US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7724

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007724 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, MOPS, ETRD, SNAR, PINR, IZ, TU 
SUBJECT: ACTING VS. PKK/KADEK IN IRAQ BEFORE POTUS-ERDOGAN: 
A MENU OF DELIVERABLES 
 
REF: ANKARA 6231 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman.  Reasons 1.5 b and 
d. 
 
 
1. (S) In anticipation of the January 28 meeting between 
President Bush and Prime Minister Erdogan, Post submits a 
list (see paras 2-5) of possible actions the USG could take 
against the PKK/KADEK/KHK in northern Iraq that the President 
could cite as completed deliverables in that meeting.  The US 
has designated the PKK/KADEK a terrorist organization and is 
in the process of adding new names and aliases of the 
organization to our terrorism list.  The President has stated 
that Iraq will no longer be a safehaven for terrorists, yet 
4,500 PKK operatives continue to find sanctuary in the 
mountains of northern Iraq.  Our NATO Ally Turkey considers 
these terrorists a significant national security threat.  We 
have agreed with Turkey on an action plan to use all elements 
of statecraft to eliminate that threat.  However, to date, 
the Turks believe that the President's commitment has not 
been followed up by concrete actions against the PKK, and 
that little or nothing meaningful has been done on the action 
plan, causing persistent tension in US-Turkey relations. 
Turkish press has suggested that if the US fails to move 
against the PKK in northern Iraq, Turkey will be compelled to 
take unilateral action.  We believe there are a number of 
significant steps short of military engagement that the USG 
could take against the PKK before the President's meeting 
with PM Erdogan that would be meaningful and perceived as 
such by both Turkey and the PKK/KADEK. Post believes it is 
imperative that some visible action against the PKK be 
undertaken by the USG as soon as possible, and certainly 
before the President's meeting with PM Erdogan. 
 
 
2. (S) Actions We Can Undertake Outside Iraq: 
 
 
-- Aggressive diplomacy to establish widespread 
acknowledgment that the PKK/KADEK/KHK is a terrorist 
organization, including designation by the EU and Turkey's 
and Iraq's neighbors of the PKK/KADEK/KHK as a terrorist 
organization; 
-- Financial steps to cut off PKK/KADEK KHK funding sources, 
including pressing Europeans -- once they designate the 
PKK/KADEK/KHK as a terrorist organization -- to take action 
to cut off funding from Europe; 
-- High-level public statements, including from the White 
House stating that the PKK/KADEK/KHK are terrorists, that the 
US will not negotiate with terrorists, that the PKK/KADEK/KHK 
have no future in Iraq, that PKK/KADEK/KHK elements in Iraq 
should take advantage of the Turkish Reintegration Law now, 
and that there will not be an option for PKK/KADEK/KHK 
terrorists to remain in Iraq. 
-- Information operations reflecting such statements in 
northern Iraq, Europe and states neighboring Iraq. 
 
 
3. (S) Actions We Can Undertake Inside Iraq: 
 
 
-- Seek statements from the CPA and Iraqi Governing Council 
and Iraqi Ministers along the lines mentioned above; 
-- Secure a finding making the PKK/KADEK/KHK and its front 
organizations illegal in Iraq closing their front offices. 
-- Have CENTCOM issue a directive to coalition forces to 
arrest any PKK/KADEK/KHK member encountered and immediately 
inform Turkey of the arrest/inquire if GOT wants the prisoner 
transferred to Turkish custody .   CJTF-7 should have 
Standard Operating Procedures along these lines for dealing 
with the surrender of any PKK/KADEK/KHK members; 
-- Transmit statement suggested in para 2 via broadcasts in 
northern Iraq and via leaflets distributed throughout 
northern Iraq; 
-- Conduct regular Iraqi border patrols in all border areas 
accompanied occasionally (perhaps weekly) by a show of force 
by coalition military forces; 
-- Engage KDP and PUK to secure a commitment that they will 
not turn captured PKK/KADEK/KHK members loose or facilitate 
their transit or resupply. 
 
 
4. (S) Actions We Can Undertake in Turkey: 
 
 
-- Explore possibility of getting DEA to offer additional 
assistance to Turkey to reduce the transfer of PKK/KADEK/KHK 
drug-related money across the Turkish border to Iraq; 
-- Explore with the GOT other ways to help Turkey patrol and 
protect its border, including to prevent smuggling (which 
would constrain PKK financial and materiel supply); 
-- Consider provision of technical means to Turkey for 
detecting movement/providing early warning along the 
Iraq-Turkey border (e.g. aerostat balloons); 
-- Support extradition requests from Turkey of named 
PKK/KADEK/KHK members in Iraq wanted for serious crimes in 
Turkey. 
 
 
5. (S) In considering the steps suggested above, we must 
ensure that we do not undermine progress being made on the 
return of Turkish refugees from Iraq's Makhmour camp.  The 
UNHCR circulated a draft tripartite agreement on this matter 
December 12.  The Makhmour population is overwhelmingly 
comprised of bona fide civilian refugees, and should not be 
lumped together with action intended for PKK/KADEK/KHK 
terrorists.  Makhmour issues should be treated as a separate 
subset in USG considerations.  We need to consider and 
discuss with UNHCR: 
 
 
-- How to separate out the 200 or 250 PKK/KADEK/KHK in 
Makhmour from the 9,500 refugees. 
 
 
-- The consequences of arresting said 200 or 250 terrorists, 
whether by Iraqi police, US forces or others. 
 
 
-- What would be done with those arrested or otherwise 
separated out. 
 
 
6. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN