US embassy cable - 03ROME5552

S E C R E T ROME 005552 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PRA, NP/ECNP, INR/SPM, NEA;NGA, 
PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2013 
TAGS: PARM, ETTC, PREL, EIND, IR, IT, EXPORT CONTROLS 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON SALE OF FAST BOATS TO IRAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 338477 
B. ROME 5202 AND PREVIOUS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION EMIL SKODON FOR REASONS 1.5(A)(B 
) AND 1.6X6 
 
1. (S)  FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF REF A INSTRUCTIONS, EMBASSY 
RAISED URGENT USG CONCERNS WITH THE FOLLOWING GOI OFFICIALS: 
 
--  FM FRATTINI:  AT A PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED DECEMBER 10 
DINNER AT THE RESIDENCE IN HONOR OF FM FRATTINI, AMB. SEMBLER 
PULLED ASIDE THE MINISTER TO OUTLINE THE PROBLEM AND THE NEED 
FOR GOI ACTION.  FRATTINI AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE ISSUE. 
 
-- PRIME MINISTRY UNDER SECRETARY LETTA (PM BERLUSCONI'S 
CLOSEST ADVISOR):  AT THE SAME DINNER, SENIOR EMBOFFS ALSO 
RAISED THE DEMARCHE WITH LETTA, WHO SAID HE WOULD CHECK ON 
THE MATTER THE NEXT DAY AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. 
 
-- FRATTINI CHIEF OF STAFF CESARE RAGAGLINI:  ON DECEMBER 11, 
DCM CONTACTED RAGAGLINI TO ENSURE THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE 
AMBASSADOR'S EXCHANGE WITH FRATTINI THE PREVIOUS EVENING, AND 
TO UNDERSCORE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE DEMARCHE.  THEY AGREED 
THAT ECMIN WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH THE MFA ECONOMIC DIRECTORATE. 
 
2. (S) ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR ECONOMICS MASSIMO LEGGERI: 
ON DECEMBER 11, ECMIN MET FOR 30 MINUTES WITH LEGGERI TO 
HAND OVER RELEASABLE REFTEL POINTS AND TO REVIEW THE 
SITUATION IN DETAIL.  ECMIN ALSO GAVE LEGGERI A COPY OF 
SECRETARY POWELL'S FEBRUARY 20, 2003 LETTER TO FRATTINI ON 
 
SIPDIS 
FAST BOATS, AS WELL PRINTOUTS THAT EMBASSY HAD DOWNLOADED 
DIRECTLY OFF THE FB DESIGN WEBSITE, WWW.FBDESIGN.IT.  (THIS 
INFORMATION, INTER ALIA, PROMOTES THE FB MIL 55 AS "SUITABLE 
FOR MISSIONS SUCH AS HIT AND RUN, COMMANDO OPERATIONS, (AND) 
OFFSHORE INTERCEPTION.") 
 
3. (S)  IN PRESENTING THE DEMARCHE, ECMIN STRESSED THAT WE 
HAD TWO LEVELS OF CONCERN.  THE FIRST WAS THE NEED FOR 
IMMEDIATE GOI INTERVENTION AT ITALIAN PORTS AND WITH FB 
DESIGN, TO STOP DELIVERY OF WHICHEVER FAST BOATS HAD NOT YET 
LEFT ITALIAN TERRITORY.  THE SECOND WAS THE NEED FOR A 
SYSTEMIC FIX TO THE NOW PROVEN INADEQUACY OF EXISTING ITALIAN 
EXPORT CONTROLS ON SUCH BOATS.  THE "INFORMAL PRESSURE" WHICH 
THE GOI HAD RELIED UPON CLEARLY HAD NOT WORKED;  DEPENDABLE 
LEGAL MECHANISMS NEEDED WERE NEEDED URGENTLY. 
 
4. (S)  LEGGERI LISTENED CAREFULLY AND ASSURED ECMIN THAT THE 
MATTER WOULD BE INVESTIGATED IMMEDIATELY.  HE CONFIRMED OUR 
EARLIER INDICATIONS (SEE REF B) THAT A GOI INTERAGENCY EFFORT 
WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY TO FIND A MORE PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE 
FAST BOATS PROBLEM.  LEGGERI SOUGHT CONFIRMATION THAT THE 
U.S. HAD MADE SIMILAR APPROACHES TO OTHER COUNTRIES WHOSE 
COMPANIES COULD SUPPLY SUCH BOATS TO IRAN.  ECMIN REITERATED 
(AS WE HAVE MANY TIMES IN THE PAST) THAT THIS WAS 
EMPHATICALLY THE CASE, ADDING THAT ITALY WAS INCREASINGLY 
PERCEIVED AS ONE OF THE REMAINING WEAK POINTS IN THE CONTROL 
EFFORT.  LEGGERI INDICATED HE WOULD WELCOME ANY INFORMATION 
WE COULD PROVIDE REGARDING WHAT LEGAL MECHANISMS OTHER 
COUNTRIES HAD USED TO BLOCK FAST BOAT EXPORTS.  IN 
CONCLUDING, LEGGERI REPEATED THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW UP WITH 
OTHER GOI AUTHORITIES RIGHT AWAY, AND KEEP US INFORMED OF 
DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
5. (S)  IN ADDITION THE ABOVE, ORCA IS RAISING THE FAST BOAT 
SITUATION WITH ITS ITALIAN COUNTERPARTS. 
SEMBLER 
 
NNNN 
	2003ROME05552 - Classification: SECRET