US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7446

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007446 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FOR P:U/S GROSSMAN FROM AMB EDELMAN; ALSO FOR EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPTION 1.6 X4, X6 
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, PGOV, MARR, TU 
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY GROSSMAN'S FORCE POSTURE 
CONSULTATIONS WITH TURKEY 
 
(U)  Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reason: 1.5 
(a) and (d). 
 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (S)  Welcome back to Turkey.  We and the GOT are looking 
forward to your December 8-9 visit.  You will be seeing TGS 
Deputy Chief Basbug (both TGS Chief Ozkok and DefMin Gonul 
are traveling), DPM/FM Gul, and MFA U/S Ziyal.  You will find 
the Turks preoccupied with the investigation into the 
Istanbul bombings and with the upcoming elections in northern 
Cyprus.  Most senior GOT officials are not expecting major 
changes to our force posture in Turkey, although some 
continue to believe the US military wants to "punish" Turkey 
for not supporting our initial military operations against 
Iraq.  Recent meetings of the High Level Defense Group 
(HLDG--Nov. 17-19 in Williamsburg) and the Economic 
Partnership Council (EPC--Dec. 1-2 in Washington) helped us 
get our broad bilateral relationship back on track.  Your 
visit, demonstrating a commitment to consultations and 
underscoring our continuing commitment to the security of a 
Europe that includes Turkey, will further underscore that 
while Iraq remains a priority for both our governments, our 
relationship is based on broader common interests. 
Nonetheless, Turks continue to look to the USG to identify 
areas beyond police training where they can contribute to 
reconstruction and stabilization.  We should also take 
advantage of your visit to urge the Turks to make the most of 
the opportunity before May to reach a Cyprus settlement, to 
reassure them of our commitment to eliminate the 
PKK/KADEK/KHK threat to Turkey in northern Iraq, to enlist 
greater Turkish political support on Georgia.  On 
Afghanistan, you should thank the Turks for their continued 
support for OEF and ISAF operations (including their recent 
offer of helicopters), encourage them to press Dostum to 
comply with the ceasefire/heavy weapons cantonment accord, 
and explore the possibility of the GOT increasing its 
contributions to ISAF and/or PRTs.  Finally, you might 
compare notes with Ziyal and Gul on our visions for the 
Istanbul Summit.  End summary. 
 
 
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The Setting:  After Traveling a Bumpy Road 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
2.  (C)  After a year in power, the AK Party government 
continues to use its overwhelming Parliamentary majority to 
pursue democratic and political reform, and has its sights 
firmly set on Turkey's winning eventual accession to the EU. 
Many within the secular establishment here continue to be 
suspicious of AK, fearing the party intends to change the 
role of religion in Turkey; but so far Prime Minister Erdogan 
has been skillful at forwarding the party's reform agenda in 
ways and at a pace that avoids provoking a strong reaction 
from the military or most other conservatives circles. 
Turkish General Staff Chief General Ozkok in particular has 
demonstrated a degree of tolerance for change, some of which 
erode the military's traditional influence, despite 
opposition within the officer corps.  Two years of sound 
fiscal/monitory policy, the rapid and successful conclusion 
of the Iraq war, expected US financial assistance, and 
unprecedented IMF support have combined to bring down 
inflation and interest rates, restore modest growth, and 
create some hope that Turkey can work its way out from under 
an incredibly high public debt burden.  However, the 
government has done little to implement the structural 
reforms that are essential if this positive momentum is to be 
maintained, and has hesitated to take advantage of our $8.5 
billion financial assistance, which could save it hundreds of 
millions of dollars in interest payments.  The bombings in 
Istanbul temporarily set the stock market back, but it 
quickly recovered, and financial markets in general have been 
stable.  Benefiting from its good performance in government, 
its clean image, and its lack of competitors that are 
credible with the public, AK remains highly popular.  The 
party hopes to cash in on this popularity (and refresh its 
mandate) during local elections in March.  US-Turkish 
relations have been stabilized at the official level, but the 
public perception of whether our interests coincide or not 
and of US purpose in the world have declined considerably. 
Turkey's leaders portray the relationship publicly in ways 
that are not always helpful in this regard. 
 
