US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7612

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U/S GROSSMAN FORCE POSTURE CONSULTATIONS WITH TURKEY AND MORE

Identifier: 03ANKARA7612
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA7612 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-12-11 15:25:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR PREL TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2013 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: U/S GROSSMAN FORCE POSTURE CONSULTATIONS WITH 
TURKEY AND MORE 
 
REF: USNATO 1254 
 
 
(U)  Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reason: 1.5 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
======= 
Summary 
======= 
 
 
1. (C) In meetings with FM Gul, DCHOD GEN Basbug and others 
from MFA and TGS, U/S Grossman initiated consultations with 
the Turks on the US global posture review.  He emphasized 
that this effort to move to a post-Cold War posture would be 
in accordance with our international security commitments and 
would make the defense of US and its Allies more effective 
through the better use of capabilities.  Turkish 
interlocutors were appreciative of US efforts to consult. 
U/S Grossman also took the opportunity to express condolences 
for the Istanbul bombings, to press for a solution on Cyprus, 
and to encourage further cooperation on Iraq and terrorism. 
End Summary. 
 
 
============ 
Briefing TGS 
============ 
 
 
2. (C) In a tete-a-tete with TGS Deputy Chief Ilker Basbug, 
U/S Grossman expressed appreciation for cooperation with 
Turkey in a variety of areas.  He underscored that force 
realignment was about the end of the Cold War and the US 
needing to change its posture, pushing more capabilities, 
instead of numbers, forward.  He also emphasized that this 
exercise was not a diminishment of our commitment to NATO and 
our Allies, a point which needed to be conveyed to the 
public.  U/S Grossman did not envision "great changes" at 
Incirlik AB and noted the US wanted flexible arrangements on 
using it.  He also said there might be opportunities for more 
training -- possibly using ground forces.  This is a real 
consultation -- we had decided that we would change our force 
posture, but how and where would depend on consultations. 
 
 
3.  (C) Grossman raised Cyprus with Basbug, noting that 
Turkey had legitimate concerns, but there was an opportunity 
to make progress.  Basbug replied that the outcome of 
elections would be crucial, but agreed that something needed 
to be done to get a fair, lasting, final outcome.  We needed 
a solution - but we may differ on approaches.  Basbug 
acknowledged that when the southern part of Cyprus becomes a 
member of the EU, life would become more difficult for the 
GOT. 
 
 
4.  (C) Afterward, Basbug, TGS/J5 Lt. Gen. Babaoglu, U/S 
Grossman and Ambassador Edelman joined the rest of the 
delegation and representatives of TGS/J5 and TGS/J3 to brief 
the TGS on US thinking about the US posture review.  U/S 
Grossman outlined the broad framework along the lines of his 
and USD(P) Feith's Dec 5 presentation to the North Atlantic 
Council (ref A).  He emphasized how change will be in 
parallel with NATO's own transformation and should strengthen 
the trans-Atlantic Alliance.  He repeated to the group that 
this was the opening round of genuine consultations, and that 
another round to discuss more specifics should occur early in 
the new year.  TGS/J5 Strategy Chief MG Arslan observed that 
this round was strategic in scope and indicated Turkey would 
like more on the US's vision for the region prior to 
discussing specifics in Turkey. 
 
 
5.  (C) DASD Hoehn next explained the three-tier approach the 
USG envisaged regarding our forces' footprint:  main 
operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative 
security locations.  He noted that Incirlik was a good 
example of a FOS that works well for both countries and 
should continue.  We wanted to ensure the proper legal 
framework was in place, including an Article 98 agreement. 
Beyond Incirlik, he continued, many of the things Basbug and 
his staff discussed the previous week with EUCOM Deputy 
Commander Gen. Wald -- training ranges and centers of 
excellence -- were exactly where we should be going.  In all 
this, Hoehn concluded, it was important that we had a shared 
view of the challenges ahead:  terrorism, WMD, threats, and 
utilizing new military technologies. 
 
 
6.  (C) RADM Goodwin then explained how EUCOM intended to 
push capabilities forward.  The new structure would move our 
presence away from its current heavy footprint, focusing 
instead on smaller, rapidly deployable units, with more 
assets located along major transportation routes, and with a 
shift of operations and training to the south and east.  U/S 
Grossman added that the reason he came to Turkey first was 
not because it would see much change in our presence here, 
but because Turkey was in the middle of this shift south and 
east. 
 
 
7.  (C) In response to questions, U/S Grossman explained that 
new technology meant some functions no longer needed to be 
accomplished forward, but could be done farther back.  The 
shift south and east was not necessarily indicative of where 
we expected terrorism to strike next, but a recognition that 
a Soviet invasion is no longer a possibility.  DASD Hoehn 
added that locations would also be selected with an eye 
towards which partners we wanted to work with.  U/S Grossman 
added that the shift would also underscore our commitment to 
the Article 5 obligations we have to the new NATO members. 
 
 
8.  (C) Basbug summarized his understanding of the messages 
the US was sending:  (1) consultations were only beginning; 
(2) no big changes were expected in the US presence in 
Turkey, which meant the US was happy with the present 
arrangements; and, (3) the door was open to do more, such as 
additional training facilities in Turkey for US forces. 
Grossman clarified that there were details in the 
arrangements at Incirlik that could be improved; the base 
remains important to us and we want our ability to operate 
there to continue and be flexible, such as an agreement to 
move U.S. forces through Incirlik back from Iraq.  He 
encouraged the general to combine his second and third points 
and look at what more could be done with US forces at 
Incirlik. 
 
