US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7584

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

TURKEY: IN SEARCH OF A ROLE IN PSI

Identifier: 03ANKARA7584
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA7584 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-12-10 14:38:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 007584 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR NP, T, AND EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2013 
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: IN SEARCH OF A ROLE IN PSI 
 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 335671 
     B. HEALD-HRYCAJ EMAIL 12/09/03 
     C. ANKARA 7443 
 
 
(U) Classified by Pol-Mil Counselor Timothy Betts, reasons 
1.5, b/d. 
 
 
1. (C) PolMilOff delivered ref A and B information to MFA 
Disarmament Department Head Bulent Meric.  Meric said that 
the GOT had discussed at length the PSI Principles and 
supported them unambiguously.  In addition, the GOT was 
committed to making an "effective contribution" to 
interdiction activities and was searching for a role in which 
it could do that.  After reviewing the "London document" the 
GOT believed that its support for PSI was sufficient to 
participate in the December meeting.  PolMilOff reiterated 
that the December meeting was for operational experts to plan 
their contributions to future activities.  PolMilOff 
suggested that bilateral consultations might be a better 
means of answering Turkey's questions.  But Meric said Turkey 
wanted to see how other countries, not just the US, were 
participating, how they came to define their roles in PSI, 
and what capabilities they were providing. Then the GOT hoped 
to determine what Turkish capabilities were needed and assign 
them. 
 
 
2. (C)  Meric noted that the GOT still had questions about 
the modalities of a PSI interdiction, and he was unsure how 
to get these answers without participating in the experts 
level meetings.  He said that Turkey would be open about its 
own interdiction shortcomings -- its legislation for this 
type of interdiction was still "embryonic" and its 
bureaucratic coordination needed to be streamlined. When 
PolMilOff asked if TGS and the Ministry of Interior had been 
consulted on the issue, Meric replied that the Turkish policy 
on support for PSI was clear. 
 
 
3. (C) Comment and Recommendation: The Turks clearly support 
PSI and want to participate, but they need to be exposed to 
the process in order to feel comfortable with it and 
determine how best to contribute.  Embassy Ankara recommends 
inviting an expert team of Turks to participate in the 
December meeting (clearly defining what type of experts are 
expected), and providing a day of consultations the day prior 
to the meeting in order to answer some of the GOT's 
questions.  Embassy Ankara looks forward to Washington's 
decision. 
EDELMAN 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04