US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1574

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NLD LEADERSHIP ON NATIONAL CONVENTION PROCESS

Identifier: 03RANGOON1574
Wikileaks: View 03RANGOON1574 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2003-12-08 09:12:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PHUM PGOV BM National Convention NLD
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001574 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, BM, National Convention, NLD 
SUBJECT: NLD LEADERSHIP ON NATIONAL CONVENTION PROCESS 
 
REF: A. STATE 335326 
 
     B. RANGOON 1562 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ FOR REASON 1.5(D). 
 
1. (U) The following refers to questions raised in reftel A. 
 
2. (C) NLD Central Executive Committee members detailed to 
the Chief of Mission and Emboffs (reftel B) the minimum steps 
necessary for the party to resume participation in a National 
Convention process.  (NOTE:  In 1995, when the SPDC 
reportedly violated the procedural ground-rules it itself had 
set, the NLD presented a list of questions about procedures 
governing the National Convention and subsequent steps.  The 
SPDC did not reply and the NLD, fearing the SPDC would ramrod 
the regime's desired outcome down the throats of the 
Convention's delegates, suspended its participation.  END 
NOTE)  CEC members, after voicing the customary deference to 
the senior party leaders still being incarcerated by the 
SPDC, told us they thought a response from the SPDC 
guaranteeing procedural and substantive fairness for all 
participants would be a minimal starting point for the NLD's 
participation. 
 
3. (C) Post emphasized in explicit terms to the CEC members 
that military action was not a realistic option.  Moreover, 
we have repeatedly made that point with Burmese interlocutors 
since we first began hearing calls for outright U.S. military 
intervention in Burma in March and April -- not 
coincidentally, just prior to and during the invasion of 
Iraq. 
Martinez 

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