US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU2340

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 002340 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
STATE PLEASE ALSO PASS USAID - ANE/SA 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2013 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, PTER, NP, UK, Maoist Insurgency, U.S-Nepali Relations 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  OTHER DONORS KEEPING A DISTANCE FROM US? 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 2163 (NOTAL) 
     B. KATHMANDU 2246 (NOTAL) 
     C. KATHMANDU 2266 (NOTAL) 
     D. KATHMANDU 2129 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: AMB. MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  Summary:  Following the delivery of increased USG 
security assistance last year, Maoist insurgents embarked on 
an anti-American propaganda campaign intended, in part, to 
isolate the U.S. diplomatically, discourage other donors from 
collaborating with us, and to incite Chinese and Indian 
concerns at U.S. "activism" in the region.  Unfortunately, 
some Western donors in Nepal appear to be falling for the 
insurgents' propaganda by repeating some of it as factual 
elements of U.S. policy.  In addition, some donor missions 
appear purposely to be excluding the U.S. from signing on to 
several recent joint statements espousing a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict and respect for human rights.  Our 
notable absence from the list of signatories to such 
statements makes it appear that we, as the Maoists allege, do 
not uphold those principles.  At the same time, Maoist 
rhetoric singling out our aid programs for "non-cooperation" 
increase other donors' reluctance to work with us and risk 
being similarly targeted.  The Embassy plans to counter the 
misrepresentations about our policy and positions with a more 
aggressive public relations campaign and increased 
information exchanges with other donor missions.  End summary. 
 
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MAOISTS MALIGNING US . . . 
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2.   (U) Since the USG began increasing its security 
assistance to the Government of Nepal (GON) last year, Maoist 
insurgents have steadily escalated anti-American propaganda 
in their public statements, on their websites and, 
apparently, in their communications to their cadres in the 
field.  Among the most common charges are that the U.S. is 
frustrating the revolutionary aspirations of the Nepalis by 
propping up a feudalistic royal regime; that USG security 
assistance to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) has militarized a 
formerly peaceful Nepali society and demonstrates our purusit 
of a military solution to the insurgency; and that our 
involvement in Nepal is a thinly veiled pretext for more 
ambitious plans in the region, including the establishment of 
miliatary bases and the destabilization of India and China. 
A broadsheet that appeared on the Maoists' English website on 
November 27, for example, alleged that "US imperialism is 
using the civil war to sell weapons and earn money" and 
accused the USG of hypocrisy in echoing the position of "some 
European countries" urging a negotiated settlement to the 
conflict while supplying the RNA with weapons and designating 
the Maoists as terrorists.  "This is the extreme reactionary 
nature of imperialism that talks peace in words but performs 
acts of terror," the statement charged. 
 
3.  (U) Recent Maoist rhetoric has unfavorably compared a 
purportedly bellicose U.S. stance with a more reasonable, 
accommodataive approach the insurgents portray other 
multilateral and bilateral donors--most notably, the UN and 
EU--as adopting.  The EU in particular comes in for frequent 
praise from the Maoists for its friendlier, more tolerant 
attitude toward the insurgents, in contrast to the allegedly 
"hostile" demeanor of the U.S.  In practical terms, this has 
translated into the Maoists' singling out U.S.-sponsored aid 
programs for "non-cooperation" (Ref A).  This message has 
reportedly filtered down to cadres at the grass-roots level 
(Ref C), with its most serious manifestation the November 17 
threat against Peace Corps trainees in Rupandehi District 
(Ref B).  (American tourists, a ready source of cash for 
Maoist extortionists, are apparently still welcome.) 
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. . . AND SOME DONORS CHIMING IN 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  While the Maoists' reasons for hoping to isolate 
the U.S. diplomatically and undermine our aid programs are 
obvious, some of our donor colleagues are, wittingly or 
unwittingly, playing into the insurgents' strategy.  Recent 
press reports in both the international and local English 
press quote high-minded but nonetheless anonymous "Western 
donors" or "international officials" depicting USG policy 
toward Nepal in terms startlingly similar to Maoist claptrap. 
 An article by an Australian journalist in Time Asia magazine 
in September exaggerated the size and scope of U.S. military 
training to the RNA--a topic briefed only to UK Embassy staff 
in Kathmandu--and quoted an unnamed European diplomat as 
desribing U.S. policy as "overextended" in Nepal and possibly 
backing the "losing side" against the Maoists.  On October 16 
the UK's Guardian published another story by an anonymous 
author described as "an official working with an 
international development agency in Nepal," claiming that the 
U.S. had adopted a more antagonistic policy against the 
Maoists than the UK and suggesting that the UK was therefore 
uncomfortable with being identified as our development 
partner. 
 
