US embassy cable - 03HARARE2310

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002310 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, ZI 
SUBJECT: ENCOUNTER WITH THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a chance encounter at a social event 
on November 25, Minister of Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary 
Affairs Patrick Chinamasa elaborated privately to poloff 
about ruling party views of the MDC and the USG.  Chinamasa 
suggested that the USG had the potential stature to influence 
events in Zimbabwe but had lost credibility with the ruling 
party as an honest broker.  The extent of its open support of 
the MDC only stiffened ZANU-PF political resolve and 
undermined prospects for any compromise.  Chinamasa 
acknowledged that the government's economic policies needed 
significant reform to restore market dynamism -- all subject 
to the overall priority of land reform.  He gave little 
indication that the government was prepared to soften its 
posture toward the opposition or reach out to the West.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Deep Suspicion of Washington/Commercial Farmer/MDC Cabal 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
2.  (C) Cordial upon introduction, Chinamasa soon became 
quite animated in a familiar critique of USG policy toward 
the GOZ.  He complained first that American "sanctions" and 
relentlessly negative rhetoric poisoned Zimbabwe's image with 
the international community, warding off investors and 
tourists that were especially critical now in light of the 
disruptions of land reform.  Sanctions constrained travel by 
certain key businesspeople, further hamstringing  Zimbabwe's 
economic recovery.  Travel restrictions on senior officials 
prevented the government from making its case and engaging 
with the USG or international financial institutions. 
 
3.  (C) The Justice Minister asserted that the USG had 
dialogue with many governments that were much worse by its 
own standards than Zimbabwe's, and yet effectively refused to 
engage with the GOZ.  That MDC officials traveled freely to 
meet USG officials in Washington but ZANU-PF  leaders could 
not convinced most in the ruling party that USG was not 
interested in pluralistic democracy so much as simply getting 
the MDC into power.  USG financial and other support for the 
MDC deepened the conviction that the USG wanted to oust 
ZANU-PF "at all costs," which only made moderation by the 
ruling party impossible.  Zimbabwe's history made its 
citizens very leery of foreign control, and outside support 
made the MDC unacceptable foreign agents in the eyes of many. 
 The USG wanted to "ignore history" and did not sufficiently 
understand the political need to redress the legacy of 
colonial injustices.  Washington "couldn't help itself" from 
identifying too closely with the interest of white farmers. 
Chinamasa maintained that the MDC's reliance on support from 
white farmers and overseas interests assured that it would 
roll back land reform, although he conceded that opposition 
posture on land reform belatedly was moderating. 
 
4.  (C) Chinamasa said that the United States had the stature 
and potential influence to facilitate political stability in 
Zimbabwe, but would have to overcome its severe credibility 
problems with the ruling party.  He noted the USG's key role 
as broker in facilitating the Lancaster House accord and 
singled out the contributions of President Carter and Andrew 
Young as especially crucial.  The GOZ was open to more 
engagement with the USG but had a sense that Washington "had 
wool in its ears," making engagement pointless.  He inquired 
what the GOZ could do to help get the bilateral relationship 
on a more constructive footing and said he would be receptive 
to meeting the Ambassador "if there was anything to talk 
about." 
 
Candor on Economic Plight 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Turning to the economy, Chinamasa acknowledged that 
the government's macroeconomic policies needed significant 
reform.  He maintained that Zimbabweans were at least as, if 
not more capitalistic than Americans and that the free market 
was operating in Zimbabwe notwithstanding government 
controls.  He advised that policies would be changed to make 
things easier for both foreign and domestic investors, but 
did not indicate when.  After asserting that economic changes 
would have to precede any political reform, he paused and 
concluded that they would go "hand in hand." 
 
Postscript 
---------- 
 
6.  (C) Moments after the exchange ended cordially, a white 
opposition lawyer confronted poloff, expressing dismay that a 
western diplomat would engage Chinamasa at all.  A former 
friend and classmate of Chinamasa and grandson of a Rhodesian 
Minister of Justice himself, the lawyer asserted that he 
would no longer speak to him.  He cast Chinamasa as 
"ungrateful" for the opportunity he was given as one of the 
nation's first black lawyers, noting that he would not have 
been allowed to attend such functions in earlier days.  He 
credited Chinamasa as the man most responsible for the demise 
of Zimbabwe's judicial system.  He pointed out that the 
Minister's administration of justice had resulted in the 
police beating of two female attorneys present at the event. 
Ironically, the two prominent women spent more than 15 
minutes joking and laughing with Chinamasa later in the 
party.  National Constitutional Assembly Chairman Lovemore 
Madhuku, who has been arrested ten times (including twice 
within the past month), also engaged the Minister separately 
in jocular banter. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (C) A hard-line architect and executor of the 
government's campaign to marginalize and silence the 
opposition, the Minister was right on message with his 
historical rendition and comments about sanctions and land 
reform.  His casual inquiry about improving bilateral 
relations probably did not reflect real interest from a party 
that remains very introspective, suspicious, and insecure of 
itself.  That Chinamasa's private discourse was so consonant 
(politically, at least) with the party's public posture 
testifies in part to the depth of party discipline.  Perhaps 
more problematically, it highlights the extent to which the 
insulated party leadership may believe much of its seemingly 
disingenouous rhetoric.  ZANU-PF's self-consciously 
xenophobic posture -- part politics, part party nature -- is 
a barrier to meaningful engagement with the opposition and 
western nations.  Nonetheless, the party's historically 
centralized power structure suggests it could dissipate on 
command.  As long as Mugabe remains in power, though, 
anti-western rhetoric is likely to remain a supporting pillar 
of ruling party strategy. 
 
8.  (C) Chinamasa's negative characterization of GOZ economic 
policy was uncharacteristic and surprising.  It suggests 
first that the hard-line moniker in the political sphere does 
not necessarily apply in the economic realm.  In addition, 
his comments and the recently released budget's failure to 
discuss any of the country's root economic problems indicate 
a possible internal stalemate on economic policy, even as 
"hard-liners" maintain the upper hand on political tactics. 
 
9.  (C) The different postures toward Chinamasa among those 
aggrieved by his maladministration of justice exemplify the 
significance of emotion in domestic politics here.  Deep 
polarization on the surface contrasts curiously with social 
relations that, shaped by varying degrees of realpolitik, 
cultural norms, intimidation and hope, often can be 
surprisingly civil -- offering potential purchase for 
political dialogue should will at the highest level ever be 
mustered. 
SULLIVAN