US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7378

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 007378 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO S/CT FOR REAP AND EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2003 TERRORISM REPORT 
 
 
(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert S. Deutsch; 
reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
-------- 
OVERVIEW 
-------- 
 
 
1. (U) Combating terrorism has long been a priority for the 
Government of Turkey (GOT).  In 2003, Turkey continued its 
strong support of the coalition in the global war against 
terror in Afghanistan by agreeing to extend its leadership of 
the International Security Force (ISAF) into 2003.  On 
October 7, the Turkish Parliament authorized the GOT to 
contribute up to 10,000 troops to an Iraq stabilization force 
for up to a year, but conditions in Iraq prevented deployment 
in 2003. 
 
 
2. (U) In separate November incidents in Istanbul, terrorists 
detonated truck bombs near two synagogues and, five days 
later, outside the British Consulate and a British-owned 
bank.  Over 50 people were killed in the attacks, while over 
700 were wounded.  Turkish authorities quickly condemned the 
attacks, and police have arrested a number of suspects. 
Domestic and transnational terrorist groups have targeted 
Turks and foreigners, occasionally including USG personnel, 
for over 40 years.  International and domestic terrorist 
groups operating in Turkey include Marxist-Leninist, radical 
Islamist, separatist, and pro-Chechen groups.  In response to 
these threats, GOT has developed both strong determination 
and the capability to fight terrorism.  Turkey continues to 
support the USG's international, coordinated approach. 
 
 
U.S. Designated Terrorist Organizations 
 
 
3. (U) On October 8, 1997, the Secretary of State named the 
separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the 
Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary People's Liberation 
Party/Front (DHKP/C, formerly known as Revolutionary Left, 
Dev-Sol) terrorist organizations, making them subject to the 
Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  On 
October 11, 2001, the Secretary of State renewed those 
designations for another two years.  (The PKK changed its 
name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, or 
KADEK, and in November 2003 changed names again, becoming the 
Kurdistan People,s Congress, KHK.  The USG quickly indicated 
that the group will continue to be viewed as a terrorist 
organization.) 
 
 
Marxist-Leninist 
 
 
4. (U) The main radical-left terror organization, DHKP-C, 
conducts small-scale operations against Turks and foreigners 
alike (armed attacks on uniformed police, suicide and other 
bombings, assassinations).  This organization increased 
operations in the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 
continues to organize itself predominantly within Europe. 
According to government authorities, DHKP-C cooperates with 
other groups in Europe by providing support, shelter, and 
arms to them.  Turkish authorities believe there has been a 
resurgence in membership attributed to the left,s 
dissatisfaction with the current government, which has 
Islamist roots.  DHKP-C claimed responsibility for a number 
of attacks against Turkish targets in 2003, including an 
attempted suicide bombing of a police bus in Ankara and two 
separate IED attacks on Turkish government vehicles in 
Istanbul.  In its rhetoric, DHKP-C continues to attack U.S. 
foreign policy, especially with regard to Iraq, and credible 
reports suggest it continues to target American interests. 
 
 
5. (U) Other active far-left terrorist organizations include 
the Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML), the 
Turkish Workers' and Peasants Liberation Army (TIKKO), and 
the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP).  TKP/ML and 
TIKKO primarily operate in the areas of Ordu, Tokat, and 
Samsun.  MLKP conducts small-scale terrorist operations, 
usually using IEDs called "sound bombs," within metropolitan 
areas.  MLKP has conducted a low-level bombing campaign 
against western businesses in all the major Turkish cities in 
2003.  In each instance, a sound bomb was placed on a 
doorstep or in the vicinity of a business in the evening 
hours when injury to innocent bystanders was least likely. 
These sound bombs result in minimal damage. 
 