 
============ 
Briefing MFA 
============ 
 
 
9. (C) Consultations at MFA largely reflected those at TGS. 
After offering condolences for the November Istanbul 
bombings, U/S Grossman noted that the purpose of his visit 
was to consult about changes in the US global force posture. 
The changes for Turkey would probably be small, but the US 
wanted Turkey to know what it was planning.  The changes were 
intended to adapt capabilities to meet the post-Cold War 
challenges of terrorism, WMD and new technologies, but the 
US's basic commitments to our allies would remain unaffected. 
 We wanted to do more with like-minded countries.  U/S 
Grossman emphasized the US had decided to make changes but 
wanted to consult Allies about how to go about them. 
 
 
10. (C) DASD Hoehn echoed the point that the US wanted to 
hear Turkey's views about how to adapt forces to new 
challenges.  In Europe there would be less emphasis on heavy 
forces and big numbers, and more emphasis on capabilities and 
arrangements with allies.  Hoehn expressed the USG's 
appreciation for access to Incirlik AB, which had been 
crucial during OEF and OIF and would continue to be important 
in the future.  The US hoped for a positive response to our 
request to use Incirlik to rotate personnel into and out of 
Iraq.  RADM Goodman described how EUCOM thought it would 
restructure its footprint.  The US would focus on brigades, 
expand special operations, and shift our force pattern south 
and east, locating along transportation routes. 
 
 
11. (C) MFA U/S Ziyal expressed appreciation for the close 
consultations ("this is a healthy approach") and emphasized 
the importance of the US-Turkey relationship.  At the same 
time, he noted, Europe was developing ESDP; mutual defense 
arrangements and involvement of non-NATO allies were 
important for Turkey.  He noted Turkey's proximity to the 
regions into which the US was shifting and offered Turkey's 
help in regional public diplomacy.  Ziyal foresaw no problems 
on future cooperation on training and said Turkey was willing 
to continue the mutually beneficial arrangements at Incirlik. 
 Grossman pressed for a positive answer to our request to use 
Incilik for troop transits.  He agreed that the two sides 
needed to work on the legal framework for US forces in Turkey. 
 
 
12. (C) U/S Grossman predicted that the public diplomacy 
challenge would be to show how the trans-Atlantic link was 
strengthened by the coming changes.  NATO/EU defense 
cooperation would be essential.  The challenge was to get the 
NATO/ESDP relationship right:  NATO should be the first 
recourse, then Berlin-plus, and finally autonomous EU 
operations. 
 
 
=================== 
Meeting with FM Gul 
=================== 
 
 
13. (C) Afterward, U/S Grossman, Ambassador Edelman, RADM 
Goodwin and DASD Hoehn met with FM Gul.  U/S Grossman noted 
that he was pleased with pace and level of US-Turkish 
consultations, with Gul's discussions with Powell, GEN Pace 
and other military visitors.  He was looking forward to PM 
Erdogan's visit on Jan. 28 leading up to the NATO Summit in 
June.  This was an opportunity for Turkey and for US to 
further enhance relations and cooperation.  U/S Grossman 
expressed his condolences for the November bombings in 
Istanbul and thanked Gul for the GOT's support and assistance 
in protecting US citizens.  He also expressed thanks for help 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
14. (C) U/S Grossman noted that Cyprus would be high on the 
agenda between then and May, and that we need to exert 
maximum pressure between now and then.  He noted it would be 
important for Turkey's prospects for EU membership. 
 
 
15. (C) U/S Grossman briefed on global force posture 
consultations. Gul agreed that the new force posture was 
understandable given that Europe was more stabilized.  He 
echoed that areas of conflict are moving east; Turkey used to 
be on the Eastern border of NATO - now more centrally 
located.  Understanding that the US wanted to use its forces 
to promote democracy and freedom, Gul argued that Turkey was 
the best partner for these efforts.  Turkey wanted all people 
in the area to enjoy democracy and transparency because the 
deficit of democracy in the area was the key to its troubles. 
 U/S Grossman agreed about US-Turkish cooperation in this 
area.  President Bush's speech in London explained that our 
challenge is to give people more of a chance to live their 
lives in freedom.  This will be an important theme for 
Istanbul Summit - Turkey's transformation, its seven packages 
of EU harmonization measures, as well as its human rights and 
economic reforms.  Gul said the GOT was keen to prove that a 
Muslim country can be accountable, transparent and modern. 
If this were realized under the AK Party government, it would 
be important for the whole Muslim world.  U/S Grossman added 
that both countries want to be successful models and beacons. 
 
 
16. (C) Gul noted that Iraq was still the main issue.  On one 
hand the problems were serious, on the other normalization 
was proceeding, as basic needs were being met increasingly. 
Gul then raised the situation in Kirkuk, noting his 
understanding from the press that the Arab population there 
was being forced to resettle -- Arab settlement came under 
Saddam's regime, but resettlement by force is bad.  Changing 
the demographic structure of the region by force was wrong. 
He noted that Kirkuk was not originally Kurdish either, and 
it was good to have mainstream Arabs there as part of the 
solution.  U/S Grossman said he would look into the situation. 
 
 
17. (C) Gul then turned to terrorism.  He recalled his public 
statements saying that the terrorists did not just hit 
Istanbul, they hit Islam.  Fortunately the GOT quickly 
identified the terrorists, whose understanding of religion - 
a Wahhabi/Salafi theory -- was very strange and had no 
grassroots support in Turkey.  It was a small cell, imported 
from outside, which would make it easier for the GOT to root 
them out and to prevent further attacks. 
 
 
18. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Grossman. 
EDELMAN 

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