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| Identifier: | 03RANGOON1574 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03RANGOON1574 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Rangoon |
| Created: | 2003-12-08 09:12:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PHUM PGOV BM National Convention NLD |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001574
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2013
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, BM, National Convention, NLD
SUBJECT: NLD LEADERSHIP ON NATIONAL CONVENTION PROCESS
REF: A. STATE 335326
B. RANGOON 1562
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D).
1. (U) The following refers to questions raised in reftel A.
2. (C) NLD Central Executive Committee members detailed to
the Chief of Mission and Emboffs (reftel B) the minimum steps
necessary for the party to resume participation in a National
Convention process. (NOTE: In 1995, when the SPDC
reportedly violated the procedural ground-rules it itself had
set, the NLD presented a list of questions about procedures
governing the National Convention and subsequent steps. The
SPDC did not reply and the NLD, fearing the SPDC would ramrod
the regime's desired outcome down the throats of the
Convention's delegates, suspended its participation. END
NOTE) CEC members, after voicing the customary deference to
the senior party leaders still being incarcerated by the
SPDC, told us they thought a response from the SPDC
guaranteeing procedural and substantive fairness for all
participants would be a minimal starting point for the NLD's
participation.
3. (C) Post emphasized in explicit terms to the CEC members
that military action was not a realistic option. Moreover,
we have repeatedly made that point with Burmese interlocutors
since we first began hearing calls for outright U.S. military
intervention in Burma in March and April -- not
coincidentally, just prior to and during the invasion of
Iraq.
Martinez
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