US embassy cable - 03THEHAGUE3051

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003051 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2013 
TAGS: MARR, NL, NATO 
SUBJECT: DUTCH SHARE COPY OF UK-FR-GE ESDP NONPAPER 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS 
1.5 (B AND D). 
 
 1. (C/NF) PM Balkenende's Foreign Policy Advisor (protect) 
passed to Amb. Sobel a copy of a French-British-German non 
Paper entitled "European Defence:  NATO/EU Consultation, 
Planning and Operations" on December 11.  Post transmits the 
text of the non paper in para 2. 
 
2. (C) Begin text of French/British/German non paper: 
 
Building on the experience of EU civilian and military 
operations in 2003 and on the discussions on these issues 
between the UK, France and Germany, this paper sets out how 
the collective capability of the EU can be strengthened, 
including the ability to plan and run certain operations, and 
describes how consideration of the options involved would 
take place between EU partners and NATO allies. 
 
NATO is the forum for discussion and the natural choice for 
an operation including the European and American allies.  In 
accordance with the EU/NATO permanent arrangements adopted in 
Nice, in a crisis contacts and meetings will be intensified 
so that EU and NATO can discuss assessments of the crisis and 
clarify their intentions regarding possible engagements.  The 
experience of 2003 shows that these arrangements are 
fundamentally sound, providing for intensified consultation, 
while respecting fully the decision-making autonomy of both 
organisations. 
 
Where NATO as a whole is not engaged, the EU, in undertaking 
an operation, will choose whether or not to have recourse to 
NATO assets and capabilities, taking into account in 
particular the Alliance's role, capacities, and involvement 
in the region in question.  That process will be conducted 
through the "Berlin plus" arrangements. 
 
In order to improve the preparation of EU operations having 
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under Berlin plus 
arrangements, we propose that a small EU cell should be 
established at SHAPE and to invite NATO to establish liaison 
arrangements at the EUMS.  It will also ensure full 
transparency between EU and NATO embodying their strategic 
partnership in crisis management. 
 
We also propose to enhance the capacity of the EUMS to 
conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic 
planning through the establishment within the EUMS of a cell 
with civil/military components.  It will in particular 
 
-- link work across the EU on anticipating crises, including 
opportunities for conflict prevention and post-conflict 
stabilisation; 
 
-- assist in planning and co-ordinating civilian operations; 
 
-- develop expertise in managing the civilian/military 
interface; 
 
-- do strategic advance planning for joint civil/military 
operations; 
 
-- reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU 
autonomous operation. 
 
Regarding the conduct of autonomous EU military operations, 
the main option for this will be national HQs, which can be 
multi-nationalised for the purpose of conducting an EU-led 
operation.  In certain circumstances, the Council may decide, 
upon the advice of the Military Committee, to draw on the 
collective capacity of the EUMS, in particular where a joint 
civilian/military response is required and where no national 
HQ is identified. 
 
Once such a decision was taken, the civilian/military cell in 
the EUMS would have responsibility for generating the 
capacity to plan and run the operation.  This would not be a 
standing HQ.  Rather it would be a capacity rapidly to set up 
an operation centre for a particular operation.  The centre 
would operate separately from the strategic role of the EUMS; 
under a designated Operation Commander.  This would require 
the necessary resources, including augmentation personnel, to 
be made available on short notice, by the EUMS and member 
states.  A core staff, essentially "double hatted" from the 
EUMS, would be required to maintain the necessary level of 
readiness.  To that effect the personnel of the EUMS could be 
reinforced, if necessary. 
 
In light of the lessons learned further developments of the 
scope or nature of this capacity could be examined.  It would 
require further decision by the Council. 
 
End text of French/British/German non paper. 
SOBEL