US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI5133

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SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO THE UAE

Identifier: 03ABUDHABI5133
Wikileaks: View 03ABUDHABI5133 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2003-12-01 12:42:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: PREL PGOV PARM MOPS GCC IZ TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
null
Diana T Fritz  03/20/2007 03:40:37 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
SECRET

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                        December 01, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 5133 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV, PARM, MOPS                                 

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO THE UAE     

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 05133

SIPDIS
Laser1:
    INFO:   FCS 
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   AMB DAO P/M USLO DCM ECON RSO 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RAALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: USLO:RSIMM

VZCZCADI219
OO RUCAACC RUEKJCS RUEHC RUCNRAQ RHEFDIA
DE RUEHAD #5133/01 3351242
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011242Z DEC 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA//
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2551
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 005133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD AMB LITT AND CCJ2 
NSC FOR THEROUX 
DOD FOR OSD/ISA/NESA 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/13 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PARM, MOPS, GCC, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO THE 
UAE 
 
Ref: A) Abu Dhabi 5003, B) Abu Dhabi 4613 
 
1. (U) Classified by Richard A. Albright, Chargi 
d'Affaires, a.i., for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
2. (C) General Abizaid:  I would like to welcome you back 
to the UAE.  The highlight of December in the UAE will be 
the 2003 Dubai Air Show, the third largest air show in the 
world and the premier aviation and air industry show in the 
Gulf region. The Dec. 7-11 Air Show will be preceded by a 
UAE Air Force-hosted Middle East Air Chiefs' Conference. 
The UAE Government regards this as a major event and 
expects strong U.S. support and presence.  Various models 
of U.S. military aircraft and equipment, plus aircrew and 
ground crew will be present.  During your two visits to the 
UAE in December, we have requested meetings with UAE Armed 
Forces Chief of Staff LTG Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed Al- 
Nahyan (MbZ), who was appointed Deputy Crown Prince of Abu 
Dhabi on November 30, and Dubai Crown Prince General Sheikh 
Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MbR).  MbZ's promotion 
clears up any doubts about who will assume the position of 
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince after Shaykh Zayed departs the scene 
and current Crown Prince Shaykh Khalifa assumes the 
presidency. 
 
3. (S) Your September 28 visit to Abu Dhabi was greatly 
appreciated, in large part because of your frank exchange 
with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayed Al- 
Nahyan and MbZ on Iraq, Iran, and terrorism (described in 
ref B), but also because we benefited from a first-hand 
account of developments on the ground in Iraq.  The 
concerns you expressed about the Sunnis resonated with your 
Emirati hosts.  In your upcoming visit, everyone will be 
interested to hear your view on the recently agreed plan to 
accelerate the transfer of authority to the Iraqis. 
 
4. (U) The host of the Air Show, Dubai, is the second 
richest and most populous of the seven Emirates that make 
up the U.A.E.  It is an international metropolis boasting 
rows of skyscrapers, beautiful beaches, and a hopping 
nightlife.  Over the last 30 years, Dubai has seen massive 
economic development, brought about by a leadership 
determined to leverage dwindling oil production into strong 
growth in trade, industry, and tourism.  Its airport serves 
as a regional hub, and its huge Jebel Ali port is the 12th 
biggest in the world.  This calendar year, the UAE has had 
over 600 port visits by the US Navy, the majority of which 
have been at Jebel Ali.  The Dubai Port Authority is 
expanding the container terminal at Jebel Ali.  The current 
berthing for aircraft carriers will need to move to allow 
that expansion.  The UAE is studying locations in the port 
that could accommodate aircraft carriers. 
 
---------------- 
SUGGESTED THEMES 
---------------- 
 
5. (C) We propose that you touch on the following key 
bilateral military issues, in addition to the more general 
themes outlined below in para six: 
 
-- Congratulate your hosts on the Dubai Air Show, and 
underscore that it advances the U.S. security and 
commercial interests, directly supports USCENTCOM war 
fighting and engagement goals and objectives, furthers 
military-to-military relations, and improves regional 
access. 
 
-- Provide a "look-ahead" on our likely military footprint 
both in the UAE specifically and the region more generally, 
particularly in light of the President's Nov. 25 
announcement on global force posture (MbZ). 
 
-- Focus the UAE military leadership on the need, as part 
of our commitment to building and solidifying our strong 
military ties, to work out a functioning Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (MbZ, MbR); 
 
-- Express our enthusiasm about the validation course at 
the Air Warfare Center, scheduled for January 2003.  The 
Center will be a model for multilateral training in the 
region (MbZ); 
 
6.  (S) More broadly, you may also wish to: 
 
-- Congratulate MbZ on his promotion to Deputy Crown Prince 
of Abu Dhabi. 
 
