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| Identifier: | 03AMMAN7646 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03AMMAN7646 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Amman |
| Created: | 2003-11-23 15:36:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL EAID ASEC IZ JO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 007646 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO, NEA AND PRM E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2013 TAGS: PREL, EAID, ASEC, IZ, JO SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ AGENCIES IN JORDAN: ADRIFT WITHOUT MISSION OR LEADERSHIP Classified By: DCM David Hale per 1.5 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Following the August 19 and September 20 attacks on UN installations in Baghdad, more than 400 UN international staff relocated from Baghdad to Amman, bringing the total number of UN international staff here to more than 500. The number of UN international staff should drop significantly after the Oil-For-Food handover, but likely will hover around 300. Individual UN agencies seem to be engaged appropriately with their counterparts from CPA and Iraqi ministries, staying in touch via e-mail and holding meetings here in Amman. As a whole however, the UN mission in general and UNAMI in particular seem adrift, unsure of their ultimate mission in Iraq and even the location from which they will operate for the foreseeable future. 2. (C) In a November 18 discussion with refcoord, UNAMI NGO coordinator Maura Lynch (protect) portrayed a UN Iraq country team in policy and managerial disarray. Although the UN Iraq team held a meeting in Cyprus November 3-8 to discuss next steps for programming, no decisions were made regarding the UN's role in Iraq, the conditions required to send international staff back to Iraq, or even where "virtual" offices should be located until UN agencies can resume full operations in Iraq. Consensus among working level staff, according to Lynch, is that UN political offices should relocate to Cyprus, while operational programs should remain in Amman where they would have proximity to NGOs and other humanitarian organizations. However, UN NY leadership, UN Jordan country team members and even GOJ officials are increasingly nervous about the security risks posed by large numbers of UN international staff in Jordan. "If they can't get us in Iraq," as Lynch paraphrased UN NY's concerns, "what's stop them from targeting us in Jordan?" For these reasons, Lynch said, many UN Headquarters officials are pressing for the entire UN Iraq team to relocate to Larnaca, Cyprus. The decision regarding the Iraq team's ultimate location will be made by UN NY. 3. (C) Lynch commented that the UN's tough policy and administrative decisions are made all the more difficult by the absence of leadership for the Iraq country team. UNSYG Annan has not yet appointed a new Special Representative for Iraq and the Deputy position, held by Ramiro Lopes da Silva, was not filled after da Silva became the Acting Special Representative following Sergio Viero de Mello's death. Now that da Silva is on administrative leave for the duration of the ongoing security investigation, Lynch said, the Iraq team has neither a Head of Mission, a deputy nor even an acting deputy. 4. (U) Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. 5. (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered. GNEHM
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