US embassy cable - 03THEHAGUE3043

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 003043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI - PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE - 
STEPHENS/GREGORIAN, L/EUR - LAHNE, L/AF - GTAFT. INR/WCAD - 
SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY 
TAGS: BK, HR, KAWC, NL, PHUM, PREL, SR, ICTY 
SUBJECT: ICTY: THREE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES OFFERED FROM 
KEY WITNESSES IN MILOSEVIC TRIAL 
 
 
(U)  Classified by Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counselor, for 
reasons 1.5(D) and 1.6. 
 
1. (SBU)    Summary:  Trial Chamber III of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) heard from 
three key witnesses in November offering unique perspectives 
on the role Milosevic played.  During the week of November 
10, historian Robert Donia resumed his testimony concerning 
the policies of Bosnian Serb leaders and their relationships 
with external actors, including Milosevic, other Belgrade 
leadership, JNA, paramilitaries, international negotiators 
and international figures.  The week of November 17, Borisav 
Jovic, former Yugoslav President who described himself as 
Milosevic's one-time closest political ally, depicted 
Milosevic as an autocrat with "absolute authority."  At the 
same time, Milosevic effectively elicited on 
cross-examination Jovic's dismissal of the notion that 
Milosevic was pursuing a plan for a greater Serbia.  In late 
November, ICTY indictee Miroslav Deronjic, who has pled 
guilty to persecution, testified through a lengthy written 
statement.  His oral testimony focused on events leading up 
to the Serb offensive in Srebrenica.  Deronjic characterized 
the massacres of Srebrenica as the "logical finale" of the 
spiraling sequence of events.  Milosevic's cross-examination 
attempted to highlight contradictions in the witness's 
statement utilizing confidential documents dealing with 
Bosnian Serb secret military orders and Karadzic,s daily 
calendar.  End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Robert Donia's Testimony 
------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On November 11, the trial chamber heard from Robert 
Donia.  Donia previously appeared before the trial chamber on 
September 12, where he provided a report that dealt with the 
policies of the Bosnian Serb leadership and the relationships 
they had with external actors.  The report analyzed the 
transcripts of 35-40 sessions of the Assembly sessions of the 
Republika Srpska to glean evidence of the policies of the 
Bosnian Serb leadership.  Milosevic resumed his 
cross-examination by attempting to discredit the report as 
biased against the "Serb side" and misleading.  Milosevic 
tried, from various angles, to show that the excerpts and 
quotes that Donia used were taken out of context to bias the 
report.  However, Donia deflected the Accused,s criticisms 
by explaining the context of the quotes to the chambers in a 
way that only strengthened his original contention. 
 
3. (SBU) Milosevic attempted to characterize the origin of 
the conflict as rooted in armed secession, and he asked 
Donia, as an historian, if he agreed.  Donia rejected this 
proposition and offered his view that "this conflict was 
caused by a determination on the part of (Milosevic) and 
others in the Belgrade leadership to prevent (a) peaceful 
secession."  Milosevic responded, as he as done previously, 
that the war was imposed upon Serbia by the premature 
recognition of individual parts of Yugoslavia.  Donia again 
rejected this view and said that the principal cause of the 
conflict was the determination of Milosevic and others in the 
Belgrade leadership to "instigate uprisings" amongst the 
Serbs in Croation and Bosnia-Herzogovina against the peaceful 
process. 
 
4. (SBU)    Milosevic addressed a particular reference to 
Karadzic speaking in the Assembly of Republika Srpska where 
he acknowledged that if Bosnian Serbs entered Srebrenica in 
1993 that there would have been "blood to the knees" given 
the history of ethnic conflict in the area.  Milosevic 
attempted to parlay this expression of awareness into 
evidence that the leadership of the Republika Srpska (RS) 
would attempt to avoid such an explosive situation.  However, 
Donia responded that the primary concern that Karadzic was 
expressing was the potential impact on the Bosnian Serb 
"state" rather than the loss of Muslim life.  He also noted 
that the situation was very different in 1995, since the 
principle threat to RS was military rather than lack of 
diplomatic recognition.  Therefore, he rejected Milosevic,s 
contention that the leaders of the Republika Srpska were as 
concerned in 1995 about entering Srebrenica as they were in 
1993.  Donia said that the context had changed, so the 
parallel could not be drawn. 
 
