US embassy cable - 03HARARE2313

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002313 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ASEC, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MASS ACTION IN THE OFFING? 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 2287 (B) HARARE 2286 (C) HARARE 2279 
 
     (D) HARARE 2124 (E) HARARE 1594 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  MDC Secretary for Presidential Affairs 
Gandi Mudzingwa on November 25 advised poloff that the 
opposition party was laying the groundwork for another "mass 
action" in late January or early February 2004.  He predicted 
that the bishops would soon publicly declare their mediation 
efforts at a dead end, opening the door for the MDC to pursue 
mass action without being accused of undermining talks.  In 
fact, the timing of mass action, imminent or not, likely will 
depend on a host of uncertain factors, including ruling party 
and international reaction to a withdrawal by the bishops, if 
indeed the bishops are yet prepared to declare their efforts 
a failure.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Civil Society Outreach 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Mudzingwa said he and other party leaders recently 
had met with senior representatives of the three 
organizations headed by the respective members of the 
"bishops troika" (ref B), although the bishops themselves 
were unavailable.  Mudzingwa said that the consensus of 
church leaders represented was that the bishops' efforts had 
been unable to overcome the ruling party's disingenuousness 
about talks and that it was time to take a different tack. 
They agreed that the bishops should declare publicly that 
their best efforts had come to naught and that they would 
suspend further mediation work.  Mudzingwa said the MDC 
expected the ruling party to respond ambivalently, evincing 
its bad faith to domestic and international audiences.  That 
would permit the MDC to renew plans for mass action without 
taking the blame for sinking prospects for talks. 
 
3.  (C) According to Mudzingwa, the party already was 
engaging a number of players it deemed potentially crucial in 
maximizing the mass action's impact.  He asserted that the 
churches could be counted on to help moblize participants at 
the parish level.  Various groups within civil society, 
including the increasingly restive labor unions would 
participate as well. 
 
Problematic Security Forces 
--------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) Mudzingwa reported that the party also was reaching 
out to the police and military.  The party had contacts in 
the police force, which he maintained could not ultimately be 
relied on by the ruling party, were popular action to be 
sufficiently massive.  Communications with the military 
remained problematic but the party had made inroads.  He said 
that at least one senior officer had indicated that the 
support or at least ambivalence of many top brass could be 
secured with promises that they could keep farms gained under 
land reform -- an approach party leadership was weighing. 
Mudzingwa said the party expected Mugabe to sweep away the 
entire top brass, replacing it with the next echelon that 
ostensibly had better rapport with the rank-and-file.  He 
said this might appear popular in the short run but the new 
brass's allegiances to the ruling party may prove difficult 
to sustain.  The party was considering public statements to 
augment discreet confidential personal approaches to certain 
officers, but recognized the risk of fueling ruling party 
insecurities and provoking a dangerous backlash.  Echoing an 
earlier approach, he sought USG assistance in quietly 
bolstering the ZDF's confidence in the MDC (ref E). 
 
5.  (C) Mudzingwa said the party's next mass action would be 
more geographically dispersed than action earlier this year. 
A key tactical difference would be to engineer more action in 
rural areas, which he asserted would stretch thin GOZ 
resources -- especially the principally rural-based "Green 
Bombers" -- devoted to suppressing public dissent. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
6.  (C) The party's apparent consideration of renewed mass 
action responds to growing impatience among a restive 
rank-and-file.  It further reflects a recognition that 
Mugabe's disingenuousness had been laid bare internationally 
by the failure of the bishops, Mbeki, and Obasanjo to find 
any purchase for talks.  A leading advocate within the 
party's more militant wing, Mudzingwa is very close to 
Tsvangirai but the extent to which the party leadership 
 
SIPDIS 
supports imminent mass action is uncertain.  Tsvangirai made 
no mention of it when he met with the Ambassador last week 
(ref A), although he made clear that convincing the world of 
Mugabe's bad faith -- presumably a political condition 
precedent to mass action -- is an MDC priority.  We question 
how soon the bishops, who are engaging regional leaders on 
Zimbabwe (ref B), or Mbeki will be prepared to admit failure 
publicly.  We suspect that a decision to proceed will await 
more definitive signals that the international community has 
given up on such efforts.  We cannot discount the possibility 
that the ruling party could manipulate its posture on talks 
so as to further string out or rejuvenate mediation efforts. 
 
7.  (C) An additional factor constraining a decision to move 
forward is continued uncertainty about the MDC's ability to 
mobilize sufficient participation in the face of public 
apathy, hamstrung communication, severe economic crisis, and 
official intimidation.  Recent efforts by the Zimbabwe 
Conference of Trade Unions (ref C) and the National 
Constituent Assembly (ref E) to engineer public 
demonstrations have elicited scant public participation. 
Anonymous e-mails calling people to the streets at specific 
times have provoked no reaction, other than from the GOZ in 
arresting several found in possession of such e-mails. 
 
8.  (C) Widespread despair and suffering precipitated by the 
country's economic implosion remain a wild card to some 
extent.  Most Zimbabweans continue to respond to their plight 
by attending to the daily challenges of scraping by and by 
eschewing political action.  If the public were to take to 
the streets in large number -- a big if, whether by political 
plan or in spontaneous reaction to an unforeseen provocation 
-- the government's ability to contain events is unclear.  To 
date, civil disturbances have been fairly centralized affairs 
choreographed with plenty of notice.  Police have had little 
trouble pre-empting or controlling such events and have been, 
since the violent reaction to the MDC's June mass action, 
relatively restrained in response -- roughing up a few 
demonstrators for show and releasing those arrested in short 
order.  The key question remains: can public discontent be 
translated into large demonstrations or can the security 
forces continue to prevent any demonstration from gaining 
momentum.  Confronted with larger and more dispersed crowds, 
the insecure and resource-strapped GOZ could be expected to 
unleash a wider and significantly more violent crackdown than 
Zimbabwe has seen in some time -- with unpredictable results. 
 
SULLIVAN