US embassy cable - 03BEIRUT5034

UNCLAS  BEIRUT 005034 
 
S/CT FOR REAP 
PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, LE 
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 301352 
 
Post's responses are keyed to questions in reftel: 
 
A)  Significant actions taken by the Government of Lebanon 
(GOL) to support the global coalition against terrorism: 
 
-- Lebanese authorities have arrested a number of individuals 
suspected of supporting al-Qa'ida.  In July 2003, Lebanese 
security forces made numerous arrests in connection with the 
April 5, 2003 bombing of a McDonald's restaurant in the 
northern Beirut suburb of Dowra and with a planned attack on 
a Hardees restaurant in the Achrafieh neighborhood of Beirut. 
 In mid-October, GOL authorities arrested a Yemeni national 
purportedly linked to al-Qa'ida, Muammar Abdallah al-'Awama, 
on suspicion of involvement in these actual and planned 
attacks against U.S. interests. 
 
-- GOL intelligence and security services have been 
cooperative with Embassy requests for information and 
support, and GOL security services have been responsive to 
Embassy requests for protective security. 
 
B)  The response of the GOL's judicial system to acts of 
international terrorism and/or significant acts of domestic 
terrorism during 2003: 
 
-- In May, a military tribunal sentenced eight people (four 
of whom were in custody and four in absentia) to prison terms 
of three to 15 years after finding them guilty of attempting 
to establish an al-Qa'ida cell in Lebanon. 
 
-- In September, a military tribunal began the trial of 35 
individuals, separately and in groups, charged with planning 
and/or executing the bombings described in (A), and also with 
planning to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador in Lebanon and 
launch a missile attack on the Embassy compound. 
 
C)  The GOL did not extradite or request the extradition of 
suspected terrorists for prosecution during 2003.  Although 
the GOL has charged two residents of Australia, Bilal Khazal 
and Maher Khazal, with involvement in the planned terrorist 
operations described in (B), there is as yet no extradition 
treaty between the two countries.  The U.S. did not request 
any new extraditions of terrorism suspects of the GOL in 2003. 
 
D)  Significant impediments to GOL prosecution and/or 
extradition of suspected terrorists during 2003: 
 
-- GOL security services and the Lebanese Armed Forces 
continue to have very limited control over Palestinian 
refugee camps in Lebanon, inside which a number of terrorist 
groups -- including Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command 
(PFLP-GC), Hamas, the Abu Nidal Organization, Al-Aqsa 
Brigades, and Asbat al-Ansar -- operate. 
 
-- The GOL remains unable or unwilling to exert control in 
certain parts of the country, including portions of the Biq'a 
valley, south Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and 
the Palestinian refugee camps.  Syrian and Iranian support 
allows terrorist elements to flourish in Lebanon, and the GOL 
is powerless to challenge Syria's policy of maintaining a 
Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist presence in various 
parts of the country. 
 
-- The Lebanese judicial system is independent in principle, 
but subject to political pressure (from influential Lebanese 
politicians, as well as Syrian leaders and intelligence 
personnel) in practice.  To date, a court hearing in the 
appeal made by the prosecutor's office regarding the 
assassination of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy and two others 
in 1976 has not been scheduled, following a court verdict 
declaring the suspect, Tawfic Muhammad Farroukh, not guilty 
of murder for his role in the killings. 
 
-- Lebanese laws prohibit the extradition of a Lebanese 
national to any third country. 
 
E)  Host government responses to international terrorism 
other than prosecution included public statements by top GOL 
officials condemning terrorist bombings in Najaf, Iraq, in 
August; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May and November; and 
Istanbul, Turkey, also in November.  Also, GOL authorities 
continued to cooperate with U.S. officials in the 
investigation of a November 2002 murder of a U.S. citizen in 
Sidon. 
 
F)  Other major counterterrorism efforts taken by the GOL 
during 2003: 
 
-- In October, the National Assembly passed two new bills 
strengthening existing legislation against money laundering 
and terrorism finance.  Law no. 547 expanded existing 
legislation on money laundering, making illicit any funds 
resulting from "the financing or contribution to finance 
terrorism or terrorist acts or terrorist organizations, based 
on the definition of terrorism as it appears in the Lebanese 
Penal Code" (which distinguishes between "terrorism" and 
"resistance").  Law no. 553 stipulated penalties for "any 
person who voluntarily and by any means, whether directly or 
indirectly, finances or contributes to finance terrorism or 
terrorist acts or terrorist organizations...."  President 
Lahoud signed the two bills into law later that month. 
 
-- From January to November, the Special Investigations 
Commission investigated 245 cases involving allegations of 
money laundering, including 22 that were related to terrorism 
financing.  No accounts used for terrorism finance have been 
discovered in Lebanese banks and financial institutions to 
date in 2003. 
 
G)  The GOL provides no known material or financial support 
to terrorist organizations.  At Syria's direction, however, 
it does provide safehavens and bases for several terrorist 
groups.  Syria allows Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist 
groups -- including PIJ, PFLP-GC, and Hamas -- to maintain 
bases and offices in various areas of Lebanon, including the 
Biq'a valley, the southern suburbs of Beirut, Palestinian 
refugee camps, and south Lebanon.  The GOL is powerless to 
challenge Syria by taking unilateral action against these 
groups, either by disarming and disbanding them or forcing 
them to depart Lebanon.  Many Lebanese officials and 
politicians routinely hail Hizballah as a "resistance" group, 
while criticism of Hizballah invites retribution from Syria 
or its Lebanese supporters.  More recently (in response to a 
circular on Hamas bank accounts issued by the Central Bank of 
Lebanon in October), some officials and politicians have 
publicly supported Hamas as yet another "resistance" 
organization. 
 
H) While the GOL has not made any public statements in 
support of a terrorist-supporting country specifically on a 
terrorism issue, many officials and politicians routinely 
defend Syria, such as in the aftermath of the October 5 
Israeli air strike on Syrian territory, which Israel claimed 
was in retaliation for a suicide bombing on Israeli territory 
planned by Palestinian rejectionist groups in Syria. 
 
I)  There were no significant changes since 2002, positive or 
negative, in the host government's attitude toward terrorism, 
international or domestic. 
 
 
FEIERSTEIN