US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU2366

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NEPAL: AMBASSADOR RELAYS CONCERNS ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF INDIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS

Identifier: 03KATHMANDU2366
Wikileaks: View 03KATHMANDU2366 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kathmandu
Created: 2003-12-04 02:14:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: PREL PTER NP IN
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, NP, IN 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  AMBASSADOR RELAYS CONCERNS ABOUT 
ACTIVITIES OF INDIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS 
 
REF: A. REF: KATHMANDU 2282 
 
     B. KATHMANDU 2298 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
1.  (S/NF)  On December 3 the Ambassador raised with Indian 
Ambassador Shyam Saran reports that intelligence agents 
assigned to the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu have been 
characterizing USG policy and motives in Nepal as 
malevolently aimed at undermining Nepal's sovereignty.  The 
Ambassador told Saran that the reports had been passed to us 
by several Nepali political sources, who claimed to have had 
such conversations in the recent past with Research and 
Analysis Wing (RAW) agents based at the Indian Embassy.  He 
also briefed Saran about unsubstantiated reports suggesting 
that some Nepali Maoist women may have received training at a 
security facility in Dehra Dun in northern India (Ref A). 
Noting that Nepalis, both within the government and in the 
opposition, sometimes attempt to play off Indian and American 
interests, he stressed that the information passed on by 
these sources had not been verified.  He noted that the 
reports predated the meeting between Nepali Maoists and 
Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist General 
Secretary Madhav Nepal in Lucknow (Ref B)--an event that has 
 
SIPDIS 
set Nepali nationalists teeth on edge against India.  The 
Ambassador emphasized that he was communicating these 
concerns to Saran as a friend and ally. 
 
2.  (S/NF)  Ambassador Saran thanked him and expressed 
concern, describing the reports as "unfortunate" and not an 
accurate reflection of official GOI policy--a point confirmed 
in his recent policy discussions in New Delhi (see para 3). 
The GOI is committed to ensuring Nepal's stability, he said, 
adding that he has obtained unprecedented levels of 
development and security assistance for the kingdom. 
Nonetheless, sometimes people in different branches of the 
GOI "go off on their own," he acknowledged, and promised to 
look into the reports. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  In a separate meeting on November 30, Saran 
briefed the Ambassador on the just-concluded policy 
deliberations in New Delhi.  He stressed that his 
interlocutors had expressed concern about possible spill-over 
of the insurgency onto Indian territory.  According to Saran, 
Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes told him that "the 
fight against the Maoists is also India's fight."  Saran 
noted, however, that certain quarters within the GOI had 
argued that India should maintain contact with the Maoists in 
order to influence them and to keep open communication 
channels in the event of a worst-case scenario in which the 
Maoists ultimately gain power. 
 
4.  (S/NF) We cannot discount the possibility that our Nepali 
sources, many of whom resent India's influence in their 
country, may have their own motives in conveying to us 
reports of Indian double-dealing.  We have always found Saran 
professional, collegial, and cooperative, and believe that he 
does not sanction--and may probably not be aware of--all of 
RAW's activities in Nepal. His acknowledgement that some in 
the GOI "go off on their own" and that some advocate 
maintaining contact and influence with the Maoists is his 
first admission to us that some elements within his Embassy 
may be working at cross-purposes to official GOI policy. 
MALINOWSKI 

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