5.  (C)  On November 17 the local Kathmandu Post published an 
interview with EU Charge Rudiger Wenk in which he was quoted 
as characterizing U.S. policy as "more or less belligerent." 
Wenk denied ever describing the U.S. in those terms and wrote 
a letter to the editor the same day to clarify.  He 
acknowledged, however, speaking out against military support 
to either side, a position he claims was endorsed by the EU 
Parliament.  (Comment:  The EU resolution he sent to 
substantiate this, however, contained no such statement.  We 
understand that the EU as an entity has never provided 
military assistance to any country, making Wenk's contention 
about the EU not providing security assistance to "either 
side" more than a bit disingenuous.  End comment.)  Wenk has 
attracted the criticism of politically conscious Nepalis and 
some European embassies here for his haste in opening a 
dialogue with the Maoists without clearance from either his 
EU colleagues or his ambassador in New Delhi.  Wenk is a 
prominent exponent of the view in some European circles that 
talks with the Maoists are useful even in the absence of any 
evidence that the Maoists are serious about a negotiated 
peace or the re-institution of multi-party democracy.  While 
proponents of this view do not deny the brutality of Maoist 
tactics, they nonetheless regard the US designation of the 
Maoists as terrorists as somehow confrontational.  Corollary 
views are that the Maoists are a force to be accommodated, an 
understandable symptom of failings in Nepali society and 
politics, a modernizing purgative, or the inevitable wave of 
the future. 
 
6.  (SBU)  On November 21 the English-language Nepali Times 
printed an article on pressure exerted by "donor governments 
led by Europeans" on the GON to restore democracy and move 
toward a negotiated settlement to the conflict.  The article 
correctly reported the U.S.position--that military assistance 
may help bring the Maoists back to negotiations but that the 
conflict must ultimately be resolved politically--but said 
that "other Kathmandu-based donor groups" report a different 
perception of our policy.  The article quoted an anonymous 
donor official as saying, "The Americans think an Iraq 
approach will work here.  It hasn't worked in Iraq, and it 
won't work here."  Also on November 21 the International 
Crisis Group (ICG), an NGO based in Belgium, submitted 
testimony to the House Human Rights Caucus that quoted 
anonymous "international officials in contact with ICG" as 
asserting that the "U.S. Embassy appears to have offered at 
least tacit support" for a controversial GON proposal to set 
up village militias--an assertion made without attempting to 
verify with us its accuracy.  (In fact, we have not been 
briefed by the GON on this proposal, which we believe remains 
very much in the conceptual--even hypothetical--phase. 
Though we are suspending judgment until we have more 
information, our first inclination is to discourage such a 
program at this time.)  The Nepali Times parroted a condensed 
version of the testimony in the local press on November 28. 
 
