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| Identifier: | 03ANKARA7451 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA7451 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-12-04 15:35:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | CY PGOV PREL TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007451 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2013 TAGS: CY, PGOV, PREL, TU SUBJECT: TURKEY MFA CYPRUS DEPARTMENT HEAD ON UPCOMING CYPRUS INITIATIVE, ELECTIONS REF: STATE 327579 (U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary. MFA Cyprus Department Head Levent Bilman worries that despite its planned initiative for a Cyprus settlement, Turkey will be unfairly blamed for future breakdowns in negotiations. He claims Turkey\'s initiative will be prepared in line with the SYG\'s requirements and said, without giving details, that the GOT will prepare public opinion for the concessions necessary for final settlement. He requested U.S. intervention with the SYG once Turkey\'s proposal is submitted and with the Greek Cypriots to reach an agreement. End Summary. Turkey\'s Upcoming Initiative 2. (C) Calling in poloff on December 4, Bilman handed over copies of recent media interviews of Cypriot President Papadopoulos and former President Clerides. He pointed out Clerides\' quotes to the effect that \"we had to put blame on the Turkish side for the failure of negotiations, while not accepting anything or making any concession during the negotiations.\" He particularly emphasized Papadopoulos\' statements that he had no intention of signing the Annan Plan in Hague. 3. (C) According to Bilman, these showed that Turkey had been unfairly blamed for breakdown of Annan Plan negotiations. He worried this would happen again if there were a breakdown when Turkey offered its new Cyprus initiative after the elections. \"If we\'re going to get blamed, what\'s the point?\" he asked rhetorically. Bilman quickly added that the GOT was still committed to going forward with its initiative, but was concerned about what the response would be. 4. (C) Poloff replied these quotes demonstrated the importance of Turkey framing its initiative in Annan Plan terms, both procedurally and substantively, in order not to leave room for anyone to claim Turkey had not done its part. If it did not agree to Annan Plan procedures, or if it contained substantive non-starters that re-opened basic principles, Turkey\'s initiative would be rejected and Turkey would again be blamed for the impasse. 5. (C) Bilman claimed Turkey was preparing its initiative in line with the SYG\'s requirements. However, he worried that in evaluating the proposal, the SYG, although well-intentioned, would rely on advisors who would take a harsh view of the initiative. He said Turkey would need help with \"access\" to the SYG. 6. (C) Bilman asked for examples of non-starters; poloff cited insistence on pre-settlement recognition of the \"TRNC\" (reftel). Asked whether the GOT had thought about how to prepare Turkish public opinion for the concessions necessary to reach final settlement, Bilman replied the GOT had thought about this, but he offered no details. He said PM Erdogan\'s December 3 statements that there were \"two different states, two different religions, two different languages\" on Cyprus, fit with the Annan Plan\'s bicommunality provisions. He was confident the public would accept a final agreement. 7. (C) Bilman predicted that even if an ostensible agreement were reached, Greek Cypriots would use the Russians to block approval in the Security Council. The Russians, he pointed out, voted with the Greek Cypriots in the COE against the recent Loizidou settlement proposal. He said the Greek Cypriot side needed to be pressured in order for real agreement to be reached; he asked for U.S. help in doing this. Even if Turkey did everything in its power to reach agreement, the Greek Cypriots would not have sufficient pressure on them and felt they would suffer no consequences for failing to respond. Poloff responded that leverage with the Greek Cypriots would be highest prior to Cyprus\' May 1 EU accession. December 14 Elections 8. (C) On elections, Bilman noted that voters lists were complete; he claimed the \"TRNC High Election Board\" (\"HEB\") had received 1232 objections and had stricken 921 names from voter rolls due to insufficient proof of residency. He claimed the \"HEB\" had received no additional objections to the voter lists outside those in pending court cases. Despite opposition claims to unequal time on local television, Bilman said \"reports from the island\" suggested these were untrue. He said the \"Speaker\" of the \"TRNC Parliament\" had invited COE and OSCE observers to the island, but none had come. Europe, he complained, had prejudged the results and would recognize an opposition victory, but not a victory but the current government parties. EDELMAN
The original 2011 source snapshot is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04