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| Identifier: | 03ZAGREB2666 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ZAGREB2666 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Zagreb |
| Created: | 2003-12-22 12:00:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | ECON EFIN PGOV HR Trade |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 002666 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2013 TAGS: ECON, EFIN, PGOV, HR, Trade SUBJECT: IMF CONCERNED THAT DEFICITS WILL RISE UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT REF: ZAGREB 2446 Classified By: ECONOMIC OFFICER ISABELLA DETWILER: REASON 1.5 (B AND D) Summary ------- 1. (C) The incoming government is playing its economic game close to its chest. A visiting IMF team that met informally with the HDZ's economic players came away without much new information. The HDZ's campaign promises, much like the campaign promises of the other parties, were expensive. Perhaps more worrying, because they were in writing, were the concessions the HDZ made to the Pensioners Party (HSU) in order to secure its three votes in the next Parliament. If implemented in anything like their current form, concessions would severely boost the budget deficit and upset the delicate balance the last government reached on pensions. 2. (C) In what was not a big surprise given the timing of the team's visit -- right after parliamentary elections -- the IMF was not able to complete the third review of the Stand-by Arrangement. It was in no position to judge Croatia's economic plans for the next 12 months -- primarily because the plans do not really exist yet. The IMF, the outgoing government, and Central Bank were able to complete an informal, backward-looking review, which found the situation generally satisfactory, but with some lingering areas of concern. End Summary. Expensive Promises ------------------ 3. (C) The two areas of the HDZ's economic policies that have attracted the most attention appear to have come from two different camps within the HDZ. A cut of two percent in the VAT tax was urged by young academic (and former Central Bank employee) Ante Babic. Babic, who is rumored to be interested only in an advisory role in the new government, is said to believe that this tax cut would stimulate business, rather than translate into lower prices. However, a recent roundtable of business people reportedly scoffed at the idea, and worried about the fiscal effects. The VAT cut, estimated to cost about 1.2 percent of GDP, would be partially financed by increased compliance and enforcement of tax collections, optimistically estimated to provide additional revenue of 0.4 percent of GDP. Pensioners Strike Back? ----------------------- 4. (C) In an unpublished but well-reported memorandum signed by representatives of the HDZ and the HSU, it was agreed to increase the base level of pensions and adopt a more favorable methodology for indexation. Other goodies are rumored, but not confirmed. World Bank economists have estimated that if the additional costs were fully covered by additional payroll taxes (not likely), the contribution rate would rise from 20 percent to 35 percent. Even if the worst-case scenario does not materialize, any significant increase in payroll taxes would create additional disincentives to employment. The World Bank and others also worry that these changes will destroy what have been the significant accomplishments of the Racan government's three-pillar pension reform. One possible result is that the private sector second and third pillars would be "crowded out" by the bulking up of the first, pay-as-you-go, pillar. 5. (C) The IFIs have tried, in the absence of hard plans or data from the incoming government, to calculate the effect of these proposals on the fiscal deficit. The deficit, which was expected to be 4.5 percent of GDP in 2003 and drop to 3.8 percent next year, could increase to between 5.8 and 8 percent, depending on assumptions. The calculation that arrives at the lower (but still large) figure increases the deficit for the VAT reduction, promised wage increases, pension and maternity benefit increases, investments in the railroads (also promised by the SDP, to have been paid for by social transfer cuts), and decreases the deficit through the hoped-for better collection of taxes and a fairly generous credit for capital expenditure cuts to the tune of 0.7 percent of GDP. While many do not believe that the HDZ will be able to implement this full package, if a significant fraction of it is, the budget deficit could balloon. IFIs in Limbo ------------- 6. (C) The IMF team visiting Zagreb in December left after signing what was called a letter of intent. It looked more like a memorandum looking back over developments over the last few months. Several players in the process told us that it was not quite clear why the IMF was here. The GOC's principle interlocutor with the IMF reportedly opposed the team's coming, while the Central Bank said that, if the team came, it had to complete the review. As it is, the letter signed by the three parties concludes "...we believe that our program implementation during 2003 has been broadly satisfactory, and it is our sincere hope that the third review can be completed early next year." The IMF has tentative plans to come back in late February (the program lapses in early April), at which time the next government would have to be ready to present detailed plans and a budget. 7. (C) When the new IMF Mission Director for Croatia, Dimitri Demekas, met with us, he said he had told the HDZ leadership -- including Prime Minister-designate Sanader and top economic advisor (and incoming Finance Minister) Ivan Suker -- to take their time in deciding what form of cooperation they would like to have with the IMF. Demekas emphasized to us that he was not pushing another Standby Arrangement on the incoming government (a good thing, since the HDZ has publicly expressed its skepticism about such a program). The IMF would like to keep engaged, however, perhaps through intensive monitoring, and would like to keep an office in Zagreb. According to Demekas, the HDZ officials were polite and non-committal. 8. (C) The World Bank's Country Director also told the Ambassador that the World Bank would like to see a strong IMF presence in Croatia. He quipped that while they were flattered by HDZ statements that they wanted to "graduate" from IMF programs and that they would prefer to work more closely with the World Bank, the IMF and World Bank came together. We have received mixed information on whether an IMF program would be necessary for the next big World Bank program, and Programmatic Adjustment Loan. Racan Government takes a Bow ---------------------------- 9. (C) As reported reftel, the Racan government leaves office with higher than expected growth -- projected at 5 percent this year -- and lower than expected inflation. The accumulated government debt has stabilized at 51 percent of GDP, the fiscal deficit will come in better than programmed, at 4.5 percent of GDP, and even the current account deficit is better than feared, at 5.4 percent of GDP. The dark cloud, especially given the Standby Arrangement's focus on stabilizing overall debt, is the burgeoning foreign debt -- public and private -- which increased from 68.5 percent of GDP to an expected 74 percent in the past 12 months, spurred on also by booming consumer borrowing. The IMF remains unhappy with the Central Bank's monetary instruments, and the government and Central Bank point fingers at each other assigning blame. Comment ------- 10. (C) The new HDZ-led coalition will have its hands full on the economic front, and the fact that it will effectively be a minority government will make matters all the more tenuous. Because HDZ made a lot of generous promises during the election campaign to cut taxes -- and now must give away much to get small coalition partners on board -- it will be difficult for the new economic team to start preaching fiscal rectitude. But sooner or later it likely must, and at that time it may appreciate having the IMF, in some form, around to serve as the bogey man requiring it to do a course correction. FRANK NNNN
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