US embassy cable - 03RANGOON1519

S E C R E T RANGOON 001519 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/EAP, DS/ICI/CI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, PREL, BM 
SUBJECT: RANGOON INCIDENTS/ANOMALIES 
 
 
Classified By: RONALD K. MCMULLEN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, REASON 1.5( 
C). 
 
1.   (U)  The following are incidents of hostile intelligence 
service activity reported by Embassy officers in recent weeks. 
 
2.   (S/NF)  On November 11 the Deputy Chief of Mission 
hosted an event at his residence for the official Amcit 
community.  Military Intelligence (MI) officers  questioned 
two drivers as they waited outside the DCR compound. 
According to one driver, MI used intimidation tactics and was 
more aggressive than in previous encounters.  In particular, 
the MI officers asked about the purpose of the event, who was 
in attendance, the position and title of the attendees, 
residential addresses, and phone numbers. 
 
3.   (S/NF)  On November 18 Post learned that MI officers 
were using a copy of an Embassy in-country travel itinerary 
to identify and question contacts visited on a domestic 
orientation trip.  MI even questioned an individual listed on 
the itinerary with whom Emboffs did not meet. We do not know 
how, or if, MI officers obtained a copy of the actual 
itinerary or information contained in the itinerary.  The 
document was created on the State Department unclassified 
email system and forwarded between various sections within 
the Embassy for revision.  The document was also faxed over 
local telephone lines to Shan State in advance of the trip. 
It is also possible that MI pieced together the information 
from phone calls made from Post to Shan State. 
 
4.   (S/NF)  Foreigners and diplomats are regularly 
surveilled in Burma.  The Government of Burma (GOB) 
aggressively targets western events, hotels, meeting areas, 
popular restaurants and maintains a heightened state of 
paranoia.  Intelligence collection is the regime's primary 
mechanism for maintaining internal control and monitoring 
political opposition.  These activities occur throughout the 
country wherever foreigners are found. 
 
5.   (SBU)  RSO Rangoon has repeatedly cautioned employees 
about operational security and the aggressive intelligence 
collection efforts of the GOB.  RSO encourages employees to 
immediately report any incidents of surveillance, 
questioning, and photographing including harassment of 
dependents and domestic staff.  RSO reviews the required 
contact reporting policies set forth in 12 FAM 262 with all 
newly assigned personnel.  RSO does not feel that the 
above-mentioned incidents are the result of heightened 
hostile intelligence service activity, but are more likely 
indicative of the GOB's normal targeted efforts against the 
United States. 
Martinez