 
3.  (S)  Iraq, quite naturally, continues to dominated our 
bilateral relations.  The disappointing March 1 parliamentary 
vote that prevented our use of Turkish territory for an OIF 
northern front, the July 4 arrest and interrogation of the 11 
Turkish special forces personnel in northern Iraq, and 
divergent US and Turkish views of Iraqi Kurds strained the 
relationship.  However, determination to improve the 
situation on both sides has resulted in Turkey's positive 
contribution to our efforts in Iraq since the war -- 
humanitarian assistance, participation in reconstruction, 
trade, and resupply overland to our forces in Iraq. 
Parliament's approval on October 7 for the GOT to offer 
troops for Iraq, before passage of UN Security Council 
resolution 1511 and in the face of significant public 
opposition, was a further demonstration of the GOT's 
determination to get our relations back on track and to 
contribute to our efforts in Iraq.  The Turks are looking for 
us to reciprocate by taking action against PKK/KADEK/KHK in 
Iraq; S/CT Ambassador Cofer Black's meetings in Ankara on 
October 2 and subsequent follow up on related issues, such as 
PRM A/S Dewey's talks here with the Turks and UNHCR on how to 
deal with the Makhmour refugee camp, are convincing them that 
we are serious although they still believe military action 
will be necessary to permanently remove this threat to 
Turkey, and from Turkey's perspective, the sooner the better. 
 However, our GOT counterparts continue to stress that any 
real concrete action short of military action, e.g., arrest 
and rendition of some senior leaders, would have a major 
impact on perceptions here. 
 
 
4.  (C)  Since the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gul agreed 
that it was best that Turkey not contribute troops to Iraq at 
this time, we have been focusing on other ways for Turkey to 
contribute to Iraq as well as other areas of shared interests 
and bilateral cooperation.  In the wake of our joint decision 
not to pursue Turkey's offer of troops for Iraq, Turkey 
continues to look to us to identify areas beyond police 
training where Turkey can contribute to reconstruction and 
stabilization efforts.  Recently, the HLDG, the EPC and the 
meetings the Turks had in Washington on the margins, served 
to accentuate what we can do together to meet common 
objectives not only in Iraq, but Afghanistan, the Caucasus, 
and in Europe--including helping Turkey grow its economy, 
modernize its military, and advance towards its EU membership 
aspirations.  Your visit and your message of continued US 
commitment to the security of a Europe that includes Turkey 
will demonstrate we value Turkey as an ally and strategic 
partner, not only regarding Iraq, but also more broadly.  Of 
course, given your position and history with Turkey, you will 
be expected to engage on issues beyond force posture with all 
the senior Turks you meet. 
 
 
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Key Issues 
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5.  (U)  In all your meetings, you will want to touch on the 
following: 
 
 
(S)  Istanbul bombings:  Investigation into the four 
terrorist bombings in Istanbul preoccupies the government, 
senior officials and the public.  We have provided our former 
consulate building in Istanbul for the use of British 
investigators, some space in our new facility to UK consular 
staff to work on visas, and investigatory and intelligence 
assistance to the Turks.  You should offer condolences and 
ask whether we can do more to help.  Your visit to the 
synagogue in Istanbul will underscore our interest and 
concern.  The Turks are livid about travel warnings and 
refuse to understand their intent.  They are lauding Syrian 
and Iranian cooperation despite the fact that several 
suspects fled to these countries and have not been "located." 
 
 
(C)  Turkish Force Posture:  Although some Turks believe that 
the USG--and the US military in particular--wants to "punish" 
Turkey for not fully supporting the US in the Iraq War by 
drawing down our presence, most are not expecting any big 
changes to our base structure in Turkey, and they will be 
expecting you to confirm this during your consultations. 
Some Turks suspect that the USG, and the US military in 
particular, wants to "punish" Turkey for not fully supporting 
the US in the Iraq War by drawing down our presence.  You 
might use your consultations to encourage a prompt and 
positive response to EUCOM's recent request to use Incirlik 
to rotate up to approximately 1,000 people per day in and out 
of Iraq between January and April 2004.  You may hear about a 
hope that the DODDS school in Izmir could reopen to 
accommodate dependents of personnel at AFSOUTH which is to 
move there, but we have already told the Turks this isn't in 
the cards and that they must take the lead in attracting an 
international school to the city.  (VCJCS Pace, when 
presented with this proposal by TGS Deputy Basbug said he 
would get back to him, so you could simply say General Pace 
will respond if it is raised with you.)  Grumbling about 
problems with DECA (Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement) implementation, mainly concerning differing 
interpretation of the agreement and diminished assistance 
levels, haven't changed much from your time in Turkey, but we 
doubt any of the senior people you will meet will raise them. 
 
