US embassy cable - 03ROME5317

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 005317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2013 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, PGOV, IS, IT, UNSC 
SUBJECT: SHARON'S VISIT TO ITALY:  ISRAELIS ECSTATIC 
 
REF: A. ROME 4484 
 
     B. BRUSSELS 5294 
 
Classified By: POL M/C FOR REASONS 1.5(b),(d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Israeli Ambassador Gol described Israeli PM 
Sharon's November 17-19 visit to Rome as "extraordinary" for 
its warmth and level of reception, in part due to the 
confluence of events -- the synagogue bombings in Istanbul 
and the state funerals for fallen Italian carabinieri and 
civilians in the Nasiriya attack -- and resulting shared 
grief.  Even the center-left opposition he met with 
reportedly balanced their concerns on the fence and 
settlements with expressions of understanding of the 
terrorist threat faced by Israel.  In public as well as in 
private,  Sharon also raised the Italian EU Presidency as the 
best Israel has even known and called Italy the best friend 
Israel has in the EU.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Israeli PM Sharon's November 17-19 visit to Rome 
included meetings with all of Italy's top political leaders, 
including President Ciampi, PM Berlusconi, Deputy PM Fini 
(who will be in Israel November 24-25), FM Frattini, Defense 
Minister Martino, Senate President Pera and Chamber President 
Casini.  Sharon also met with principal opposition leaders, 
including Francesco Rutelli and Arturo Parisi (President and 
Vice President of the Daisy Party), Piero Fassino and Massimo 
D'Alema (Secretary and Honorary President of the Democrats of 
the Left), as well as the Italian Jewish community.  The 
visit occurred just two days after the bombings of two 
synagogues in Istanbul and overlapped with the state funeral 
for the 19 Italian victims of the suicide attack on 
carabinieri headquarters in Nasiriya. 
 
3. (C)  Israeli Ambassador Gol told Pol M/C on 21 November 
that Sharon's visit was "extraordinary."  Gol's DCM, Amos 
Radian, filled in the details, saying Sharon made the same 
points privately that he did during his few public statements 
during the visit.  Radian said that the Italian MFA's 
prediction that Italy would have a tough message to deliver 
to Sharon was not borne out, a fact that he attributed to the 
confluence of tragic events in Istanbul and Nasiriya. 
Instead, the tough messages were left to EU FMs to deliver at 
the EU-Israel Association Council meeting in Brussels which, 
coincidentally, occurred at the same time as the monthly 
meeting of EU foreign ministers, and which was chaired by FM 
Frattini. Indeed, the Italian FM reportedly was very careful 
to distinguish EU from Italian policy in his discussions with 
Sharon.  Radian was also struck by the fact that there were 
no public demonstrations in Rome against Sharon and no press 
criticism of how the Italian government handled the visit. 
Post will try to get an MFA read-out of the visit to report 
septel. 
 
4.  (C)  Several specific topics came up repeatedly during 
Sharon's meetings: 
 
--  the wall/fence:  This issue was raised at every meeting, 
and Sharon responded that there are actually only nine 
kilometers of wall, with the rest being fence.  Fences and 
walls, he said, can be taken down eventually.  Human lives, 
however, cannot be restored.  Also, Sharon reportedly added, 
the fence will benefit the Palestinian economy because it 
will enable Israel to admit bonafide workers and keep out 
terrorists.  Sharon's oft repeated line that Israel will make 
compromises for peace but will not compromise security also 
went over well with his Italian interlocutors, and he 
reportedly got no push back after making these points. 
Responding to the Pope's call to "build bridges rather than 
walls" to achieve peace, Sharon retorted that bridges can't 
 
be built on the bodies of the victims of terrorist attacks. 
 
--  the Geneva informal settlement agreement:  This issue 
also was raised by each of Sharon's interlocutors.  Sharon's 
response was that the agreement had no legal standing and 
that it not only contradicts but detracts from the Road Map, 
which remains the Israeli focus.  He emphasized to all that 
there can be no back channel negotiations.  When conditions 
permit, he said, serious negotiations under the Road Map can 
begin.  Radian said Sharon was concerned about an initiative 
in the Italian parliament to endorse the agreement. 
 
--  Arafat:  As necessary, Sharon made it clear that Israel 
did not intend to take any action against the Palestinian 
leader other than to keep him penned up in Ramallah.  FM 
Frattini reportedly told Sharon that Israel should not 
boycott EU officials who meet with Arafat, but he did not 
press the issue.  (Comment. Shalom reportedly told EU FMs in 
Brussels that Israel would end its boycott on EU Special 
 
Representative Marc Otte -- see Ref B). 
 
--  EU Action against Israel:  Referring to suggestions 
within the EU regarding economic actions against Israel, 
Frattini told Sharon unconditionally that Italy would never 
permit that to happen.  (Comment.  This position is not just 
about Israel per se, but about avoiding a slippery slope that 
would bring the EU to take similar actions against other 
countries that Italy cares about, e.g. Libya, Iran, and 
Syria.) 
 
--  Sharon also discussed Iran's nuclear program with FM 
Frattini.  According to  Radian, Sharon's public statements 
once again reflected his private conversation with his 
Italian counterpart, which expressed great concern given 
Israel's current relationship with Iran.  Frattini reportedly 
assured Sharon that the EU expects Iran to sign the 
Additional Protocol and especially expects a lot of 
transparency on Tehran's past regarding the freeze of nuclear 
enrichment activities. 
 
5. (C) Radian took as a positive sign the fact that 
Berlusconi did not raise the point he had raised during all 
previous meetings with his Israeli visitors -- that if Israel 
refrained from retaliating after terrorist attacks, it would 
win respect from Palestinians and the international 
community.  According to Radian, Berlusconi now understands 
that Israeli public opinion demands a response to every 
attack. 
 
6. (C) During a meeting with the leaders of Italy's main 
opposition parties, current Democrats of the Left leader 
Piero Fassino, instead of criticism, served up a series of 
not-so-difficult questions. Daisy leader Francesco Rutelli 
and DS Honorary President Massimo D'Alema were more critical, 
but even they were not especially forceful or persistent. 
 
7. (C)  Sharon both publicly and privately described Italy as 
Israel's best friend in the EU and the Italian EU Presidency 
as the most balanced that Israel has ever seen.  Radian said, 
however, that the Israel government expects new EU demarches 
starting on January 1 (when Ireland takes over the EU 
Presidency). 
 
8. (C) Deputy PM Gianfranco Fini will get an extra warm 
welcome when he visits Israel November 24-25, where he will 
meet with top Israeli leaders, including PM Sharon, FM 
Shalom, and the head of the Knesset.  It is important for 
both sides that Fini's visit be seen as a critical step in 
removing the stigma attached to Fini's National Alliance (AN) 
party because of its Fascist roots (see Ref A).  Israel sees 
Fini as a future Italian PM and wants to build bridges with 
him now. 
 
9. (C) Before Sharon's visit, other EU embassies were 
apprehensive that Berlusconi's public statements would 
undercut the "EU" agreed policy towards Israel, much like 
what happened during the EU-Putin summit.  As far as we can 
tell, Berlusconi didn't say anything publicly that the other 
EU states would object to, but nor did he press as strongly 
the other points they would have liked him to make regarding 
settlements, the fence, and Arafat. 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2003ROME05317 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL