US embassy cable - 03BOGOTA11615

UNCLAS  BOGOTA 011615 
 
 
S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER 
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: A. REF A: STATE 301352 
     B. REF B: BOGOTA 10403 
     C. REF C: BOGOTA 10048 
 
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Summary 
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1. Colombia continues its struggle against the country's 
three main terrorist organizations ) the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) 
and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) -- all 
of which have been designated by the U.S. as Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations.  Although there were no reports of 
international terrorist acts in Colombia during 2003, there 
were and continue to be persistent actions by guerrilla 
groups endangering U.S. and Colombian government personnel 
and assets, and targeting congested public areas such as 
shopping malls, parks, and popular restaurants. 
 
The Government of Colombia does not support terrorists 
politically or financially; to the contrary, the Uribe 
administration continues to take a tough stance against 
terrorism. In 2003, President Uribe has increased military 
pressure on illegal armed groups and pushed forward an 
ambitious security agenda, which: 1) secured congressional 
passage of anti-terrorism legislation; 2) strengthened 
programs promoting the desertion and reintegration of illegal 
armed group members; and 3) engaged the GOC in demobilization 
negotiations with the AUC. The latter process has led to a 
recent mass demobilization of 855 paramilitaries in Medellin 
and another 155 in Cauca; another is planned for early 2004. 
End Summary. 
 
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Terrorist Organizations Continue to Attack 
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2. In February, the country's largest terrorist organization 
(the approximately 16,000-member FARC) set off a major 
car bomb attack on Bogota's Club El Nogal. The bombing killed 
34 and wounded over 160. One week later near Florencia, 
Caqueta Department, the FARC captured three U.S. contractors 
and killed another American and a Colombian - all crew 
members of a crashed U.S. aircraft; the three Americans 
continue to be held hostage. The FARC struck again on 
February 15 when a house bomb detonated in Neiva, Huila 
Department, killing sixteen and wounding over forty.  In 
September, the ELN kidnapped eight foreign tourists visiting 
archeological ruins in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. One 
escaped, two were released in November 2003, but five remain 
captive at year's end. 
 
In October, November, and December 2003, the FARC set off a 
car bomb in San Andresito, an area of Bogota where contraband 
electronics are commonly sold and where the FARC and the AUC 
are known to extort shop owners and compete for turf, 
launched a rocket at a prominent Colombian business leader, 
fired another rocket at the military side of Bogota's 
international commercial airport, and tossed grenades at two 
restaurants frequented by Americans and other foreigners. 
Numerous other attacks have been thwarted in Bogota, due in 
large part to intelligence work performed by Colombian public 
security forces. 
 
Reflecting increased high level attention and funding, the 
GOC's ambitious security agenda has produced substantial 
achievements. In 2003, murders have decreased by sixteen 
percent, assassinations of trade unionists are down 
sixty-eight percent and kidnappings have been reduced by 
thirty percent from 2002. The Colombian military has 
completed phase 2A of its "Plan Patriota" national defense 
plan in the Cundinamarca area surrounding Bogota, which 
reaped significant successes, including the killing of at 
least five mid-level FARC commanders who operated in the area. 
 
3. The following addresses ref A's specific questions: 
 
a. The GOC has taken the following actions in 2003 to support 
the global coalition against terrorism: 
 
-- The GOC continues to cooperate in blocking terrorist 
assets.  The Financial Information and Analysis Unit (UIAF), 
 
similar in function to the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Unit (FINCEN), was created in 2001. UIAF collaborates closely 
with the Embassy's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); 
 
-- President Uribe will have met his goal of installing a 
state security presence in every one of the country's 1098 
municipalities by the end of 2003. This has been a major 
accomplishment toward reclaiming territory from terrorist 
organizations; 
 
-- President Uribe has submitted to Congress two important 
draft laws with significant public security implications: 1) 
the anti-terrorism bill; and 2) the conditional parole bill 
(ref B). The anti-terrorism bill, which was approved by 
Congress December 10, will increase the government's 
authority to conduct wiretaps, residential searches, and 
detentions.  The conditional parole legislation is connected 
to the broader peace process, and provides the GOC with 
flexibility to waive prison sentences for combatants who 
agree to demobilize and support the GOC's anti-terrorism 
efforts; 
 
-- With USG assistance, the GOC expects to encourage this 
year upwards of 4000 illegal combatants to desert ) an 
increase of 84 percent from 2002.  The program has yielded 
significant intelligence, which will help in capturing and 
prosecuting other illegal armed group commanders (ref C); 
 
-- On November 25, the GOC demobilized 855 paramilitaries 
from the AUC's Cacique Nutibara Bloc. In December, 155 
paramilitaries in Cauca Department were demobilized.  The 
next AUC demobilization is scheduled for early 2004 in 
northern Colombia; 
 
