning, and can continue to fight the Government of 
Nepal (GON) for a hundred years.  Rana noted that the Maoists 
control more territory than ever before and commented with 
dismay on a "much more generalized human rights problem." 
The Maoists and the King share the same anti-democratic 
views, Mahat and Koirala of the Nepali Congress charged, and 
are thus "complementing each other."  Mahat claimed that the 
number of armed Maoists rose from 15,000 to 50,000 during the 
negotiations held after the King dismissed Deuba.  (Note: 
While we question both the accuracy and source of these 
statistics, the Maoists clearly used the ceasefire to build 
up their strength.  End note.) 
 
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MADHAV MEETS THE MAOISTS 
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7.  (C)  Reporting on his November 20 meeting with Maoist 
leaders in Lucknow (Reftel), UML General Secretary Nepal 
described the insurgents as confident of ultimate victory. 
(The Maoists did not appear at all concerned for their own 
safety and security in India, Nepal noted with a chuckle.) 
While the insurgents believe they cannot be defeated by the 
RNA, they also recognize that they cannot sustain control 
over the whole country--primarily because of "adverse 
reaction" from the international community, Nepal reported. 
Describing "the EU and Scandinavian countries" as 
"sympathetic" to the Maoist cause and discounting India and 
China as "not a problem," Maoist leader Prachanda reportedly 
asked Nepal why the U.S. alone remains "unconvinced."  Nepal 
said he responded by citing the insurgents' violent behavior 
as the main reason behind U.S. antipathy.  Prachanda 
reportedly dismissed the violent excesses reported in the 
local press as aberrations from officially sanctioned Maoist 
policy.  Nepal said he told the insurgents that if they lay 
down their arms and change their ideological demand for a 
one-party state--and if the King continues to refuse to 
compromise with the parties--the Maosits might win support 
from other democratic political parties.  He was unable, 
however, to convince the Maoists of the need to renounce 
violence.  The insurgent leaders did not utter any threats 
against U.S. citizens or interests during the meeting, Nepal 
reported. 
 
8.  (C)  The other three political leaders were unanimously 
critical of Nepal for meeting the Maoists after the GON had 
designated them as terrorists.  Noting that the Indian 
government has been embarrassed by the publicity surrounding 
Nepal's meeting, Rana speculated that by allowing the meeting 
to take place, the GOI was "trying to pass the message (to 
the King) that its preference for democracy cannot be 
ignored."  Although the Indians had been "playing the Maoists 
like a card" against the GON, India's comfortable relations 
with the Maoists may be coming to a "different juncture" now 
that the insurgents have increased their activities along the 
Indian border.  "India's ability to use the Maoists will be 
limited by (its) own security concerns," he concluded. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9.  (C)  All of our interlocutors seemed genuinely dismayed 
at the current state of affairs, and all hopeful of some kind 
of resolution.  The political parties seem willing to accept 
a compromise with the King, but are awaiting the first 
overture from the Palace.  The King's plan to begin 
contacting the political leaders (septel) may offer a start. 
For this initiative to succeed, however, both sides must be 
prepared to compromise more than is customary or comfortable 
for either.  We will continue to urge that the best interests 
of the nation require both the Palace and the parties to do 
just that. 
 
10.  (U) A/S Rocca has cleared this message. 
 
MALINOWSKI