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LEFT OUT OF JOINT MISSIONS, STATEMENTS 
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7.  (SBU)  Besides incorrectly depicting us in their 
statements as isolated from the mainstream, some donors seem, 
unfortunately, to be attempting to isolate us in fact as 
well.  The head of a U.S.-based NGO has reported reluctance 
on the part of other donors and aid agencies to cooperate 
with his organization in outlying areas.  Another U.S.-based 
aid organization was blocked by other human rights NGOs from 
participating in a fact-finding mission formed to investigate 
the killings of four students at a school in Doti District 
(Ref D) because of its U.S. affiliation.  An effort by our 
Public Diplomacy section to produce programs on U.S. aid 
success stories has encountered difficulty in finding NGOs 
that receive U.S. funding that are willing to be publicly 
identified with the USG. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Nor has the U.S. Mission been invited to sign on 
to several recent joint statements issued by donors about the 
conflict.  On November 7 the local press carried a notice of 
"Basic Operating Guidelines" for development and humanitarian 
assistance signed by 10 bilateral donors (Germans, Swiss, 
Canadians, British, Danes, EU, Japanese, Norwegians, Dutch, 
and Finns)--every bilateral donor except the U.S.  The 14 
guidelines espoused such principles as respecting the dignity 
of local religions, culture, and customs; promoting pro-poor, 
non-partisan development; transparency; upholding human 
rights and international humanitarian law; and a commitment 
not to allow program equipment, supplies and facilities to be 
misused, including by "armed or uniformed personnel." 
British aid agency DFID officials here told us that they 
intended to invite USAID to sign on to the November 7 joint 
operating guidelines, but did not follow up an initial, 
half-hearted attempt to contact the Mission Director (who was 
out of the country at the time).  Following the World Bank 
Board approval of the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) 
to Nepal, assorted donor missions and embassies in Kathmandu 
issued a joint statement on November 19, calling for resumed 
negotiations with the Maoists and respect for human rights, 
and clarifying that their Executive Directors' approval 
should not be misinterpreted as "an endorsement of the 
current absence of representative democracy in Nepal."  There 
was no apparent effort to contact the U.S. Embassy before the 
PRSC statement was issued. 
 
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WHAT WE ARE DOING 
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9.  (SBU)  Since increasing our security and development 
assistance to Nepal last year, we have maintained a regular 
dialogue with the diplomatic and donor community here, 
especially with the British, Indian, Japanese and (albeit on 
a less frequent basis) Chinese, regarding our policy to 
Nepal.  Despite our best efforts, however, a number of 
misperceptions about our policy clearly persist among other 
donor agencies and the general public in Nepal.  This is not 
only a diplomatic liability but may also encourage the 
Maoists to single out US assistance for intimidation.  We 
will counter these misperceptions publicly--through an 
augmented PR campaign that reiterates and re-emphasizes our 
leadership in supporting free and fair elections, multi-party 
democracy, human rights, and a negotiated end to the 
conflict.  Privately, we will increase and regularize our 
policy exchanges with counterparts in other embassies and 
with multilateral and bilateral donors.  On December 1 in a 
meeting with UK Special Envoy Sir Jeffrey James, the 
Ambassador made note of the failure of some of the donors, 
including the UK's DFID, to seek the inclusion of the U.S. in 
past statements.  James responded that the exclusion was 
"most unfortunate." 
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COMMENT 
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10.  (C)  The Maoists have been able to conduct a nationwide 
insurgency for nearly eight years in part because of their 
continued success in pitting their multiple adversaries 
against each other--and because of their adversaries' naivete 
in falling for the ploy time and again--thereby preventing 
the legal, constitutional forces from mounting a united, 
well-coordinated opposition to Maoist violence.  The Maoists 
obviously are trying to apply this tried-and-true method to 
split the international community's potential opposition to 
their movement.  Some of our colleagues in Kathmandu, 
unfortunately, seem all too willing to be taken in.  The 
reasons for this may be several.  Many of the foreign 
missions here are strictly development agencies, rather than 
full-fledged embassies, and are staffed by aid officials, 
rather than seasoned diplomats, who see complex foreign 
policy issues like the insurgency solely through a 
development lens.  For such missions, working out a modus 
vivendi with the Maoists that will allow them to continue 
their programs may be a greater imperative than attempting to 
work out a long-term political solution to the conflict. 
Other missions, or individuals within those missions, may be 
venting their ire at U.S. policy in other parts of the world, 
perhaps particularly on Iraq.  Whatever their motivation, 
these colleagues' willingness to accept the insurgents' 
propaganda--and thereby isolate us further--is helping 
perpetuate Maoist myths about our policy. By keeping us off 
joint public statements espousing human rights and dialogue 
and repeating Maoist untruths about our alleged support for a 
military solution, some of these donors are helping to depict 
us just as the Maoists are attempting to misrepresent us. 
 
 
 
MALINOWSKI