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| Identifier: | 03LAGOS2465 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03LAGOS2465 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Consulate Lagos |
| Created: | 2003-12-05 19:35:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV PINS PREL |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 051935Z Dec 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 002465 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2010 TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL SUBJECT: VISIT OF AF A/S WALTER KANSTEINER: US/UK DISCUSSION 1. Classified confidential by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 2. Summary: Visiting AF Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner and Ambassador Jeter met July 25 with British High Commissioner Phillip Thomas to discuss Nigeria's pre-election political climate and tensions between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula. There was agreement that steps can be taken by the U.S., U.K. and France before a World Court decision is announced to encourage both countries to peacefully abide by the Court's ruling. End Summary 3. During a July 25 visit to Abuja, AF Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner and Ambassador Jeter told British High Commissioner Philip Thomas that President Obasanjo had been very agitated over the issue of the Bakassi Peninsula in a meeting earlier in that day (septel). The Ambassador noted that Nigeria might be willing to fight over Bakassi if the International Court of Justice(ICJ) judgement goes against Nigeria's interests. President Obasanjo may need outside mediation to avoid being pushed towards military intervention, and to foster dialog with Cameroon, preferably before the ICJ ruling is announced. A/S Kansteiner observed that the new French Foreign Minister is very interested in Africa and could be an asset in joining the US and UK in sending a strong and unified message to Nigeria and Cameroon. Specifically, the message would be that a military response by either side to the Court's decision would be internationally unacceptable and would be catastrophic for Nigeria's image, reputation and leadership in Africa. 2. The High Commissioner remarked that in his previous conversations with the Nigerian President, Obasanjo had indicated a willingness to abide by the ICJ's decision, although he appears to have told French President Chirac that the Army might not swallow a verdict against Nigeria. The High Commissioner pointed out that Cameroon's military capability does not match Nigeria's which could cause Nigeria to do something stupid. The Ambassador replied that while Nigeria's military would take casualties in an encounter, they would eventually overwhelm the Cameroonian military. He noted that national pride and Presidential egos were factors in the building tensions. Nigeria is already publicly accusing Cameroon of mistreating Nigerian citizens who constitute 90 percent of the population in the Peninsula and, the Ambassador observed, there are already unconfirmed reports that Nigeria might do something pre-emptive. 3. Thomas turned to the broader problem of Nigeria's difficult economic situation and lack of institutional political strength that could lead to a power grab before the 2003 elections. He said that former President Babangida is a wild card in the political game. Furthermore, it is still unclear if the Obasanjo-Abubakar ticket will survive and, if it does not, who else might emerge as alternatives. The High Commisioner agreed that there are no quick fixes to ensure Nigeria's democracy and the country is too important to walk away from. 4. Thomas fully endorsed the idea of holding a bilateral meeting on Nigeria in London during October and suggested that the World Bank and perhaps the EU be included along with representatives from the Department of State, the FCO and Number 10. Ambassador Jeter recommended including representation by Canada. The Ambassador proposed that DFID and USAID meet on one day while political meetings take place simultaneously; a second day could be devoted to a joint political/economic/assistance session on Nigeria. 5. The High Commissioner strongly agreed with the Assistant Secretary's views that the shared goal of both the US and the SIPDIS U.K. is the preservation of civilian rule in Nigeria and a peaceful election in 2003. The alternative -- implosion in Nigeria -- would be an enormous humanitarian tragedy. 6. Comment: The concerns expressed in the meeting over saber-rattling between Nigeria and Cameroon were underlined in the July 28 issue of the widely read Sunday Vanguard newspaper. An article expressed fear that Cameroonian authorities have something up their sleeves and are deploying their troops close to the border with Nigeria. The article goes on to assure the reader that Nigeria has taken steps to "have as many men on the ground in case of any surprise act of aggression by Cameroon." End Comment. 7. Assistant Secretary Kansteiner did not clear this cable before his departure. HINSON-JONES
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