US embassy cable - 03AMMAN7909

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 007909 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, KISL, JO, KTER 
SUBJECT: ISLAMIC PARTY THE KING-MAKER IN JORDAN'S SPEAKER 
RACE 
 
REF: AMMAN 07874 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires David Hale for Reasons 1.5 (B,D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) Saad Hayel Srour, former Speaker of the Lower House 
of Parliament, told PolCouns and PolOff that he withdrew from 
the Speaker race after the Islamic Action Front made too many 
demands in exchange for backing his candidacy.  He expects 
only limited progress in approving the backlog of provisional 
laws and warned of hostile reaction to proposed government 
price hikes on basic commodities.  Srour cautioned that PM 
Fayez was making "too many promises" in his dialogue with the 
opposition and questioned whether the government was fully 
committed to its calls for political development.  Current 
Speaker Abdul Hadi Majali denied making concessions to the 
IAF to win its support in the contest for Speaker.  End 
Summary. 
 
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A FULL PLATE 
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2.  (C) PolCouns and PolOff met December 3 with Saad Hayel 
Srour (East Banker, North Badia) to discuss the agenda for 
the regular session of Parliament and the recent election of 
Abdul Hadi Majali as Lower House Speaker (see ref).  Srour 
predicted that the agenda would be dominated by:  1) the vote 
of confidence for Prime Minister Fayez's government; 2) 
debate on the government's proposed 2.67 billion Jordanian 
Dinar budget; and 3) consideration of the more than 200 
remaining provisional laws.  Srour said that the budget could 
prove contentious and he doubted whether Parliament would 
make significant headway in clearing the backlog of 
provisional laws in the time available. 
 
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PROMISES, PROMISES 
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3.  (C) Srour described PM Fayez as a very "nice" person and 
confirmed that Fayez had engaged in unprecedented dialogue 
with MPs and civil society.  He warned, however, that Fayez 
was "making too many promises" in the dialogue and could be 
raising unrealistically high expectations for his government. 
 If MPs and other Jordanians did not see concrete steps taken 
in the next 3-4 months to fulfill the promises and implement 
the government's stated goals, they could sour on Fayez and 
his ministers.  Srour noted that MPs reacted very negatively 
when Fayez had broached the subject of price increases, 
foreshadowing a public outcry against the government if it 
tried to raise prices for gasoline and staple goods. 
 
4.  (C) Srour also questioned whether the government was 
fully committed to its call for political development.  He 
remarked that real, meaningful democratic change was 
achievable, but doubted whether the government had the "will 
and determination" to take more than half-measures or 
cosmetic steps.  In order to push through any significant 
reforms, political or otherwise, Srour said that the new 
Cabinet would have to be united and speak with one voice, in 
contrast to previous Cabinet ministers who contradicted each 
other publicly and in front of Parliament. 
 
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IAF: TOO BIG FOR ITS BRITCHES 
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5.  (C) Srour, a five-time Speaker, was chosen to lead the 
Lower House during Parliament's "extraordinary session" 
earlier this year and had declared his intention to continue 
in this role before withdrawing from the Speaker race on 
November 24.  According to Srour, there was keen competition 
between parliamentary blocs to claim the position of Speaker 
and none of the major blocs, except for the Islamic Action 
Front (IAF), was willing to throw its lot behind the 
candidate of another bloc prior to voting.  Therefore, 
although the IAF contains only 17 MPs (plus 3 "independents" 
who consistently vote with the IAF), it played the deciding 
role in the Speaker's race, and reached a deal to back 
Majali.  Once Majali had secured the IAF votes in addition to 
those of his own National Action Front bloc, he became the 
undisputed front-runner, prompting Srour and other candidates 
for Speaker to drop out of the competition. 
 
6.  (C) Although the IAF had supported Srour for Speaker 
during Parliament's extraordinary session, Srour said that he 
was unable to reach an agreement with the bloc to back him 
this time around.  Srour claimed that the IAF had developed 
an inflated opinion of its importance in Parliament and, 
accordingly, had become much more demanding during his 
negotiations with them.  Srour mentioned in particular that 
the IAF wanted him to guarantee the position of "first deputy 
speaker" (the number two leadership position in the Lower 
House) for one of its members, as well as a commitment from 
him to work to achieve return of the three HAMAS leaders 
deported in 1999.  With a sense of indignation, Srour stated, 
"I was not going to let (deported HAMAS leader) Khalid Mishal 
control the Speaker election." 
 
7.  (C) Srour opined that Majali had likely made "too many 
concessions" to secure the IAF's backing on issues over which 
he has little influence.  Consequently, this could come back 
to haunt him in the future.  He also remarked that several 
IAF members had told him in confidence that they were 
disheartened by the bloc's decision to support Majali given 
Majali's long and close association with Jordanian security 
forces (see ref) and repression of the IAF.  Srour said that 
his negotiations with the IAF over the Speaker race were 
conducted through IAF MP Azzam Al-Hunedi (West Banker, Amman 
- 1st District) with IAF Secretary General Hamzah Mansur "on 
the sidelines." 
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BACKROOM DEAL? 
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8.  (C) Many in Amman share Srour's belief that Majali caved 
in to IAF pressure on political matters to gain the bloc's 
support for his bid for Speaker.  In a press interview 
published December 4, Majali denied these allegations, 
stating that his talks with the IAF never touched on 
sensitive political issues, but focused on subjects of common 
interest such as greater public freedoms, political 
development, and a more assertive Parliament.  "We agreed to 
jointly study pending legislation and to a adopt a position 
or consensus on these laws before they are presented to 
Parliament, and to coordinate with each other over (the 
composition) of House committees," stated Majali. 
 
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COMMENT 
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9.  (C) Widely considered the most organized and cohesive of 
the parliamentary blocs, the IAF, in its negotiations with 
Srour and Majali over the Speaker contest, is learning to act 
like a real political party.  Although other blocs may have 
more members, the IAF's internal discipline and political 
cunning, especially in knowing how to exploit differences 
between other blocs, give it more importance than its numbers 
may suggest. 
 
10.  (C) Notwithstanding any promises Majali may have made to 
the IAF on security or foreign policy, these issues will 
remain firmly within the control of King Abdullah and the 
government.  Majali and Parliament will have only marginal 
impact. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site 
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE