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| Identifier: | 03ROME5625 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ROME5625 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rome |
| Created: | 2003-12-16 15:09:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | EAID PREL PREF EAGR ECON KN KS UN |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS ROME 005625 SIPDIS SENSITIVE FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME STATE FOR D/S RARMITAGE, U/S MGROSSMAN, IO A/S KHOLMES, EAP A/S JKELLY, A/S PRM ADEWEY, EAP/CM, AND IO/EDA RBEHREND USDA/FAS FOR U/S JPENN AND MCHAMBLISS USAID FOR ADMINISTRATOR NATSIOS, JBRAUSE, AA/DCHA RWINTER, AND DCHA/FFP LLANDIS NSC FOR JDWORKEN, MGREEN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID, PREL, PREF, EAGR, ECON, KN, KS, UN SUBJECT: END OF YEAR NORTH KOREA HUMANITARIAN WRAP-UP REF: (A) ROME 5222 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. NOT SUITABLE FOR INTERNET POSTING. ------- SUMMARY ------- 1. (SBU) Recent press reports, WFP requests, inquiries from other donors and Assistant Secretary Boucher's comments have focused attention on the continuing humanitarian crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). WFP has renewed its request for a favorable decision on the remaining 60,000 tons of Secretary Powell's February tentative 2003 offer of 100,000 tons of food aid. Other donors have inquired about the U.S. stance and are awaiting our decision before taking (more) action of their own. Finally, accusations of the U.S. using food as a weapon in the larger political context are gaining more traction. It is not in our interest to be perceived in this context. Releasing the remaining 60,000 tons will address that misperception. End Summary. -------------------------------------- DPRK: Facing another "winter famine?" -------------------------------------- 2. (SBU) WFP is claiming that up to 3.8 million North Korean beneficiaries - 17 percent of the country's population - could be dropped from receiving food aid by the end of the winter. In its latest statement of the need in the DPRK, WFP announced that 2.2 million have already had to be cut from receiving assistance, of the 6.4 million targeted among vulnerable groups for 2003. According to WFP, this means, "young children, pregnant and nursing women will not receive food assistance." Individual rations have reportedly been cut to 300 grams per day, less than half of the normal survival ration. 3. (U) WFP's current emergency operation is only resourced at 333,000 metric tons (mts), or about 65 percent of the total 2003 appeal. Pipeline breaks in cereals have begun (the shortfall for December is reportedly 40,000 mts), with no cereals scheduled to arrive in the eastern part of the country beginning in January. WFP notes, "cereal shortfalls, estimated at 156,000 tons over the next six months, will affect all 3.8 million WFP beneficiaries countrywide from May. In addition, local food production factories in the east will stop functioning in April due to lack of wheat flour, while Food For Work projects for the spring season will have to be suspended unless new pledges are immediately confirmed." 4. (U) The 2004 UN Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), issued last month, requested USD 191.9 million for food aid (including USD 171 million, or 485,000 mts of food, through WFP), out of the CAP total of USD 221.24 million. Note: the subtotal for agricultural assistance is USD 4.16 million, of which USD 3.5 million is for the Food and Agriculture Organization's projects to increase local food production. End note. 5. (U) Despite marked improvements in nutritional status since the first internationally sponsored survey in 1998, WFP and UNICEF's recent report stilldocumented a 41 percent severe malnutrition rate for children under seven. Additionally, the recent FAO-WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission stated that while the 2003/04 cereals production is forecast at 4.16 million tons (the best harvest over the last nine years), domestic cereals production will still fall 944,000 mts short of needs. The country will again have to depend on substantial external food assistance, as its capacity to import commercially remains highly constrained. --------------------------------------------- -- Monitoring and access: progress but no victory --------------------------------------------- -- 6. (U) In Executive Director Jim Morris' December 2 letter to Secretary Powell, he outlines some of the progress WFP has achieved during the past year, including: - obtained access to one additional district; - increased the number of monitoring visits per month from 425 last year to 503 this year; - obtained access to focus group discussions with beneficiaries, and consumer markets in Pyongyang (important for monitoring, targeting and understanding food security); - experienced a reduction in number of monitoring requests that have been rejected, down from 8 percent in 2001 to 0.8 percent in the past six months; - received permission to use mobile communications in WFP vehicles; and - obtained official and unofficial wage and price information (important for analyzing food insecurity at the household level). 7. (SBU) While none of these represent substantive change in the openness of the North Korean regime, WFP maintains that it has "managed to achieve progress since February through our persistent efforts in this area." Note. The recently released Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report (visit of Keith Luse and Frank Januzzi in August 2003) commented that WFP had taken some "small but significant steps" to enhance its operations and to prevent food aid diversion. 8. (SBU) Executive Director Morris, WFP Regional Director for Asia, Anthony Banbury, and UN resident humanitarian coordinator in North Korea, Masood Hyder, have continued to raise program oversight constraints and impediments with the highest level of DPRK authorities. WFP has expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts, both public and private, to raise better monitoring and greater access issues both with the North Koreans and our regional allies. 9. (SBU) Public reports of diversion of food aid, such as an early October 2003 CNN story about food aid sold in one of the public markets, have been shown to be bi-lateral food assistance, not U.S. food aid donated through WFP and its implementing partners. ---------------------------------- Looking to the U.S. for leadership ---------------------------------- 10. (SBU) U.S. Mission/Rome has been approached numerous times about whether and when the U.S. might "close the loop" on our 2003 "offer" of 100,000 tons. The Rome representation of the Republic of Korea remains in frequent contact regarding U.S. food aid policy for DPRK. While ROK's donation to WFP has remained steady at 100,000 tons, it has expressed concern about our drop in donations (from USD 102 million in 2001 to 31 million in 2003). The British and Australian governments have made indirect inquiries about current U.S. policy, as has a major international NGO. 11. (SBU) The recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report (referred to above) which commented that "North Korean officials are convinced that the United States is using food as a weapon," generated a great deal of press attention. That in turn sparked additional inquiries. 12. (SBU) Obviously, it is in our interest to be and to be seen on the high road. Allegations of using food as a weapon weaken our position to exert leadership in dealing with the DPRK. For this reason, as well as for the humanitarian considerations noted in WFP's statements, we recommend that the U.S. reach a quick, favorable decision on the remaining 60,000 tons of the Secretary's offer for food aid in 2003. --------------------------------------------- ----- Conclusion - Personal Comment from Ambassador Hall --------------------------------------------- ----- 13. (SBU) Having visited North Korea six times since 1996, I have seen our food aid feeding hungry North Koreans. I will never forget the visits outside of Pyongyang where children were abandoned by hungry parents unable to feed them. More than the individual stories of people in dire need, I saw the impact our humanitarian assistance had on attitudes towards the United States. While the hideous regime is still in place, the ordinary people who would run from a Westerner seven years ago, were thanking me the last time I was there. Our gift of 20 million bags that say "gift of the people of the United States" are still being used as suitcases throughout the country. People were well aware that the United States was helping them in their time of need. 14. (SBU) I understand there are numerous other serious political factors in our relationship with North Korea, and will not presume to speak about them. But I do know that the U.S. policy to not use food as a weapon is sound and just. Especially in a time when our moral authority is questioned, providing food for our enemies when they are hungry will yield rewards. Hall NNNN 2003ROME05625 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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