US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7597

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MORE ON TURKISH AIRPORT SECURITY

Identifier: 03ANKARA7597
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA7597 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-12-10 15:36:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: PTER EAIR TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS ANKARA 007597 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
STATE FOR DS, EB/TRA AND EUR/SE 
ROME FOR FAA 
PARIS FOR TSA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, EAIR, TU 
SUBJECT: MORE ON TURKISH AIRPORT SECURITY 
 
 
REF: ANKARA 7316 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  In December 3-4 meetings with Turkish 
officials responsible for aviation security, EconCouns 
reiterated the USG's strong interest in Turkish 
airport/aviation security efforts and expressed concern about 
a loophole in the current system that enables some passengers 
arriving on international flights to Ankara to evade 
immigration processing.  The officials acknowledged that, due 
to passenger complaints, aviation authorities had recently 
abandoned the requirement for all international passengers to 
go through immigration at their port of entry in Turkey, and 
that the current system -- based on sorting passengers by the 
color of their boarding passes -- was not being effectively 
implemented.  Embassy is following up with other GOT 
agencies.  End Summary. 
 
 
2.  (SBU) EconCouns discussed airport/aviation security with 
Director General of Civil Aviaition Topa Toker December 3 and 
with Turkish National Police Protection Department Chief 
Mustafa Bal December 4.  He welcomed the GOT's new airport 
security procedures (reftel) and its continued cooperation 
with TSA on security at Istanbul's Ataturk Airport, and 
reiterated the USG's continuing interest in Turkish 
airport/aviation security efforts at domestic as well as 
international airports.  Toker and Bal both stressed that 
they implemented the same comprehensive security practices at 
all airports, domestic and international.  Bal noted that 
they had sent a notice to all airports in early November -- 
before the Istanbul bombings -- urging them to maintain a 
high level of alert. 
 
 
3.  (SBU) EconCouns expressed concern about the recent 
reappearance of an apparent loophole in procedures that would 
enable international travelers to avoid going through Turkish 
immigration in some cases.  Several Embassy officers arriving 
in Ankara, via Istanbul, on international flights in recent 
weeks had noticed that airline staff were asking 
international passengers to board one bus (going to the 
international terminal) and domestic passengers to board a 
second bus, going to the domestic terminal, where there is no 
immigration or customs control.  However, at least on these 
flights, airline staff did not check to verify that 
passengers boarded the correct bus, meaning that any 
international passenger could easily have boarded the bus to 
the domestic terminal and bypassed all entry controls. (Note: 
 International passengers did not pass through immigration or 
customs in Istanbul.  End note) 
 
 
4.  (SBU) Toker and Bal said that, approximately a year ago, 
in response to similar embassy expressions of concern, 
aviation authorities had issued instructions requiring all 
international passengers to go through immigration and 
customs at the first port of entry (usually, but not always, 
Istanbul).  In response to passenger complaints, however, 
authorities had reversed that decision effective October 1. 
Toker and Bal explained that, under the new system, 
international and domestic passengers received different 
color boarding passes, and airline staff were required to 
segregate passengers upon arrival based on those boarding 
passes.  Toker argued that this system was effective. 
 
 
5.  (SBU) EconCouns responded that our own experience 
indicated that the system was not effective, as Embassy staff 
had witnessed first-hand on several flights that airline 
staff were not making any effort to control what in effect 
was a "self-segregation" mechanism.  He added that we 
considered this loophole to be a serious security problem, 
and asked that GOT authorities look into it right away. 
 
 
6.  (SBU) Toker agreed to take a look at the system.  Bal 
acknowledged that the airlines did not appear to be 
implementing the new mechanism in a disciplined manner, and 
said Embassy's comments would give him ammunition to fight 
for a return to the pre-October 1 security system.  Embassy 
will continue to press the GOT, including the Ministry of 
Interior, to close this loophole, and will keep Washington 
advised of developments.   . 
 
 
 
 
EDELMAN 

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