US embassy cable - 03ZAGREB2505

S E C R E T  ZAGREB 002505 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PARM, PGOV, HR, Political Parties/Elections, Defense Reform (Mil & NATO) 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PROPOSED DECEMBER 6 SECDEF VISIT 
TO CROATIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
1.  (C) Your visit to Croatia just two weeks after 
parliamentary elections will give the USG a unique 
opportunity to influence the next government's policy. 
Although HDZ President Ivo Sanader has not finished putting 
together the coalition which will give him the support needed 
to pass a vote of confidence, his overwhelming victory in the 
November 23 poll means that he will almost certainly be 
Croatia's next Prime Minister by early January. 
 
2.  (C) Even before his campaign went into high gear, Sanader 
made clear his intention to take steps to improve Croatia's 
relationship with the U.S.  Since the election, the HDZ has 
in private meetings with the Ambassador and in public 
statements re-affirmed its intention to sign an Article 98 
agreement and to move to deploy Croatian troops to join the 
coalition in Iraq.  Despite the HDZ's strong showing in the 
election, however, Sanader's majority in parliament will be 
very narrow; he may not be able to deliver easily on these 
pledges.  Nevertheless, it would be appropriate to "cash this 
check" by expressing the USG's gratitude for these tough 
policy decisions. 
 
3.  (C) Both in meetings with us and with the EU, Sanader has 
demonstrated that he knows the right things to say about 
addressing Croatia's war legacy.  While he chooses his words 
carefully, Sanader has said that a government led by the HDZ 
would cooperate with The Hague war crimes tribunal and would 
address refugee return and property restitution issues.  Your 
visit should underscore that both the U.S. and the EU will 
look for results, not just statements on these issues; 
cooperation with the war crimes tribunal is not negotiable. 
 
4.  (C) Croatia made good progress towards NATO membership 
during the tenure of the Racan government.  Just over three 
years ago, Croatia was outside of Partnership for Peace.  Now 
completing its second cycle in the Alliance's Membership 
Action Plan, Croatia has demonstrated its commitment to 
making the necessary sacrifices to reform its military and 
develop capabilities to make a contribution to NATO.  One 
important goal of your visit would be to convince Sanader to 
continue the progress begun in the past two years.  This was 
not merely SDP party policy, but a sound direction which met 
with the approval of NATO allies. 
 
5.  (C) Reform of the Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) is 
progressing slowly, but in a positive direction.  The focus 
of CAF's reform efforts in 2002 and 2003 has been on 
downsizing and restructuring at the price of not training and 
modernizing the force.  This process is being conducted in a 
transparent manner, with criteria set on professional 
capabilities and the needs of the force, not political 
affiliation.  Croatia has made significant progress in 
de-politicizing its armed forces.  But senior HDZ officials 
have suggested that they may reverse some of this progress. 
Your visit could serve to underscore that NATO expects the 
uniformed services to remain outside of politics. 
 
6.  (C) Although the Racan government -- and President Mesic 
-- were not helpful on Iraq, Croatia has been an active 
supporter of international efforts to combat terrorism. 
Croatia deployed a highly-professional platoon of military 
police to Afghanistan.  This unit functioned as a national 
unit under the supervision of the German contingent during 
ISAF III and is now under Canadian command as part of a 
Canadian MP company in ISAF IV.  Croatia made significant 
contributions of weapons and munitions to the fledgling 
Afghan National Army and made donations of humanitarian 
assistance both to Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
7.  (C) When the Racan government signaled in July 2003 that 
it might be ready to make a troop contribution for Iraq, 
Croatia established a liaison officer at U.S. CENTCOM 
headquarters to begin technical talks in advance of a 
political decision to deploy.  Although the Racan government 
decided to defer deployment until after elections, Croatia's 
liaison officer remains at CENTCOM working to coordinate 
issues from Croatia's ISAF mission.  Since this officer 
already in Tampa and since Croatia's Special Operations 
Forces soldiers designated for Iraq have already finished a 
five-month training course, deployment of Croatia's soldiers 
-- provided the HDZ can line up enough votes in parliament -- 
could take place quickly. 
 
8.  (S/NF) Acquisition of Croatia's S-300. Two successive 
Croatian Ministers of Defense have promised, yet not 
delivered on facilitating the transfer to the USG of 
Croatia's incomplete, yet highly desirable S-300 (SA-10 
 
 
Grumble) surface-to-air missile.  MOD Antunovic worked 
closely with our Defense Attache to orchestrate transfer of 
this system to the USG, but she ran out of political support 
and time before the parliamentary elections brought a halt to 
the transfer.   Elements of this system are intended for use 
by the U.S. Air Force in testing and validating future 
generation aircraft.  An ongoing legal dispute between the 
GoC and arms purveyor Zvonimir Zubak over S-300 ownership has 
the system locked up in civil court proceedings.  Ceding 
possession rather than ownership is a possible workaround for 
the GoC. Department of State, OSD and Air Force staffs are 
actively involved in this foreign material acquisition case. 
FRANK 
 
 
NNNN