US embassy cable - 03LAGOS2465

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VISIT OF AF A/S WALTER KANSTEINER: US/UK DISCUSSION

Identifier: 03LAGOS2465
Wikileaks: View 03LAGOS2465 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Consulate Lagos
Created: 2003-12-05 19:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINS PREL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

051935Z Dec 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 002465 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL 
SUBJECT: VISIT OF AF A/S WALTER KANSTEINER: US/UK DISCUSSION 
 
 
1.  Classified confidential by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; 
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
2.  Summary:  Visiting AF Assistant Secretary Walter 
Kansteiner and Ambassador 
Jeter met July 25 with British High Commissioner Phillip 
Thomas to discuss Nigeria's 
pre-election political climate and tensions between Nigeria 
and Cameroon over 
the Bakassi Peninsula.  There was agreement that steps can be 
taken by the 
U.S., U.K. and France before a World Court decision is 
announced to encourage 
both countries to peacefully abide by the Court's ruling. 
End Summary 
 
 
3. During a July 25 visit to Abuja, AF Assistant Secretary 
Walter Kansteiner 
and Ambassador Jeter told British High Commissioner Philip 
Thomas that 
President Obasanjo had been  very agitated over the issue of 
the Bakassi 
Peninsula in a meeting earlier in that day (septel).  The 
Ambassador noted that 
Nigeria might be willing to fight over Bakassi if the 
International Court of Justice(ICJ) judgement goes against 
Nigeria's interests. President Obasanjo may need outside 
mediation to avoid being pushed towards military 
intervention, and to foster dialog with 
Cameroon, preferably before the ICJ ruling is announced.  A/S 
Kansteiner 
observed that the new French Foreign Minister is very 
interested in Africa and 
could be an asset in joining the US and UK in sending a 
strong and unified 
message to Nigeria and Cameroon.  Specifically, the message 
would be that a 
military response by either side to the Court's decision 
would be 
internationally unacceptable and would be catastrophic for 
Nigeria's image, reputation and leadership in Africa. 
 
 
 
 
2. The High Commissioner remarked that in his previous 
conversations with the 
Nigerian President, Obasanjo had indicated a willingness to 
abide by the ICJ's decision, although he appears to have told 
French President Chirac that the Army might not swallow a 
verdict against Nigeria.   The High Commissioner pointed out 
that Cameroon's military capability does not match 
Nigeria's  which could cause Nigeria to do something 
stupid.  The Ambassador replied that while Nigeria's 
military would take casualties in an encounter, they would 
eventually overwhelm the Cameroonian military.  He noted that 
national pride and Presidential egos were factors in the 
building tensions.  Nigeria is already publicly accusing 
Cameroon of mistreating Nigerian citizens who constitute 90 
percent of the population in the Peninsula and, the 
Ambassador observed, there are already unconfirmed reports 
that Nigeria might do something pre-emptive. 
 
 
3. Thomas turned to the broader problem of Nigeria's 
difficult economic 
situation and lack of institutional political strength that 
could lead to a 
power grab before the 2003 elections. He said that former 
President Babangida 
is a wild card in the political game.  Furthermore, it is 
still unclear if 
the Obasanjo-Abubakar ticket will survive and, if it does 
not, who else might emerge as alternatives. The High 
Commisioner agreed that there are no quick fixes to ensure 
Nigeria's democracy and the country is too important to walk 
away from. 
 
 
4. Thomas fully endorsed the idea of holding a bilateral 
meeting on Nigeria in London during October and suggested 
that the World Bank and perhaps the EU be included along with 
representatives from the Department of State, the FCO and 
Number 10.  Ambassador Jeter recommended including 
representation by Canada. The Ambassador proposed that DFID 
and USAID meet on one day while political meetings take place 
simultaneously; a second day could be devoted to a joint 
political/economic/assistance session on Nigeria. 
 
 
5. The High Commissioner strongly agreed with the Assistant 
Secretary's views that the shared goal of both the US and the 
 
SIPDIS 
U.K. is the preservation of civilian rule in Nigeria and a 
peaceful election in 2003.  The alternative -- implosion in 
Nigeria  -- would be an enormous humanitarian tragedy. 
 
 
6.  Comment: The concerns expressed in the meeting over 
saber-rattling between Nigeria and Cameroon were underlined 
in the July 28 issue of the widely read Sunday Vanguard 
newspaper.  An article expressed fear that Cameroonian 
authorities have something up their sleeves and are deploying 
their troops close to the border with Nigeria.  The article 
goes on to assure the reader that Nigeria has taken steps to 
"have as many men on the ground in case of any surprise act 
of aggression by Cameroon."  End Comment. 
 
 
7. Assistant Secretary Kansteiner did not clear this cable 
before his 
departure. 
 
 
HINSON-JONES 

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