US embassy cable - 03TEGUCIGALPA2814

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 002814 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT (JREAP), L, IO, EB, INL, AND NP 
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/USOAS, AND WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, KTIA, AORC, PARM, EAIR, EWWT, KCRM, HO 
SUBJECT: HONDURAS: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 301352 
 
1. The 2003 Annual Terrorism Report for Honduras follows. 
Points are keyed to reftel paragraph headings: 
 
A. Significant Actions by GOH 
----------------------------- 
 
In 2003, President Ricardo Maduro continued his policy of 
strong Honduran support for U.S. efforts against terrorism, 
was a member of the Coalition of the Willing for Iraq, and 
sent 370 troops to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
The GOH also ratified three outstanding counterterrorism (CT) 
conventions during the year.  The GOH promptly issued freeze 
orders for terrorist-related assets at U.S. request.  No 
terrorist assets have been found in Honduran financial 
institutions, to date.  However, the GOH has yet to designate 
a national coordinator for counterterrorism.  The GOH has 
been an advocate in the region for U.S. anti-terrorism goals 
and supported the United States in regional fora, in the 
United Nations and in the Honduran media with forthright and 
unambiguous public statements against terror.  The Government 
of Honduras (GOH) continues to provide increased security 
around the U.S. Embassy and other USG facilities. 
 
After September 11, 2001, Honduras took the lead, in its role 
as President Pro-Tempore of the Central American Integration 
System (SICA), in organizing Central American cooperation in 
the war against terrorism.  The GOH convoked Central American 
heads of state for a terrorism summit on September 19, 2001. 
The Summit produced an endorsement of President Bush's call 
for an international coalition against terrorism, a firm 
condemnation of all terrorist acts, and full support for 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and 
Organization of American States (OAS)/Rio Treaty actions.  In 
February 2002, the Congress passed and President Maduro 
signed legislation to strengthen the Honduran anti-money 
laundering regime, in accordance with UN conventions.  The 
GOH responded significantly to all U.S. requests for 
intelligence cooperation.  The GOH took immediate measures to 
implement new U.S. civil aviation security regulations, and 
continues to work with the Transportation Security 
Administration on such measures. 
 
The GOH has tightened visa restrictions by adding countries 
to its list of countries that require Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) approval prior to visa issuance, coordinated 
the Central American SICA regional counterterrorism plan, and 
began developing its own national counterterrorism plan. 
 
Since September 11, 2001, the GOH has signed and ratified the 
Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism 
Crimes in November 2002, acceded to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings in November 2002, and 
signed the OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of 
Terrorism in June 2002.  In 2003, the GOH ratified three more 
pending counterterrorism (CT) conventions, the 1980 
Convention on the Physical Protection on Nuclear Materials, 
the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, 
and the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives 
for the Purpose of Detection (signed by the GOH March 26, 
1991), which makes the GOH a party to 10 international CT 
conventions.  The GOH still needs to sign and ratify two 
outstanding International Maritime Organization 
conventions/protocols and ratify two OAS conventions (1971 
and 2002) against terrorism. 
 
B. Response of the Judicial System 
---------------------------------- 
 
The weakness of the rule of law in Honduras continues to be 
the most serious impediment to any prospective government 
prosecution, extradition, or investigation of suspected 
terrorist activity.  Historically, the judicial system has 
not played a significant role in dealing with terrorism. 
Heavy caseloads, severe resource constraints, insufficient 
personnel and lack of expertise in handling complex 
international investigations limit the ability of the 
judicial and law enforcement authorities to deter terrorists 
from operating in Honduras.  Moreover, the judicial system 
remains vulnerable to political tampering, corruption, and 
improper, extra-legal influence. 
 
There were no terrorist incidents thwarted or terrorist cells 
broken up in Honduras in 2003.  There were no cases of 
terrorism, domestic or international, before the Honduran 
judicial system during 2003. 
On May 14, a group calling itself the "Popular Revolutionary 
Forces" issued a communique announcing the beginning of a 
campaign to overthrow the Maduro government and vowed to 
evict "Yankees" and other foreign occupiers.  The communique 
also identified diplomats from the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Spain as legitimate military targets.  Initial 
assessment by both the Embassy and the Honduran police 
concurred that the communique was an attempt to gain 
political support and therefore not considered a realistic 
threat. 
 
C. Extradition of Suspected Terrorists 
-------------------------------------- 
 
The GOH did not request the extradition of any suspected 
terrorist.  The U.S. has not asked the GOH to extradite 
anyone suspected of terrorism in 2003. There are no third 
country extradition requests for suspected terrorists. 
 