 
Radical Islamist 
 
 
6. (U) The primary radical Islamist terror group of Turkey is 
Turkish Hizbullah.  Known to fight its rivals, namely the PKK 
(and its successors) and rival Islamic groups, Turkish 
Hizbullah has avoided confrontations with authorities. 
Turkish Hizbullah has not carried out any major operations in 
2003 but, according to state authorities, continues to 
maintain the capability to conduct operations.  Local press 
has speculated that Hizbullah may have played a role in the 
November bombings in Istanbul. 
 
 
7. (U) Other Islamic groups include the Great Eastern 
Raider's Front (IBDA-C), Federal Islamic State of Anatolia 
(Kaplancilar), Selam Group, Islamic Movement Organization 
(IHO), the Jerusalem Warriors, Selefiler, Sofular, and 
Beyyiat-I El-Imam.  Both IBDA-C and Beyyiat-I El-Imam are 
sympathetic to Al Qaida.  IBDA-C claimed to have conducted 
the Istanbul bombings in November, but Turkish authorities 
said publicly that the group could not have conducted the 
operation without the assistance of a larger organization 
such as Al Qaida. 
 
 
Separatist 
 
 
8. (U) KHK, formerly known as the PKK and, later, KADEK, is 
the largest separatist organization in Turkey.  There are 
credible indications that the group is organizing again to 
launch attacks against the GOT in Turkey's western cities. 
KHK,s capability to operate has been drastically reduced due 
to vigorous and on-going counter-insurgency efforts of the 
Turkish Armed Forces, Jandarma, Turkish National Police 
(TNP), and village guards (a paramilitary guard force 
recruited from local villagers).  This effort ultimately led 
to the arrest and conviction of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 
1999.  The European Union (EU) designated the PKK a terrorist 
organization in May 2002.  In April 2002 the group changed 
its name and organization.  Renamed the Kurdistan Freedom and 
Democracy Congress (KADEK), the organization expanded its 
operations by focusing more on political activities. 
 
 
9. (U) In the summer of 2003, KADEK renounced its 
self-proclaimed cease-fire and threatened to renew its 
separatist struggle in both the Southeast and Turkey's 
western cities.  Turkish press subsequently reported several 
incidents in the Southeast in which Turkish security forces 
were attacked by KADEK militants.  As part of the GWOT, the 
U.S. is committed to eliminating the threat to Turkey posed 
by the PKK/KADEK in Iraq.  In November 2003, KADEK changed 
its name to the Kurdistan People,s Congress (KHK) and now 
claims to be an organized political group advocating Kurdish 
rights.  According to Turkish government experts and NGOs, 
KHK maintains approximately 500-armed militants in Turkey and 
up to 5000 armed militants in Northern Iraq. 
 
 
Chechens in Turkey 
 
 
10. (U) Although Chechen terrorists did not conduct any major 
operations in Turkey in 2003, they maintain the capability to 
do so, according to Turkish officials.  Large numbers of 
Turks, many with roots in the Caucasus, are sympathetic to 
Chechen ambitions.  In April 2002, Mustafa Yilmaz, a Turkish 
citizen of Chechen origin, seized the Marmara Hotel in 
Istanbul and held 13 hostages for approximately twenty 
minutes until he surrendered without incident.  This followed 
an April 22, 2001 seizure of Istanbul's Swiss Hotel by 13 
pro-Chechen Turkish citizens who held 150 hostages, including 
37 Americans, for approximately 12 hours. 
 
 
11. (U) The capitalized titles below correspond to reftel 
questions. 
 
 
--- ------- ---------- ---------- --------- ------- 
------------- 
GOT ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM 
(A) 
--- ------- ---------- ---------- --------- ------- 
------------- 
 
 
12. (U) Turkey remained a strong and active contributor to 
the Global War on Terrorism effort.  Turkey agreed to extend 
its leadership of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) beyond December 2002 (when its six-month term what set 
to end) to February 2003.  Turkey also contributed forces to 
ISAF III under the leadership of the Germans/Dutch and to 
ISAF IV under the leadership of NATO. 
 