-- The USG's Anti-Terrorist Assistance (ATA) programs are 
training Colombian police and military anti-kidnapping units 
(GAULA). Kidnappings are an important means of revenue for 
the illegal armed groups, particularly for the FARC and ELN. 
DSS/ATA is implementing one of the largest USG 
anti-kidnapping assistance programs ($25-million) to help the 
GOC train and equip GAULA units; 
 
-- The GOC is also taking its own steps to strengthen its 
anti-terrorism capabilities.  A newly-improved and expanded 
anti-terrorism unit has been set up in the Prosecutor 
General's Office (Fiscalia).  This unit was formally part of 
the narcotics section, but was separated out in 2003.  The 
GOC has assigned additional prosecutors to the anti-terrorism 
unit to focus on prosecuting infrastructure attacks, 
particularly in oil producing areas such as Arauca and 
Casanare; and 
 
-- Plan Colombia has made significant strides in combating 
narco-trafficking, a key source of income for terrorist 
organizations. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates 
that coca cultivation could be reduced by aerial eradication 
by as much as 50 percent this year (almost 130,000 hectares 
eradicated). The GOC sprayed approximately 2700 hectares of 
opium poppy this year.  In August 2003, the U.S. resumed the 
Airbridge Denial Program, which assists the GOC in 
intercepting aircraft trafficking narcotics and arms. 
 
B. The GOC has been particularly cooperative in cases and 
investigations involving Americans, such as the kidnapping of 
the contractors and the recent grenade attack in Bogota. 
 
C. The US-Colombia extradition relationship continues to be 
one of the most successful in the world.  The GOC has 
extradited 136 Colombian citizens to the U.S. since July 
2000, mostly related to narcotics cases. Continued 
cooperation from the GOC's Foreign and Justice Ministries has 
led to the extradition of 88 persons during President Uribe's 
tenure (through November 14), 64 in the year 2003.  In May 
2003, the GOC approved the extradition of Nelson Vargas 
Rueda, the first FARC member to be sent to the U.S. (Note: 
Vargas Rueda is accused of the 1999 kidnapping and murder of 
three American NGO activists working on behalf of Colombian 
indigenous groups. End Note.) Also extradited in May was 
Gerardo Herrera Iles, accused of taking foreign oil workers 
hostage, including U.S. citizens. 
 
D. There is no impediment to extradition for terrorist acts 
occurring outside of Colombia.  However, for terrorist acts 
that occur in Colombia involving American victims, there 
could be an impediment if the GOC initiates its own 
prosecution before the U.S. submits a request for 
extradition.  The Colombian Code of Criminal Procedure and 
jurisprudence from the Colombian Constitutional Court 
prevents extradition of individuals who have been, or are 
being, prosecuted in Colombia for the same act or acts.  Once 
a case has been opened in Colombia, even if it were later 
dismissed, double jeopardy could prevent the defendant from 
being extradited on those charges.  Accordingly, the U.S. 
recently had to withdraw an extradition request for an 
Ejercito Liberacion Popular (ELP) defendant who was already 
being prosecuted in Colombia for the same act. 
 
E. In addition to prosecution, the GOC has taken several 
other measures to combat terrorism: 
 
-- As in 2002, the GOC continues to speak out forcefully and 
often against terrorist organizations; 
 
-- The GOC continues to improve and expand its Informer 
Network, which trains civilians to assist police in crime 
prevention and alerting law enforcement to illegal armed 
group activity; 
 
-- A U.S. financed Rewards for Justice (RFJ) campaign has 
been initiated for information that leads to the capture, 
arrest, and prosecution of those persons involved in the 
hostage-taking of the three American contractors; and 
 
-- Despite severe national budget constraints, President 
Uribe continues to increase the amount Colombia spends on 
security.  In 2003, the GOC allocated 4.0 percent of GDP to 
security ) up from 3.5 percent in 2002. It hopes to increase 
spending to 4.5 percent by 2006. 
 
F. The GOC has sought to build international condemnation of 
Colombian terrorists.  At the GOC's request, the Organization 
of American States (OAS) passed Resolution 837 condemning the 
bombing of El Nogal, specifically naming the FARC as the 
perpetrators.  The GOC also requested and received UNSC 
condemnation of the attack. In mid-2003, the United Kingdom 
hosted a conference in London in which 24 countries voiced 
their commitment to support Colombian democracy and 
disapproval of the illegal armed groups. 
 
G. The GOC has not provided any support for international 
terrorism, terrorists, or terrorist groups. 
 
H. The GOC has not made any statements in support of 
terrorist organizations or terrorist-sponsoring states. 
 
I. Comment: Colombia understands only too well the 
devastation caused by terrorism.  From the day it assumed 
office on August 8, 2002, the Uribe Administration has 
demonstrated a firm resolve in fighting terrorism. The GOC is 
supportive of USG efforts to combat terrorist acts, target 
terrorist finances, and cooperate with extradition requests. 
We expect this highly productive USG-GOC cooperation to 
continue. 
 
 
BACA