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| Identifier: | 03FRANKFURT10314 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03FRANKFURT10314 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Consulate Frankfurt |
| Created: | 2003-12-18 13:07:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | ECON EFIN EUN |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 FRANKFURT 010314 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR PDAS RIES, EB, EUR/AGS, AND EUR/ERA STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD STATE PASS NSC TREASURY FOR DAS SOBEL TREASURY ALSO FOR ICN COX, STUART PARIS ALSO FOR OECD TREASURY FOR OCC RUTLEDGE, MCMAHON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON, EFIN, EUN SUBJECT: ECB on the Stability and Growth Pact: Results or Call The Bluff T-IA-F-03-0065 This cable is sensitive but unclassified. Not/not for Internet distribution. 1. (SBU) Summary: The European Central Bank (ECB) was exceptionally, sternly and publicly critical of Ecofin's decision on Germany and France under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), but has been careful neither to trash the SGP nor the process. Rather, their message is that the SGP lives and that they expect Germany, France and Ecofin to live up to their commitments. In the case of the two countries, this means that deficits be under 3% in 2005 and, failing to do so, Ecofin take measures under the procedures previously recommended by the Commission. Putting a bit of monetary muscle into the mix, the ECB has listed "fiscal policies" as one of the various indicators it considers when assessing future inflation trends, although they are quick to point out this has always been so. A Council Secretariat expert points out that, in fact, by "suspending" the proceedings, Ecofin wanted to be clear that it reserved the possibility to re-open proceedings and still apply sanctions, even though the time limit for doing so is to expire at the end of the year. The question remains whether and on what evidence the Commission, the only entity that can recommend re-opening the proceedings, would do so. Once burned, twice shy. End Summary. ECB: Not Dead, but Alive ________________________ 2. (SBU) Senior ECB officials have explained that while the ECB was very upset with Ecofin's decision under the SGP on Germany and France, they don't want to give the impression that the SGP is dead or they want to change it. Rather, they want the commitments made in the Ecofin decision to be respected. 3. (SBU) In its December Monthly Bulletin, the ECB's editorial reported that the Governing Council took note of the commitments made by France and Germany to "correct their excessive deficits as rapidly as possible and at the latest by 2005." The Council also noted that the Ecofin Council "stands ready to give notice to the two governments to take measures that would lead to a correction of their excessive deficits." ECB President Trichet was more direct in his press conference after the Governing Council's December 4 meeting: the Governing Council "noted that the Ecofin Council stands ready to take a decision under Article 104(9), on the basis of the Commission recommendation, should the two government fail to act in accordance with their own commitments." He went on to declare that the SGP "remains of central importance and should be fully respected." Link to Monetary Policy? All Part of the Whole Ball of Wax _____________________________________________ ______________ 4. (SBU) At his December press conference Trichet also mentioned that the outlook for price stability is conditional on quite a number of assumptions. Among them he cited the usual, e.g. oil prices, exchange rates, and wage developments. He also mentioned "fiscal measures." This lead to a follow up question, on whether the discussion over the SGP will have a direct effect on ECB interest rate policy. Trichet replied that they take in all data to make such an assessment and they have a "working assumption" that the "commitments that were made by the countries concerned and the commitments that were made by the qualified majority of the Council would be met 100%." 5. (SBU)Some market commentators have speculated that the ECB Governing Council might use monetary policy to "punish" Finance Ministers for their decision. ECB officials are quick to point out that this is not the case. Rather, fiscal policies are included in the comprehensive array of data the ECB examines in determining potential inflationary pressures. (Note: The notion of such retribution is not as odd as it may sound; the halls of the Bundesbank still echo with the story of the then-Chancellor Schmidt flying to Frankfurt to plea for lower interest rates directly with the Bundesbank Council, only to have the Council raise rates after he left the room - as if to disabuse anyone that they were not truly independent.) Form and Substance: ECB Focuses on Substance _____________________________________________ 6. (SBU) At the press conference one journalist attempted to lure Trichet into a debate of the form of Ecofin's decision over its substantive meaning, e.g. implications for the euro. Trichet would not take the bait, musing that one cannot "separate the form, the procedure and the substance." However, the following week at the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, Trichet did seek to clarify the "economic underpinnings" as to why the SGP is "very important for the function of the single currency area." 7. (SBU) He explained that the SGP allows him to respond to two criticisms, "frequently voiced from the other side of the Atlantic." First, is the criticism about monetary policy conducted with "random behavior of fiscal policies" in the absence of an EU federal budget. Second, is the criticism that the absence of a federal budget does not allow Europe to cope with asymmetric shocks, when one country suffers a shock not felt by another. The SGP is the only means by which Europe can claim to deal with random fiscal policies and to admonish countries to have a close to balanced budget to provide room for maneuver to cope with shocks. 8. More generally, Trichet said that there is a limit beyond which increased deficits "hamper growth because you are creating more lack of confidence than .you can get from the simple neo-Keynesian effect." According to an ECB official close to Trichet, this is a very personal view, not one necessarily blessed by the Governing Council. Trichet had elaborated that point in his first major policy speech on November 20 in Frankfurt. He had said that governments following the SGP "will reduce public spending, which is conducive to growth through the alleviation of unproductive spending and reduction of costs in the economy." In his view, economic growth would be enhanced since lower deficits would diminish medium and long-term interest rates and improve households' and business confidence that taxes won't increase leading to higher consumption and investment. Ecofin Decision: Trigger Cocked, but Will Commission Pull It? _____________________________________________ ____________ 9. (SBU) According to an expert in the EU Council, the Council decision reflected the discretion afforded Ministers under the SGP, but was firmer than the press or the Commission made it out to be, in his opinion. He shared the ECB's view that Ecofin had put itself on the hook to take action: "The Council stands ready to take a decision under Article 104(9)" should France or Germany "fail to act in accordance with the commitments set out in these Conclusions." Note that Article 104(9) is the step requiring specific commitments to be fulfilled within a specific timeframe. Failing that, the next step would be sanctions under Article 104 (11). 10. (SBU) With respect to sanctions, this Council expert pointed out that Ecofin's decision to hold the excessive deficit procedure in "abeyance" was designed to retain the leverage of possible sanctions. Under Article 7 of Council Regulation 1467/97, the decision to impose sanctions "shall be taken within 10 months" of the dates from which the excessive deficits were reported. For France that would be at the end of December - one reason the Commission rushed it treatment for France (reftel). By putting the procedure into "abeyance" (a measure also provided for in the Council Regulation), the clock is stopped on the 10 months time limit for imposing sanctions. In practical terms that would mean that failure to fulfill these commitments would still result in sanctions even though the original 10 months time period had lapsed. One Observation _______________ 11. (SBU) All this is interesting, but the open question is whether Ecofin would fulfill its own commitment. To do so, the Commission would have to make another recommendation to Ecofin for action should France or Germany be straying from their respective consolidation paths. Having lost this round, the Commission may feel shy about a second attempt - once bitten, twice shy. On the other hand, if France and Germany are clearly off track, it would be interesting for the Commission to call Ecofin's bluff. If the Commission had a strong case, it would be difficult for Ecofin to face it down again - particularly with so many other EU economic issues, e.g. budget, constitution, at play. 12. (U)This cable coordinated with USEU and Embassy Berlin. 13. (U)POC: James Wallar, Treasury Representative, e-mail wallarjg2@state.gov; tel. 49-(69)-7535-2431, fax 49-(69)- 7535-2238 Bodde
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