 
13. (U) Although it denied permission for U.S. troops to 
deploy to Iraq at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
from Turkey, Turkey provided substantial assistance to OIF, 
allowing overflight by U.S. aircraft bound for Iraq and 
supporting ground lines of communication (GLOC) through 
Turkey for supply and re-supply of U.S. forces in Iraq.  The 
Turks permitted the transport to Iraq of humanitarian goods, 
contributed humanitarian goods and services and sold vital 
material such as fuel, food and water to U.S. forces in Iraq. 
 Turkey also sold electricity to Iraq.  The Turks offered to 
provide training to Iraqis, including Iraqi police and 
customs officials, and to provide personnel to CPA and a 
number of other goods and services related to Iraqi 
reconstruction.  Turkey pledged USD 50 million at the Madrid 
Conference.  In October 2003, the Turkish Parliament approved 
a motion granting the GOT permission to deploy Turkish force 
in Iraq as part of a Stabilization Force for OIF.  In 
November 2003, the GOT, in consultation with the USG, decided 
not to deploy troops. 
 
 
14. (U) Turkey continues to counter Al-Qaida activity in 
Turkey.  In 2003, Turkish authorities apprehended several 
senior-level Al Qaida operatives.  Turkish officials 
speculated in the press that arresting the high-ranking Al 
Qaida members may have prompted the November bombings in 
Istanbul. 
 
 
15. (SBU) In compliance with UN Security Resolution 1373, 
Turkey has ratified all United Nations conventions on 
combating terrorism.  However, Turkey has acted (by Council 
of Ministers decrees) to freeze the assets only of those 
terrorist organizations, persons, and entities designated 
pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1267 (relating to 
Taliban and Al-Qaida), because Turkish law does not currently 
permit it to freeze the assets of other such organizations, 
persons, and entities.  The initial decree, No. 2001/3483, 
dated December 22, 2001, has been updated by decree Nos. 
2002/3873, dated March 21, 2002, 2002/4206, dated May 16, 
2002, 2002/4896, dated October 1, 2002, and 2002/5426, dated 
March 28, 2003.  Turkey needs to pass laws that will: 1) 
explicitly criminalize the financing of terrorism; 2) resolve 
jurisdictional disputes between courts; 3) make it easier to 
seize terrorists, assets; 4) improve functioning of MASAK 
(the Turkish financial intelligence analysis unit); and 5) 
strengthen the Suspicious Transaction reporting regime. 
Turkey is drafting legislation that Turkish officials say 
will meet these needs, and has requested U.S. and EU 
assistance in drafting and implementation.  The U.S. has 
initiated such assistance, and the EU plans to do so 
beginning in early 2004. 
 
 
16. (U) Turkish efforts to seize the assets of those who fund 
terrorist organizations have been further hampered by 
insufficient training and limited cooperation between 
agencies.  The U.S. and EU assistance referenced above is 
intended as well to address these deficiencies.  The success 
of these efforts will in large part be dependent political 
support from top levels of the GOT. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (B) 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
17. (U) State Security Courts (DGM) in eight provinces, with 
jurisdiction for all crimes that fall within the purview of 
the Anti-Terror Law, take a vigorous approach towards 
prosecuting terror-related crimes.  Approximately 5,500 cases 
came before the State Security Courts in 2003, although not 
all were related to terrorism.  Average trial times run more 
than a year, and defendants are usually incarcerated during 
their trials. 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (C/D) 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
18. (U) In 2003, the Republic of Turkey did not seek the 
extradition of any suspects from the United States on 
terror-related charges, nor did the United States seek the 
extradition of such suspects from Turkey.  There are no 
impediments to host government prosecution and/or extradition 
of suspected terrorists. 
 