5. (SBU) Milosevic raised issue with Donia,s use of "Greater 
Serbia" in his report.  Milosevic noted that "not a single 
representative of the Government of Republika Srpska ever 
used the term 'Great Serbia.'"  Donia responded that while 
"Velinka Srbija" does not appear in the citation, the "sense 
of that terminology" indicates that a "Greater Serbia" was an 
objective of the leadership of the RS and that use of the 
term was suitable. 
 
------------------------- 
Borisav Jovic's Testimony 
------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) On November 20, the trial chamber heard from Borisav 
Jovic, the Serbian member of Yugoslavia's collective 
presidency in 1989 and 1990 and later president of the 
Serbian Socialist Party.  Jovic described himself as one of 
Milosevic's closest political associates, but he described 
Milosevic as a autocrat with "absolute authority."  He 
claimed that Milosevic had him replaced in a "non-democratic 
manner" like many others.  However, during the 
cross-examination, Jovic helped Milosevic paint a picture of 
the Serb leadership trying to keep Yugoslavia together and 
protect the Serbs from a multitude of forces including armed 
succession by Croatia, an over-zealous Germany forcing the 
European Community into recognizing the republics, and a 
United States bent on fighting Communism even if it meant 
tearing apart a country. 
 
7. (SBU) Jovic submitted his evidence-in-chief as a written 
statement, which included large chunks of his diary that 
chronicles, among other things, Milosevic's manipulation of 
the political system for his own gain.  Jovic testified that 
Milosevic had "absolute authority" and no one would disagree 
with him publicly.  He said that he had a rare relationship 
with Milosevic, one in which he could privately disagree with 
Milosevic.  However, Jovic noted that Milosevic usually put 
in place people he could "trust to accept the decisions he 
had made."  When pressed on this issue during Milosevic,s 
cross-examination, Jovic replied that these were his personal 
conclusions as he expressed them in his book and are ones he 
stands by today.  Milosevic asked Jovic, "But did I not 
respect other,s opinions?"  Jovic replied, "Yes, as long as 
they did not clash with your own."  Jovic explained that at 
first things were different, but later prestige and 
confidence in his own ability changed Milosevic.  He further 
observed that through this transformation political bodies 
were marginalized as they automatically adopted Milosevic's 
policies.  In short, he concluded, Milosevic's word was 
decisive, both necessary and sufficient. 
 
8. (SBU) Jovic testified to Milosevic's willingness and 
ability to manipulate the media to his own ends.  He also 
explained the cult of personality that was formed around 
Milosevic.  When Jovic protested the practice of the public 
of carrying around photographs of socialist leaders, 
Milosevic agreed and put an end to it with the exception of 
his own photo.  Milosevic responded to Jovic's accusations 
with a series of questions.  Milosevic asked whether any 
papers or radio stations were censored or prohibited, whether 
there were local private television stations, and whether 
there were any political prisoners?  To each of these 
questions, Jovic answered no.  However, Jovic commented that 
Milosevic had complete control over the State run papers, 
radios and television stations.  Moreover, Jovic identified 
the State-run national television station as the single most 
influential medium. 
 
9. (C)      Milosevic employed his usual tactic with 
potentially helpful witnesses whereby he cultivates their 
support during the early part of his examination by holding 
back issues of disagreement until the end. As such, Milosevic 
began his cross-examination with his favorite coined phrase: 
"Greater Serbia."  He asked Jovic whether this "Greater 
Serbia" was a fabrication and whether they ever had this on 
their mind.  Jovic responded that they never thought about a 
"Greater Serbia."  He noted that historians are looking into 
the origin of this concept, but that it did not concern their 
discussion.  Instead, he explained that they had 3 
principles: preserve Yugoslavia, provide self-determination 
through referenda, and ensure equality for Serbs everywhere. 
Milosevic chimed in, "Serbian people should be equal no 
matter, nothing more, nothing less." 
 
10. (SBU)   Milosevic then turned to the source of the 
conflict.  He characterized the source of the conflict as an 
internal affair of Croatia that turned into a violent act of 
secession leading to the oppression of Serb rights.  Jovic 
said that no one cared about the secession of Slovenia, since 
it had a single ethnic identity, and agreed with Milosevic 
that the violent succession of Croatia was the origin of the 
conflict.  Moreover, they both attributed blame to Germany 
for forcing the hand of other European states to approve the 
early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.  Milosevic quoted 
Jovic's diary as claiming that the United States wanted to 
destroy communism, even at the expense of breaking up 
Yugoslavia.  Jovic responded that it was clear that the 
United States wanted to topple Communism in Eastern Europe 
and was prepared to take Yugoslavia apart to introduce 
multi-party elections in the individual republics. 
 