-- Express thanks for the UAE's exemplary support for U.S. 
and coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, namely 
access to bases and logistical support, including air and 
sealift of Bulgarian troops to Iraq, the UAE SOC deployment 
at Bagram, as well as extensive intelligence coordination. 
Thank MbZ for his offer to use a squadron of the UAE's 
newly acquired South African Seeker II UAV's (MbZ); 
 
-- Pass on our gratitude for the UAE's generous 
humanitarian assistance, especially the UAE Armed Force's 
establishment of the very successful Shaykh Zayed hospital 
in Baghdad and the UAE's efforts to re-supply with 
equipment and medicine other Iraqi hospitals and the 
provision of basic foodstuffs to the Iraqi people (MbZ); 
 
-- Express thanks for the UAE's strong public show of 
support for the Iraqi Governing Council and the interim 
cabinet, who have been received at the highest levels on 
several visits to the UAE (MbZ, MbR); 
 
-- Consult and provide assurances on need to maintain 
Iraq's territorial integrity, minimize external influence 
(Iran) and manage sectarian rivalries (MbZ, MbR); 
 
------------------------- 
BILATERAL MILITARY ISSUES 
------------------------- 
 
Regional Footprint: 
------------------ 
 
7. (C) If appropriate, I would recommend that you outline 
with the leadership -- MbZ -- what we see in terms of our 
likely regional footprint, and specifically what we have in 
mind for the UAE.  MbZ and his Air Force Commander have 
dropped strong hints at being open to a more robust 
presence, but we need to prepare them for the direction in 
which we may wish to move here.  The Emiratis are likely to 
have seen the President's November 25 announcement on 
global force posture and may have questions. 
 
Defense Cooperation Agreement 
----------------------------- 
 
8. (C) We need to discuss a successor agreement to the 
dormant, unimplemented Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), 
which comes up for renewal in 2006.  Following a meeting 
with the Ambassador in late October during which she noted 
the need to start addressing the DCA issue, MbZ directed 
his staff to begin discussions with us on the way ahead for 
a re-negotiated DCA.  This will require heavy lifting on 
both sides and the sooner we agree on a strategy and define 
our "non-negotiable" items, the easier it will be to 
proceed with the Emiratis.  Your visit would provide a good 
opportunity to resurface this important bilateral military 
issue.  Embassy representatives met with GHQ lawyers in 
mid-November to hear their views.  The Emiratis continue to 
have reservations about criminal jurisdiction provisions, 
as well as concerns over perceived ambiguities regarding 
the status of US personnel in the UAE.  We are seeking 
guidance on how to proceed. 
 
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement 
----------------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Both MbZ and UAE Air Force Chief of Staff MGen 
Khalid have broached the issue of negotiating an 
Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA).  MGen 
Khalid has expressed some frustrations with support to 
UAEAF C-130s operating to and from Bagram in support of the 
UAE SOF deployment.  We are seeking guidance and assistance 
to initiate ACSA negotiations. 
 
Air Warfare Center 
------------------ 
 
10. (C) The Gulf Air Warfare Center at al-Dhafra Air Base 
has tremendous potential to become a resource for 
multilateral training, defense cooperation, and 
compatibility.  The GAWC will provide an excellent 
opportunity for CENTCOM pilots to hone their skills in 
theater.  It comes with the added benefit of offering the 
perfect setting for our officers to build long-term 
relationships with their Arab and European counterparts. 
The GAWC represents the UAE leadership's commitment to 
increasing inter-operability with U.S. and coalition 
forces. 
 
ATACMs/Predator Update -- (If Raised) 
------------------------------------- 
 
11. (S) We are moving forward with the ATACMs 1A deal.  The 
Emiratis have agreed to the principles outlined in what 
will be a regional Memorandum of Understanding governing 
the use of this system.  We have forwarded the MOU to GHQ 
for UAE approval.  Once we have their approval, the next 
step in the process is for GHQ to submit an LOR for Pricing 
and Availability, after which we can begin the LOA process. 
We are awaiting the provision of a revised Pricing and 
Availability and Acquisition, following an Emirati visit to 
the US last July to discuss their forecast system 
requirements. 
 
12. (S) Over the past year, MbZ raised his desire to 
procure the armed Predator B with just about every 
interlocutor in Washington, and Deputy Prime Minister and 
de facto Foreign Minister Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayed Al-Nahyan 
raised the Predator issue his meetings in late October in 
Washington, including with the Secretary and Deputy 
Secretary of State.  Both believe this system will provide 
 
SIPDIS 
the UAE the much-needed capability to survey and defend its 
long, porous coasts and inland borders.  The Joint Staff is 
currently coordinating a policy decision with State 
regarding release of this MTCR Category I weapon system to 
the UAE.  CENTCOM in September forwarded an assessment to 
OSD supporting sale of an unarmed Predator B to the UAE. 
We are awaiting an OSD policy decision on this issue.  The 
Emiratis will find it difficult to understand that we can 
sell them F-16s while denying them an armed Predator B. 
 