 
19. (U) In the past, Turkey has faced difficulty in 
extraditing terror-related suspects from European countries. 
According to government officials, Turkey has requested the 
extradition of 245 high level administrators of terrorist 
organizations since 1991.  Sympathy with Kurdish political 
and cultural aspirations in some European states, allegations 
of torture by Turkish officials, and Turkey's legal provision 
for the death penalty have all proved impediments to such 
extraditions.  However, in August 2002, as a part of the 
European Union reform package, the Turkish Parliament passed 
a law banning the use of the death penalty. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (E) 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
20. (U) Turks see themselves to be among the world's primary 
victims of terrorism.  They cite the 15-year insurgency of 
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and the worldwide 
assassination campaign against the Turkish diplomats and 
their families by Armenian activists of the 1970s and 1980s. 
They have long complained about European countries' harboring 
Kurdish (PKK), leftist (DHKP-C) and Islamist (Hizbullah, 
Kaplanists) terrorists.  The Turkish government and media 
were quick to respond to the events of September 11.  At all 
levels, there was an outpouring of sympathy and solidarity. 
There was widespread public sentiment that now others were 
beginning to experience what Turks had lived with for years. 
Turkey's pre-9/11 historic cooperation with the U.S. in law 
enforcement, military and intelligence activities has 
increased over the last two years.  There has been visible 
support for the security of Americans at our mission's 
buildings by local police. 
 
 
21. (U) The Turkish stand on terrorism has been somewhat 
softer in the case of the Chechens.  There are cultural and 
religious ties between Turks and Chechens, and both have had 
a long-time rivalry with Russia.  The media treated the 
takeovers of a ferryboat in 1999 and a hotel in 2001 in 
Istanbul more like protests than terrorist attacks. 
 
 
22. (U) The leftist and Islamic fringe press sometimes 
portrays Chechen rebels, Palestinian suicide bombers and even 
Al Qaida members as "freedom fighters."  Terrorism has long 
been an interest of academics and writers in Turkey.  In 
recent years there have been several conferences on the 
topic.  Those organized by institutions of the State have 
been seen as tools in the fight against terrorism.  Privately 
funded academic programs have focused more on analyzing the 
impact of terrorism and the root causes of terrorism. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE GOT (F) 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
23. (U) The Government of Turkey continued its aggressive 
counterterrorism efforts in 2003.  In addition to sharing 
intelligence information on various groups operating in 
Turkey, the Turkish National Police and the National 
Intelligence Organization (MIT) conducted an aggressive 
counterterrorist campaign and detained numerous suspected 
terrorists in scores of raids, disrupting these groups before 
terrorist acts could be carried out.  In 2003 the GOT took 
into custody a number of high-level Al Qaida operatives. 
 
 
24. (U) The GOT continues its active suppression of the 
PKK/KADEK/KHK, though its security operations tempo has been 
significantly reduced in line with a reduction in the 
conflict.  It continues to monitor the organization's 
political movements in an effort to stem any potential 
disturbances. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (G) 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
25. (U) The GOT consistently and strongly opposes both 
domestic and international terrorism.  Turkey does not view 
its maintenance of diplomatic or economic/commercial 
relations with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria as 
constituting support for international terrorism. 
--------------------------------------------- - 
SUPPORT STATEMENTS FOR TERRORIST COUNTRIES (H) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
26. (U) Turkey shares borders with, and has been an historic 
trading partner of Syria, Iran and Iraq.  It balances a 
condemnation of terrorist activities in those countries 
(including providing havens for the PKK) with the need to 
access historic trade routes.  Public statements against 
state-supported terrorism are clear. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TERRORISM (I) 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
27. (U) Since the attacks of September 11, the GOT has taken 
an active role in the worldwide opposition against terrorism. 
 In May 2002 the European Union placed the PKK and DHKP/C on 
its list of terrorist groups after an intensive push by the 
GOT for the EU to adopt tougher measures against Turkish 
terror groups operating in Europe.  Despite Turkish pressure, 
the EU never placed KADEK on its list of terrorist 
organizations.  Turkish officials will now press the 
international community to recognize the PKK/KADEK successor 
group, KHK, as a terrorist organization. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
USG COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH GOT (J) 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
 
28. (U) Turkey remains a staunch ally in the War on 
Terrorism.  The Turkish National Police (TNP) continues to 
provide excellent protection of U.S. diplomatic and military 
facilities throughout Turkey. 
 