D. Impediments to Prosecution/Extradition 
----------------------------------------- 
 
The Honduran Constitution (Article 102) prohibits the 
extradition of Honduran nationals.  The U.S.-Honduras 
Extradition Treaty of 1928 permits each party to refuse to 
extradite its own citizens.  In July 2000, Honduras ratified 
a revised extradition treaty with Spain that enumerates 
various acts of terrorism that cannot be considered political 
crimes.  The GOH will not extradite anyone for a crime 
punishable by death, unless the requesting country provides 
formal assurances that the individual will receive a lesser 
penalty if convicted (the maximum sentence for any one crime 
in Honduras is 20 years imprisonment).  There are no other 
legal impediments to Honduras's ability to prosecute or 
extradite suspected terrorists. 
 
E. Responses Other Than Prosecution 
----------------------------------- 
 
Honduras belongs to Interpol and shares criminal information 
with other countries, but has had difficulty preparing basic 
Interpol "red notices" and provisional arrest requests.  As 
noted above, it is sharing intelligence information with the 
U.S. and its Central American neighbors.  The GOH has been an 
advocate in the region for U.S. anti-terrorism goals and has 
supported the United States in regional fora, in the United 
Nations and in the Honduran media with forthright and 
unambiguous public statements against terror. 
 
There is growing evidence of the existence of an illicit 
trade of "arms for drugs" utilizing illegal narcotics that 
transit through Honduras (see answer G).  In July 2003, the 
GOH passed Article 332 of the Honduran Penal Code making the 
possession of AK-47s and other types of automatic weapons 
illegal.  A 90-day arms-for-money program was initiated to 
facilitate the collection and destruction of weapons deemed 
illegal.  The GOH's severely limited capacity to interdict 
drugs and the alleged involvement of current and former 
military/police officials, who may retain access to arms 
caches left over from the 1980's Central American conflicts, 
undermine efforts to disrupt these transactions. 
 
In addition, there is little or no security at the country's 
three principal ports on the Caribbean coast, Puerto Cortes, 
La Ceiba, and Trujillo.  However, the GOH launched an 
expedited effort to meet new International Maritime 
Organization and U.S. port security standards. 
 
F. Major Counterterrorism Efforts 
--------------------------------- 
 
Honduras strongly opposes international terrorism in 
international fora.  President Maduro and his cabinet 
consistently and vigorously spoke out in support of U.S. and 
international anti-terrorism efforts in statements to the 
Honduran media. 
 
G. Support for International Terrorism 
-------------------------------------- 
 
The GOH provides no support to international terrorism, 
terrorists, or terrorist groups.  There are no known 
terrorist elements operating in Honduran territory.  The GOH 
does not permit sanctuary, training sites, training or 
storage/transfer of weapons to terrorists groups. 
 
However, there is growing evidence of the existence of an 
illicit trade of "arms for drugs" utilizing illegal narcotics 
that transit through Honduras.  The arms from these deals are 
presumably destined for use by terrorist groups in Colombia. 
The GOH's severely limited capacity to interdict drugs and 
the alleged involvement of current and former military/police 
officials, who may retain access to arms caches left over 
from the 1980's Central American conflicts, undermine efforts 
to disrupt these transactions. 
 
Honduras has maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba since 
late January 2002, but has not named an ambassador, even 
though Cuba has an ambassador in Honduras.  Honduras has no 
diplomatic relations with the other state sponsors of 
terrorism -- Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. 
 
H. Public Statements in Support of Terrorist-Supporting 
Countries on a Terrorism Issue 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
The GOH has not voiced support for terrorist groups or their 
objectives, or for state sponsors of terrorism. 
 
I. Changes in Attitude toward Terrorism 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks, 
Honduran police and military authorities began working even 
more closely with U.S. Mission counterparts to assess links 
to international terrorism in Honduras.  This cooperation has 
continued under President Maduro in 2002-2003.  Extensive 
investigation and ongoing threat analysis has not revealed 
any terrorist links in Honduras.  Honduran financial 
officials and its private sector banking association 
responded promptly to UNSC and U.S. requests related to the 
freezing and seizing of terrorist financial assets and 
accounts.  The GOH continues to issue freeze orders of 
accounts of terrorist individuals and groups listed in the 
U.S. Executive Order, and the financial community has fully 
cooperated.  To date, no terrorist accounts have been found. 
 
On May 14, a group calling itself the "Popular Revolutionary 
Forces" issued a communique announcing the beginning of a 
campaign to overthrow the Maduro government and vowed to 
evict "Yankees" and other foreign occupiers.  The communique 
also identified diplomats from the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Spain as legitimate military targets.  There was 
no further action by the "Popular Revolutionary Forces" or 
evidence that this group represented a realistic threat at 
this time. 
Palmer