US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO2036

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 002036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT, EUR/NB 
DEPARTMENT ALSO PLEASE PASS TOPEC 
NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  11-25-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, MOPS, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Acting chief of monitors says ceasefire being 
observed; Navy chief defends aggressive posture 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 2010 
-      (B) Colombo 1845 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador met November 24 with 
Hagrup Haukland, the acting head of the Norwegian-run 
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and separately with 
Sri Lankan Navy Chief Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri. 
Haukland said the GSL and the Tigers continued to 
observe the ceasefire accord.  The SLMM remained 
concerned about the possibility of Tamil-Muslim violence 
in the east, however.  Haukland indicated that Norway 
might make a determination soon regarding the fate of 
chief monitor Tellefsen, whose removal President 
Kumaratunga had demanded in October.  Despite the 
tensions in the south and other uncertainties, it is 
positive that the SLMM finds itself able to continue its 
important work.  Admiral Sandagiri agreed that it was 
important to support the peace process, but showed a 
more belligerent attitude towards the Tigers.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) MEETING WITH SLMM:  Ambassador Lunstead met 
November 24 with Hagrup Haukland, the acting head of the 
SLMM.  Haukland, a retired Norwegian military officer, 
told the Ambassador that both the Sri Lankan government 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
continued to observe the February 2002 ceasefire accord. 
Regarding the LTTE's unauthorized camp located at Wan 
Ela near Trincomalee city in the east, Haukland noted 
that the LTTE had made no move to dismantle the camp in 
spite of the SLMM's earlier ruling that its construction 
violated the ceasefire agreement.  The Ambassador 
queried Haukland as to why the Tigers were adamant in 
their refusal to dismantle the camp.  Haukland replied 
that it was a "matter of principle" for the Tigers, as 
the camp was not particularly strategic and "could 
probably be disassembled in a couple of days." 
 
3.  (C) In addition to the Wan Ela camp, Haukland noted 
that the Tigers occupied seven "pockets" in the east and 
one in the north in the Mannar District area.  He said 
the existence of such pockets could be "explosive" 
should the GSL challenge LTTE occupation of the areas in 
question.  Haukland added that one of the most crucial 
missions the SLMM had was defusing Tamil-Muslim ethnic 
tension in the east.  The situation there was poor and 
LTTE-Muslim violence was possible.  Along these lines, 
Haukland briefly mentioned a November 23 incident in 
Kinniya, near the Wan Ela camp, in which two Muslims had 
been killed. 
 
4.  (C) The Ambassador related that, during his meeting 
with President Kumaratunga following her November 4 
takeover of three ministries and suspension of 
Parliament, he had stressed the importance of the GSL's 
and the LTTE's continued adherence to the ceasefire 
agreement.  The Ambassador added that he had also 
underlined to the President the vital importance of the 
SLMM's role. 
 
5.  (C) NORWAY TO DECIDE ON CHIEF MONITOR:  Noting the 
difficulties inherent in the SLMM's work, Haukland 
underscored the continued importance of monitoring the 
situation at sea.  He stated that the SLMM's monitoring 
effort at sea continued much as it had previously 
despite the October 16 incident which had led to the 
President's calling for the removal of chief monitor 
Tryggve Tellefsen.  (Note:  In the incident referred to, 
a SLMM official contacted the LTTE to ask about a report 
about a possible Tiger resupply ship.  In doing this, 
the SLMM was accused of inappropriately tipping the LTTE 
off to Sri Lanka Navy scrutiny of the reported vessel. 
Citing such concerns, President Kumaratunga demanded 
that Tellefsen be replaced -- see Ref B.)  Responding to 
the Ambassador's query as to Tellefsen's status, 
Haukland replied that Tellefsen remained in Norway for 
"consultations" and the Norwegian government could make 
a decision as early as this week whether or not to 
retain him as chief of mission.  Haukland noted, 
however, that he "couldn't see how Tellefsen could come 
back" with President Kumaratunga acting as head of the 
Defense Ministry.  The Ambassador commented that 
considering the nature of the SLMM's mission, it was 
difficult to deal with political pressure of this type. 
Haukland concurred, remarking that if the SLMM were seen 
as susceptible to political pressure, then its mission 
would be compromised. 
 
6.  (C) MEETING WITH NAVY CHIEF:  In an office call later 
the same day with the Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya 
Sandagiri, the Ambassador reiterated the message that he 
has given each of the service commanders -- U.S. 
appreciation of the responsibility and restraint shown 
by the armed forces throughout the peace process. 
Admiral Sandagiri was the most outspoken of the three 
Commanders in asserting the rights and duties of the 
military to defend the "sovereignty of the nation."  The 
LTTE, he said, is not a legitimate organization and 
should not be allowed to import items into Sri Lanka. 
It became clear throughout the session that while he 
publicly supported the peace process, he would not be 
deterred by the confines of the MOU in preventing the 
LTTE from importing dangerous materials into the 
country.  "Why else does the Navy exist?" he asked. 
 
7.  (C) Ambassador noted the difficulty and ambiguity of 
the Navy's task. The Navy wanted to support the peace 
process and observe the ceasefire, but at the same time 
wanted to protect Sri Lanka's waters and prevent the 
LTTE from smuggling in weapons.  These two objectives 
could conflict with each other.  Discussing the Navy's 
recent imbroglio with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, 
Sandagiri said that in future the SLMM will not be 
informed of a suspected LTTE vessel until confirmation 
is made of its location and identification.  He admitted 
that in some cases getting an SLMM representative to the 
site of an incident could take up to a day, but argued 
that the alternative, giving up secrecy and surprise to 
the LTTE by allowing SLMM observers on board earlier, 
was unacceptable. 
 
8.  (C) During the discussion, the Admiral revealed that 
he believes the war could have been won in 2001 if the 
government had not established the peace process.  He 
described an LTTE that was "nearly beaten," hampered by 
the Army's attacks against its leadership and running 
out of resources.  With the peace process, Sandagiri 
lamented, the LTTE has been able to build itself 
geographically, politically, socially, economically, and 
militarily.  Ambassador reiterated the US belief that 
neither side would have been likely to win, and that 
negotiation, not fighting, was the path to ending the 
long-term conflict. 
 
9.  (C) COMMENT:  The SLMM's role as chief monitor of 
the ceasefire has been, and will continue to be, a key 
component in the success of the peace process.  The good 
news is that Haukland seemed upbeat and confident in his 
group's ability to carry out its mission.  Given the 
uncertainties involving the political situation in the 
south and over Tellefsen's continued leadership of the 
group, as well as Norway's recent decision to place "on 
hold" its facilitation effort, it is certainly positive 
that the SLMM finds itself able to continue its 
important work.  On the other side, Admiral Sandagiri 
seems almost to be spoiling for a fight.  The new 
procedure, where SLMM monitors will not be taken aboard 
while the SLN searches for suspected Tiger vessels, but 
only brought out after a vessel is located, is fraught 
with danger.  It could take up to a full day for a 
monitor to reach the scene.  It is hard to believe that 
a Sri Lankan Navy vessel and an LTTE gunrunner will sit 
calmly and observe each other for that length of time. 
END COMMENT. 
 
10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
LUNSTEAD