US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU2451

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NEPAL: ATTACKS AGAINST UK-AFFLIATED DEVELOPMENT

Identifier: 03KATHMANDU2451
Wikileaks: View 03KATHMANDU2451 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2003-12-17 06:47:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ASEC PTER EAID NP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 002451 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS, LONDON FOR POL/GURNEY, DS/DSS/ITA, 
DS/IP/SA, NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, EAID, NP 
SUBJECT: NEPAL: ATTACKS AGAINST UK-AFFLIATED DEVELOPMENT 
 
REF: A. A. KATHMANDU 2383 
     B. B. KATHMANDU 2246 
     C. C. KATHMANDU 2332 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
 1. (SBU) Summary.  Nepal's Maoists torched two British 
Department for International Development (DFID) project 
vehicles that were parked in a forestry department compound 
in Butwal, Rupendehi District on 14 December, the day prior 
to a Maoist called strike ("bandh") in the district.  In 
addition to this incident, two local employees working on a 
DFID funded project in Dailekh District have been murdered by 
the Maoists in separate incidents.  These incidents raise 
questions about the continued feasibility of 
foreign-supported activities in a number of districts.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) On December 14 at approximately 1800 hours (local 
time), the Maoists torched two British Department for 
International Development (DFID) project vehicles that were 
parked in a forestry department compound in Butwal, Rupendehi 
District in Nepal's southern lowlands.  Dan Huntington, 
DFID's in-country security chief, told Econoff on 16 December 
that DFID did not believe that the attack was directed 
against DFID or development work in the district.  Rather, 
the attack was meant to intimidate locals into adhering to 
the Maoist-called strike ("bandh"), which started 15 
December.  (FYI.  This interpretation squares with past 
patterns of violence during the lead-up to Maoist-enforced 
bandhs.  End FYI.) 
 
3.  (C) Although Huntington rationalized that the attacks 
were not directed at DFID's work because the two vehicles 
were unmarked, both vehicles did bear blue (diplomatic) 
plates which identified them as British affiliated. 
 
4.  (C) On November 30, the Maoists reportedly gunned down a 
female Nepali staff member of a local NGO associated with the 
World Food Program (WFP), German Technical Cooperation Agency 
(GTZ) and DFID in the western district of Dailekh on charges 
of being a spy for the government (reftel).  Huntington 
shared DFID's investigation results on the murder, indicating 
that DFID believes that the Maoists killed the woman because 
of her alleged love affair with an Army solider.  Huntington 
again stressed that the murder was not directed against DFID 
or development work in the district. 
 
5.  (C)  Huntington disclosed that DFID had learned on 16 
December that another female Nepali staff member of a local 
NGO associated with Helvetas (a Swiss development agency) and 
DFID was killed in Dailekh District. (Note: According to 
Huntington, Helvetas' activities in Dailekh are funded by 
DFID.  End Note.)  It is believed that she was murdered by 
the Maoists on charges of being a spy for the government. 
DFID plans to hold a security meeting this week to discuss 
the implications for development work in the district that 
these murders occurred.  Again, Huntington contended that 
this attack was not directed against DFID or development work 
in the district. 
 
6.  (C)  Comment.  The geographic distribution of these 
incidents appears to reinforce our perception that Maoist 
intimidation and associated crimes vary from district to 
district, apparently depending on the attitudes of the local 
leadership and the relative visibility of foreign-supported 
activities.  Rupendehi is the district where a group of Peace 
Corps trainees was threatened (ref B) and a Coca-Cola sales 
distributor was threatened and a distribution van was 
recently torched (ref C).  In Dailekh District, USAID 
attempted to launch a program focused on the sustainable 
production of forest and high-value agricultural products. 
However, when staff for the project made a site visit in July 
2003 (during the cease-fire), the Maoists threatened the 
group and indicated that prior to working on any project in 
the district the work plan and budget had to be approved by 
the local Maoist Commander.  The Maoist also demanded that 
the project would have to pay 2-3 percent of its budget to 
the local Maoist fund, which was, of course, unacceptable. 
There are currently no Peace Corps volunteers in Rupandehi or 
Dailekh Districts and only a limited USAID-funded health 
project in Dailekh. 
 
7.  (C)  Comment continued.  Huntington's assessment that 
none of these acts of terror were specifically directed 
against DFID may be accurate, but that may be increasingly 
beside the point.  The real question is whether Maoist 
terror, regardless of its targets, will undermine donors' 
ability to provide development assistance to those who need 
it most.  End Comment. 
MALINOWSKI 

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