 
 
 
(C)  PKK/KADEK/KHK:  TGS Deputy Chief Gen Basbug left 
Washington with the expectation that VCJCS Gen Pace would be 
prepared to share a military course of action (COA) against 
the PKK/KADEK/KHK in Iraq during his December 2-5 visit. 
However, CENTCOM's proposed COA have not yet been briefed to 
SecDef, so General Pace was not able to provide much detail 
on the road ahead.  You will need to reaffirm our 
determination to "use all instruments of statecraft" to 
eliminate this threat to Turkey, beginning by whittling down 
the size of the threat through diplomacy, information, and 
diligent effort to create success stories that will help 
convince Turkish Kurds in Iraq -- both PKK members and 
non-members -- that life in Turkey can be better than the 
lives they left and better than their possible future in 
Iraq.  We will need concrete steps for the President to cite 
on this when PM Erdogan visits in late January. 
 
 
(C)  Iraq:  In the past three weeks, Turkey has signed a 
trade agreement with Iraqi leaders, and agreed to improve the 
flow of traffic across the Habur Gate border crossing.  It 
would be useful for you to emphasize the importance of rapid, 
successful implementation of the promised improvements at 
Habur.  While expressing appreciation for the assistance 
Turkey has given and continues to provide to the US vis-a-vis 
Iraq (including the GOT's most recent offer of police 
trainers), you might also underscore the importance of Ankara 
resolving Iraq issues directly with the Iraqi leadership. 
 
 
(C)  Cyprus:  Ankara understands that the period following 
the northern Cypriot elections and prior to Cyprus's May 1 
accession to the EU will see intense efforts to reach a 
Cyprus settlement.  The Turks are preparing a new proposal to 
that end, although there are conflicting views within the 
GOT.  TGS and conservative elements in the bureaucracy remain 
loyal to Denktash and opposed to the Annan plan, so we are 
skeptical about how helpful the proposal will be.  You might 
probe for a preview of the initiative while underscoring the 
need to reach a settlement for Turkey to realize its EU 
ambitions. 
 
 
(S)  Caucasus/Georgia:  The AK government has been receiving 
some (deserved) criticism for its lack of engagement during 
the Georgian transition.  We have indications that the Turks 
have concluded that the US has no strategy for the region and 
that it is in Turkey's interests to cut a deal with the 
Russians.  Given Turkey's close ties to Ajara, it is 
important that Turkey send an unambiguous message of support 
for Georgia's territorial integrity.  You might want to 
reiterate the USG's strong support for continued development 
of the East-West Energy Corridor. 
 
 
(S) Afghanistan:  You should express our appreciation for 
Turkey's continued support for OEF and ISAF operations, 
including their recent offer to provide helicopters for ISAF. 
 The GOT continues to allow us to conduct OEF-related 
refueling missions out of Incirlik, and the base serves as 
the main transit hub for moving Al-Qaeda detainees from 
Afghanistan to GTMO and back to their countries of origin. 
Recently, we have seen fragmentary reports suggesting that 
the Turks may be less than helpful in encouraging Dostum to 
comply with the cease-fire/heavy weapons cantonment accord. 
It would be useful to remind your MFA and TGS interlocutors 
that we are working hard to ensure that all of the different 
interests in Afghanistan work toward together toward a common 
objective, and encourage the Turks to use their special 
relationship with Dostum to press the latter to follow 
through on his commitments.  You should also use your 
meetings (particularly with Ziyal and Basbug) to explore the 
idea of Turkey increasing its support for stabilization 
efforts in Afghanistan.  Turkey has already contributed much 
to the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and the 
rebuilding of the country.  Still, there is room for Ankara 
to do more.  MFA already supports Turkey's making a greater 
contribution to Afghanistan -- both to ISAF and the PRTs; TGS 
is reluctant to send more troops. 
7.  (C)  Finally, with Gul and Ziyal, you could usefully 
touch on the Istanbul Summit.  We expect Turkey to help make 
the summit a success by working with us to convince other 
allies of the need to reorient PfP from Eastern Europe to the 
Caucasus and Central Asia and to reinvigorate the 
Mediterranean Dialogue process.  The Summit also provides 
Turkey the opportunity to showcase its progress in 
democratization, its economic modernization, its western 
orientation, and its positive contribution to the various 
regions it borders.  Significant achievements on 
long-standing issues like relations with Armenia, reopening 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate's school on Hakki, and a Cyprus 
settlement would ensure Turkey is seen in the best possible 
light by all. 
EDELMAN