 
29. (U) In September and October 2003, USG officials met with 
interagency Turkish teams to work out a joint action plan to 
eliminate the threat posed by the PKK/KADEK/KHK presence in 
northern Iraq.  Turkey agreed to consider an information 
campaign to ensure that the terms of its "Reintegration Law" 
and the conditions to which Turkish refugees in Iraq and 
PKK/KADEK/KHK operatives surrendering under the law would 
return were well known in northern Iraq.  The U.S. pledged to 
use all the elements of statecraft in eliminating the 
PKK/KADEK/KHK threat.  S/CT Coordinator Cofer Black announced 
that the terrorist group had no future in northern Iraq.  To 
generate momentum for returns to Turkey, the USG worked with 
the Turks and UNHCR in November to accelerate the voluntary 
repatriation of Turkish refugees in northern Iraq.  Assistant 
Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration 
 
SIPDIS 
Dewey met with Turkish and UNHCR reps in Ankara in late 
November to move this process forward. 
 
 
30. (U) As noted above, Turkey is now in the process of 
modifying its domestic laws to comply with the UN Convention 
on Suppression of Terrorist Financing, which the GOT adopted 
in 2002. 
 
 
31. (U) Turkey is also an active participant in the 
Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.  Since 2001, 
the Turks have participated in 20 ATA courses, including 
Financial Underpinnings of Terrorism Seminar and a follow-on 
Financial Underpinnings of Terrorism Seminar for 
investigators. 
 
 
(Information for the Report's classified annex) 
 
 
32. (S) The Turkish Government continued to allow the use of 
Incirlik AFB to support U.S. operations in and out of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, including: 
 
 
- Allowed the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base as a key transit 
point for humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan and Iraq; 
 
 
- Authorized the U.S. to use Incirlik Air Base to transit 
Taliban and Al-Qaida detainees from Afghanistan to GTMO; 
 
 
- Allowed the U.S. military to station tankers at Incirlik 
Air Base to support OIF- and OEF-related refueling missions; 
 
 
- Contributed KC-135 tankers to support OEF-related 
operations; 
- As a result of S/CT Coordinator Black,s enhanced 
intelligence sharing regarding PKK/KADEK/KHK as part of the 
joint action plan to eliminate the PKK/KADEK/KHK threat from 
Northern Iraq. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION-INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION (K/1) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
(Information for the Report's Classified Annex) 
 
 
33. (C) The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United 
States and Turkey, which entered into force in January 1981, 
governs investigative cooperation.  The GOT has processed 
requests for investigative access to evidence under this 
treaty.  However, in some cases the GOT has left requests 
unanswered for over three years. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
COOPERATION-PREVENTION (K/2) 
---------------------------- 
 
 
34. (U) The GOT coordinates closely with the USG on 
anti-terrorist financing initiatives.  In response to USG 
requests to freeze terrorist-related financial assets, the 
GOT has added to its domestic asset freeze list all names of 
individuals and firms designated under UNSCR 1267 (names 
related to financing of Taliban and al-Qaida).  The GOT also 
investigates these names and freezes assets found in Turkey. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
COOPERATION DURING PAST FIVE YEARS-PREVENTION (L) 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
35. (U) Overall, in the last five years, the GOT has worked 
closely with the USG in the apprehension, conviction, and 
punishment of those responsible for terrorist attacks in 
Turkey.  GOT response is always immediate and substantial 
when alerted to threat or incident involving US interests. 
DEUTSCH