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| Identifier: | 03THEHAGUE2981 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03THEHAGUE2981 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy The Hague |
| Created: | 2003-11-28 14:19:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | EAIR ECON NL |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002981 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DHS FOR DAVID TEACH BRUSSELS FOR TSA REPS KNUDSEN AND CELLAR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAIR, ECON, NL SUBJECT: AVIATION SECURITY: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT NEW U.S. CARGO INSPECTION RULES REF: NOVEMBER 2003 TSA AVIATION SECURITY DIRECTIVES 1. (SBU) Summary. Dutch aviation security officials and national carrier KLM recently voiced their shared concern that new U.S. requirements for inspections of incoming cargo (a.k.a. the 10% rule) will be difficult for carriers to meet. The Dutch contend that their inspection procedures are sufficient. The GONL plans to conduct its own risk assessment, for which U.S. Customs has offered to lend expertise. The GONL reiterates its commitment to aviation security, and enjoys regular consultations on matters of mutual interest with TSA/Department of Homeland Security. End Summary. 2. (SBU) On November 18, EconOff and U.S. Customs liaison Bryan Evans (who is based in Rotterdam) met with Harry Mayer, Head of Legal Affairs, and director for aviation security policy at the Ministry of Justice. The meeting was the latest in a series of periodic consultations between post and Dutch aviation security officials. Mayer affirmed his support for strong transatlantic cooperation in aviation security, but highlighted several emerging concerns that the Dutch have on aspects of U.S. air security requirements. In general, the Dutch feel deluged by what they see is an excessive number of security directives from the USG. The Dutch mantra on aviation security directives is that American requirements appear haphazard; instead, requirements should be more closely linked to risks. (Note: this sentiment has been a repeating theme in our consultations with Dutch authorities. End Note.) Mayer had just returned from Washington where he met with DHS/TSA Director of International Affairs David Tiedge. Mayer spoke very highly of his reception at TSA and mentioned that he and Tiedge discussed a number of topics of mutual interest including the USG's new "continued search" requirements on passenger baggage, which the Dutch find rather redundant and burdensome. (Note: TSA informs post that its reps are working with the Dutch to streamline the process. On November 17 per the new security requirement, TSA offered Schiphol Airport options to minimize the number of tables for passenger check-in services. End Note.) Mayer offered Tiedge a preview of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport's new risk analysis (a.k.a. profiling) policy, which is still in the development phase. Mayer noted that he looks forward to following up with DHS on these two items of interest. 3. (SBU) EconOff raised the issue of new threats to cargo aviation, as have been identified in recent TSA bulletins, and the accompanying new requirements that cargo carriers perform 10% random screening. The Dutch are "very focused" on this issue, but question whether the increased risk warrants the 10% inspection measure. Mayer said the new requirement creates a significant burden for carriers and says that it will take some time for them to meet the requirement in full. The Ministry of Justice is working jointly with Dutch Customs and the Royal Marechaussee to develop a risk assessment for cargo passing through Schiphol Airport. U.S. Customs Liaison Evans volunteered to tap sources of DHS expertise for any future the risk assessment, and Mayer welcomed the suggestion. Mayer noted that TSA's 2003 certification of Schiphol Airport did not identify any major soft spots in the area of security. 4. (SBU) EconOff also discussed cargo security with Mr. Teun Platenkamp of national carrier KLM's government affairs office. Platenkamp echoed the Ministry's complaints about the 10% requirement, adding, "It's impossible to open 10% of cargo." KLM and other cargo carriers at Schiphol employ the "known shipper" system to the greatest extent possible, and do what they can to ensure a secure supply chain, including the use of sophisticated seals and GPS-based tracking systems. KLM x-rays any cargo that does not come from a "known shipper." In addition, the Dutch national carrier has a trace detection system available that looks for explosives. Platenkamp suggested that it would be more effective to apply enhanced security requirements to cargo agents, rather than carriers. If the USG recognized the GONL's national cargo security requirements for regulated agents, this would greatly reduce the burden on air carriers transporting cargo to the U.S. Agents, he says, are more vulnerable than carriers. America's new cargo security requirements were among the more popular topics of conversation at the recent European civil aviation meeting in Athens, he noted. KLM is drafting a letter outlining its procedures which it will present to TSA officials in response to the cargo requirement. RUSSEL
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