US embassy cable - 03HARARE2287

C O N F I D E N T I A L HARARE 002287 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. DELISI, M. RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER ON OBASANJO VISIT, POLITICAL 
STALEMATE 
 
REF: HARARE 2256 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
1.  (C) Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai on November 21 
confirmed to Ambassador Sullivan the essential details 
related by associates to the Embassy last week (reftel) of 
his meetings with Nigerian President Obasanjo on November 17. 
 He clarified that Obasanjo had said that Mugabe indicated 
agreement to meet Tsvangirai personally, but only at an 
unspecified time after consultation with his party. 
Stressing its potential importance, Tsvangirai suggested that 
a face-to-face meeting could have a psychological impact on 
Mugabe and his party, and noted the utility of having it done 
in the presence of a credible African leader, such as 
Obasanjo, to keep Mugabe honest.  Even if Mugabe came to the 
meeting without good will, he thought it possible to get an 
agreement that the national crisis required the two sides to 
work together toward a solution, which could get the ball 
rolling.  Addressing options for a transition, Tsvangirai 
emphasized his preference for a 6-12 month period under 
ZANU-PF rule, followed by internationally monitored 
elections.  He was vague on a transition under shared 
authority, noting that "joint management" risked yielding 
"joint failure". 
 
2.  (C) Tsvangirai told Obasanjo that democratic space was 
actually shrinking in Zimbabwe and emphasized that none of 
the five conditions laid down by the Commonwealth had seen 
any progress.  Confidence-building measures, such as 
re-opening The Daily News, would be important to build 
credibility.  He confirmed that Obasanjo had been vague about 
CHOGM, not even mentioning it until Tsvangirai raised it 
first.  Tsvangirai saw Obasanjo's objective for the trip as 
"due diligence" -- going the extra mile to justify whatever 
course he took on Zimbabwe's invitation trying to keep 
Zimbabwe from casting a shadow over his CHOGM.  Tsvangirai 
attributed Mugabe's theatrics over CHOGM to possible "false 
assurances" from Namibian President Nujoma over his prospects 
of being invited.  At the end of the day, Obasanjo told 
Tsvangirai that he would continue to press for a meeting to 
 
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take place, following up with a letter to Mugabe shortly. 
 
3.  (C) COMMENT: Tsvangirai's emphasis on a face-to-face 
meeting with Mugabe reflects his conviction, shared by most 
here, that Mugabe's approval is the most significant sine qua 
non for talks to commence.  He probably has few illusions 
that Mugabe would agree to a peronal encounter, which, as 
Tsvangirai suggests, could put into motion events beyond his 
 
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control.  In any event, the government's media propaganda 
machine seems quite prepared to make political hay for the 
ruling party no matter what Obasanjo decides to do with 
Zimbabwe's CHOGM invitation. 
SULLIVAN