US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7526

S E C R E T ANKARA 007526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, MOPS, MARR, PINR, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRAQ: TGS SUGGESTS USING PMF AS TRAINING 
UNIT OR IN NEW IRAQI ARMY 
 
REF: ANKARA 6804 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman.  Reasons 1.5 b and 
d. Recommendation at para 4. 
 
 
1. (S) During talks with VCJCS Pace December 3-4, Turkish 
General Staff Chief Gen. Ozkok and Deputy Gen. Basbug 
suggested that the "Peace Monitoring Force (PMF) can be used 
as a training unit or a security force in the new Iraqi 
National Army."  Earlier, a senior Turkish officer voiced a 
similar suggestion to the Office of Defense Cooperation Chief. 
 
 
2. (S) Comment: While the notion of an intact PMF serving as 
a unit in the new Iraqi army is clearly problematic, the fact 
that TGS made the suggestion, without linking PMF's future to 
PKK/KADEK issues or the future of Turkish Special Forces in 
northern Iraq, hints at a possible way forward on ending the 
PMF presence in northern Iraq.  We defer to CPA and CJTF-7 as 
to the viability of either Turkish suggestion.  End comment. 
 
 
3. (S) Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq have wanted to 
end the PMF presence for years (see reftel), and have passed 
an act of the Kurdish parliament calling for an end to the 
force.  We understand US commanders in the field also seek an 
end to this armed unit operating in the coalition AOR outside 
of coalition command.  We recently asked Iraqi Turkmen Front 
reps in Ankara if any ITF or PMF members had sought to enlist 
in the new Iraqi army.  The ITF reps did not think so, but 
said that Turkmen enlistment would be an important factor for 
integrating Iraqi Turkmen into the structures of the new Iraq. 
 
 
4. (S) Recommendation: Assuming the coalition would not want 
to keep the PMF intact, a concerted effort to encourage Iraqi 
PMF members to enlist in the new Iraqi army could help bring 
the PMF to closure.  We believe it is worth seeking TGS 
support for such an effort if the PMF's over 400 trained (and 
armed) Iraqi Turkmen and Assyrians could be reasonably 
assured of selection into the new Iraq army or other Iraqi 
security structures should they choose to enlist.  We would 
first need to publicly declare that the coalition welcomed 
application for enlistment from current (and previous) 
members of the PMF.  We could then inform the TGS and the PMF 
that Iraqi PMF members must choose to enlist by a date 
certain, after which the PMF would cease to exist and its 
members not applying for enlistment would disarm and disband. 
 We offer this suggestion as food for thought. 
 
 
5. (U) Baghdad Minimize Considered. 
EDELMAN