11. (SBU) Jovic also provided useful testimony for the 
Accused concerning his control over the Yugoslav People's 
Army (JNA).  Milosevic asked whether he could give commands 
to the JNA.  Jovic responded that only members of the 
Presidency could make binding decisions, thus the JNA could 
not receive orders from Milosevic under the Constitution. 
However, Jovic left the door open by adding that whether the 
JNA followed suggestions made by others was certainly 
something that the generals could be asked.  Milosevic then 
asked whether in 1991 the JNA was still the Army of 
Yugoslavia and not a Serbian Army.  Jovic concurred that the 
JNA was not a Serbian Army and noted that the Chief of Staff 
was Bosnian, the General Staff was Croatian and the entire 
army was ethnically mixed.  Later, Jovic reiterated that 
Milosevic could not give orders to the JNA. 
 
----------------------------- 
Miroslav Deronjic's Testimony 
----------------------------- 
 
12. (SBU) On November 26, the prosecution called Miroslav 
Deronjic, who had already pleaded guilty before the ICTY for 
ordering the ethnic cleansing of a Muslim village, Glogova. 
Deronjic testified to the involvement of the JNA, 
paramilitary groups and the Red Beret commandos in military 
operations around Glogova.  Milosevic accused the witness of 
lying to the court as part of his plea agreement with the 
Prosecution.  The witness rejected this proposition. 
Deronjic also provided a lasting impression as he described a 
domino effect of conflict and ethnic tensions of which 
"Srebrenica was the logical finale." 
 
13. (SBU)   Deronjic described how Serbian paramilitary 
groups including Arkan's men and Seselj's men would arrive 
into an area and escalate the ethnic tensions with violent 
conflicts and looting, which brought on panic and fear.  He 
described their efforts as part of a secret plan that not 
everyone in the SDS new about.  He also testified to the 
presence of the JNA.  He said the JNA took part in the 
offensives in some areas.  Deronjic also said that the Red 
Berets commandos were present.  Milosevic, as  president of 
Serbia, would have had control over this group through his 
interior ministry.  Deronjic also accused Milosevic of 
sending volunteer forces from Serbia to help cleanse Muslims 
from villages in the area. 
 
14. (SBU) Milosevic charged Deronjic with agreeing to provide 
false testimony as part of a plea agreement with the 
Prosecution.  Deronjic replied that he had not provided false 
testimony and had expressed his desire to appear as a witness 
for the prosecution before he ever made a plea agreement.  He 
said that he was not testifying because of the plea 
agreement, but that it was his "absolute wish to testify 
before this court." 
 
15. (C)     Milosevic referred to two separate documents 
while trying to refute the specifics of Deronjic's testimony. 
 Deronjic claimed that he became away of potential military 
preparations concerning Srebrenica and became concerned that 
local Serb forces would incur major losses if not supported 
by more professional soldiers.  Deronjic claimed that he 
traveled to Pale to talk with Karadzic about these 
preparations.  Milosevic attempted to discredit the witness 
by referring to a secret military order issued out of Pale, 
which Milosevic claims Deronjic would have seen.  Also, 
Milosevic provided the court with a copy of Karadzic's 
calendar for the day in question taken from the diary of his 
secretary.  While his efforts to discredit the witness were 
 
SIPDIS 
not all that effective, it is noteworthy that Milosevic 
continues to have access to such documents. 
 
16. (SBU)   In his testimony, Deronjic described how already 
existing ethnic tensions were deliberately aggravated by the 
arrival of Serbian paramilitary and volunteer units.  He 
described a domino effect where tensions, conflict and 
violence lead to an atmosphere of fear and panic.  He said 
that the massacre in "Srebrenica was the logical finale." 
 
17. (C) Comment:  November was an important month for 
Milosevic and the prosecution, with each side making gains 
through key testimony.  With the most dedicated focus yet on 
the crimes which occurred in Bosnia, the month opened with 
the "big picture" testimony of Lord David Owen, continued 
with a host of insiders and "crime-base" witnesses, and 
concluded with one of the Bosnian Serb officers on the ground 
during the Srebrenica massacres of July 1995.  Some of the 
witnesses, including Owen and Jovic, gave some credence to 
Milosevic's argument that he did not control the actions of 
Bosnian Serb political and military leaders.  Others, such as 
Deronjic and Donia, saw things differently, with Milosevic 
clearly at the center of the war in Bosnia, if not an actual 
perpetrator of each crime a clear inspiration of them.  In 
sum, neither side made the trial chamber's job any easier. 
End comment. 
SOBEL