US embassy cable - 03HARARE2353

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AMENDMENTS TO LAND ACT DUCK THE REAL ISSUES

Identifier: 03HARARE2353
Wikileaks: View 03HARARE2353 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Harare
Created: 2003-12-04 13:40:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ECON EAGR PGOV ZI Land Reform
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002353 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JFRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2013 
TAGS: ECON, EAGR, PGOV, ZI, Land Reform 
SUBJECT: AMENDMENTS TO LAND ACT DUCK THE REAL ISSUES 
 
Classified By: Laboff KRBel for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (U)  Summary:  Recently announced amendments to Zimbabwe's 
Land Acquisition Act do little except close several loopholes 
through which commercial farmers based legal challenges to 
compulsory acquisition of their land.  Through a blend of 
easing the procedural constraints on the GOZ and making these 
amendments retroactive (to May 2000), the amendments 
underscore the GOZ's de facto ability to do whatever it 
likes, including removal of procedural or legal impediments. 
Nothing contained in the amendments deals with the real 
issues surrounding land reform:  returning the land to 
agricultural productivity, respecting the rule of law, or 
addressing the thorny issue of sanctity of title.  Given the 
fact that most commercial farmers have already been 
dispossessed of their land, the very utility of an amended 
Act at this time is questionable.  End summary. 
 
------------- 
The Specifics 
------------- 
 
2. (U)  In a nutshell, the amendments make the GOZ's seizure 
of land easier by: 
 
-- removing the GOZ's burden of "personal service in writing" 
of intent to seize land on the landowner and any other holder 
of a registered real right (e.g., mortgage holders or water 
right holders), and substituting publication of such intent 
in the GOZ gazette and in "a newspaper circulating in the 
area in which the land to be acquired is situated..."; 
 
-- repealing Sections 6A and 6B of the original Act, under 
which farmers had previously offered either partition of 
large farms or substitution of alternate farms -- despite 
possible Administrative Court confirmation of existing offers; 
 
-- removing landowners' legal challenges from the High 
Court's jurisdiction (where many landowners had obtained 
interim relief) and lodging original jurisdiction with the 
Administrative Court; 
 
-- repealing the Hippo Valley Agreement Act, which governed 
development of the irrigated sugar lands in Chiredzi: this 
Act previously stated that any land sold to planters under 
that agreement could be repurchased by the GOZ "if... 
required... for public use by the Government," with the 
proviso that the GOZ must pay compensation "mutually agreed 
upon," or otherwise determined by valuation, for the 
repossessed land; 
 
-- emasculating the previously-enumerated criteria listed in 
the original Land Reform Programme (which exempted 
large-scale plantations growing tea, coffee, timber, citrus, 
or sugar cane; agro-industrial farms involved in poultry, 
beef, dairy, or seed-crop production; export processing zones 
(EPZs); properties operating under a Zimbabwe Investment 
Centre (ZIC) certificate; approved conservancies; or the sole 
property of the owner), and declaring that these criteria 
were henceforth not binding upon the GOZ and no legal basis 
for a landowner's objection; 
 
-- broadening the scope of the process by declaring that the 
original eleven million seized hectares was "only .. the 
minimum" required for resettlement, thus opening the way for 
the inevitable peri-urban land grab foreshadowed in the Utete 
report. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
3. (C)  These amendments do little except polish the thin 
veneer of legality surrounding the ongoing land grab.  In 
fact, they intimate that a new wave of "resettlement" 
initiatives is waiting in the wings, with formerly exempted 
properties targeted.  As with previous amendments to the Land 
Acquisition Act, these newest amendments are tailored to 
counter the arguments landowners have used successfully to 
challenge acquisitions through the courts:  flawed process, 
offers of alternative land, pre-existing agreements under 
competing law, protection under EPZ or ZIC rules, approved 
conservancy status, or unsuitability of specific land for 
agricultural purposes.  As the GOZ rushes to legislate 
legitimacy for its poorly planned acquisitions, there is 
little hope that any of these arguments will now provide any 
relief in the courts. 
 
4. (C)  Despite recent press reports about Minister of 
Information Jonathan Moyo's desire for a "legal instrument 
that makes those title deeds a little lower than toilet 
paper, forever a nullity that invites ridicule in any decent 
court of law," (Herald, October 25, 2003), the GOZ has 
apparently not been able to figure out a method for 
addressing the issue of title. On the one hand, the GOZ 
cannot abolish title to all agricultural land without harming 
Zimbabwe's indigenous farmers.  On the other hand, the GOZ 
cannot abolish title only to white-owned land without 
puncturing its contention that the land acquisition program 
is about colonialism rather than politics and race.  It 
cannot abolish title deeds for all lands purchased before 
independence without acknowledging that most agricultural 
land was purchased (often with GOZ acquiescence) after 1980 
-- scuttling its arguments about rectifying colonial 
imbalances. The GOZ could attempt to invalidate title only 
for "non-Zimbabweans," but it has already faced numerous 
challenges to laws designed to disenfranchise third- and 
fourth-generation residents (and voters) ahead of the 2002 
presidential elections. 
5. (C)  While the GOZ may be comfortable with leaving its 
small-scale A1 farmers with possession only and no pretense 
to title, it cannot ignore the issue forever with its 
large-scale A2 commercial farmers.  At this point, "new 
farmers" occupy even the largest farms without any sort of 
bankable title.  Absent independent wealth, commercial 
agriculture requires capital -- and capital requires 
collateral.  The GOZ, following its own precedent in creating 
"bearer's cheques" rather than printing more bank notes, 
could theoretically print a title-deed-like document rather 
than invalidate existing title deeds.  Indeed, the GOZ has 
floated publicly the idea of issuing 49 or 99 year leases for 
such land, "which banks should accept as collateral." 
However, it is unlikely that many mainstream banks would 
accept such instruments as security for agricultural loans -- 
particularly with competing claims of ownership, and the 
inevitability of legal conflict should a bank wish to 
foreclose.  If capital is indeed a coward, then Zimbabwean 
agriculture will remain a frightening investment destination 
until such anomalies are resolved. 
 
6. (C)  Except for removing the legal protections that have 
theoretically, but not in practice, fenced off conservancies, 
export zones, and other categories of land, the timing of the 
law makes little sense.  The vast majority of commercial 
farmland is already de facto in the hands of new possessors 
(as opposed to titled owners), making the amended law 
something of a moot point. 
SULLIVAN 

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