E-2C Hawkeye  If Raised) 
-------------------------- 
 
13. (C) We are making progress on a UAE request to obtain 
E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning aircraft.  Although the 
original LOA lapsed in July without a UAE signature, in 
August they signed a Letter of Intent and deposited $5 
million to continue negotiations.  The US Navy 
International Programs Office led a team in September and 
delivered a final LOA to the UAE on November 16.  The 
Emiratis are studying the final LOA with a goal of signing 
it, then announcing a deal at the Dubai Air Show.  The five 
aircraft have been transferred to Northrop Grumman, which 
is awaiting UAE acceptance of an LOA to begin refurbishing. 
 
AH-64 Apache A-to-D Remanufacture (If Raised) 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
14. (C) The AH-64 Apache A-to-D Remanufacture LOA lapsed in 
July.  UAE officials continue to conduct discussions with 
Boeing and US Army officials as though the LOA were still 
valid, despite notice to the contrary.  The UAE must 
provide another formal Letter of Request and obtain updated 
Pricing and Availability before Boeing and USASAC proceed 
with this project.  Meanwhile, the planned transfer of the 
AH-64A fleet from UAEAF to UAE Land Forces has been 
postponed, pending a remanufacture decision. 
 
Remote sensing (If Raised) 
-------------------------- 
 
15. (S) The Emiratis continue to request new, long-term 
access to satellite imagery of Iran and the UAE region, as 
part of its strategic relationship with the United States. 
A USG interagency team visited the UAE in November to 
discuss a government-to-government agreement that the USG 
had provided to the UAE last May.  In an unexpected move, 
the Emiratis presented alternative text to the agreement, 
requesting an option to lease a US satellite.  The USG team 
must now review the proposal and respond to the Emiratis 
when a review is complete. 
 
-------------- 
BROADER ISSUES 
-------------- 
Afghanistan and Iraq: Support for Coalition Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
16. (S) The UAE Armed Forces has deployed a 35-man Emirati 
Special Operations contingent to Bagram Air Base.  As you 
know, the UAE continues to play a very helpful role in 
Afghanistan, particularly in the provision of humanitarian 
and reconstruction assistance.  The UAE Armed Forces 
provided the Afghan National Army with approximately $50 
million in assistance in kind in 2002 and overall 
humanitarian assistance has crossed the $50 million mark. 
The UAEG also continues to provide substantial personal 
financial support to President Karzai.  In Iraq, the UAEG 
provided a "lift" in support of Iraqi stabilization 
efforts. 
 
17. (S) Regarding MbZ's offer to use a squadron of the 
UAE's newly acquired South African Seeker II UAV's, we are 
coordinating the prospects for the deployment with the UAE 
Special Operations Command and CENTCOM/J5, CJTF-180, and 
CJSOTF-A.  A joint US team traveled to the UAE in early 
November to discuss operational UAV experience in 
Afghanistan, command relationships, integration and fusion, 
intel support, strategic lift, beddown location, force 
protection, logistics, and third country contractor 
support.  UAE SOC has proposed a deployment as early as 
January 2004, and we are working the details for 
implementation. 
 
Iraq:  UAE Humanitarian/Medical Assistance 
------------------------------------------ 
 
18. (SBU) As you know, the Emiratis were among the first in 
the Arab world to step up to the plate in providing much- 
needed humanitarian assistance and medical relief to the 
Iraqi people.  The Embassy, the HOC in Kuwait and CENTCOM 
worked closely with the UAE Red Crescent Authority to move 
supplies into Iraq and transport Iraqi patients to the UAE 
for treatment.  This cooperation continues.  Thanks to the 
system put in place by CENTCOM and the HOC, the Emiratis 
are now moving assistance into Iraq on an almost daily 
basis using their own transportation.  The Shaykh Zayed 
hospital in Baghdad continues to receive hundreds of 
patients a day. 
 
Iraq: Timely Public Statements 
------------------------------ 
 
19. (U) The Emiratis have strongly supported Iraqi 
delegations at official meetings in the region or when they 
visited the UAE.  The UAEG also issued strong public 
condemnation for the attacks against the UN's Baghdad 
headquarters and against Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim and his 
followers in Najaf.  Privately, the senior leadership has 
told us that they applaud the U.S. decision to accelerate 
the transfer of authority to the Iraqis (see ref A). 
 
Iran: Worries Persist 
-------------------- 
 
20. (S) All of our senior Emirati interlocutors worry about 
Iran's intentions in Iraq and in the Arabian Gulf region as 
a whole.  Iran is one of the major reasons the UAEG is 
actively pursuing acquisition of ATACMS, remote sensing 
technology, and is so keen to get Predator.  The Emiratis 
have urged us to help prevent Iran from meddling in Iraq's 
domestic affairs.  They view Iran's nuclear program with 
deep suspicion and have consistently supported a tough 
approach by the IAEA. 
 
ALBRIGHT 

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