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| Identifier: | 03ABUJA1996 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ABUJA1996 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abuja |
| Created: | 2003-11-21 11:35:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL LI NI |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001996 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2013 TAGS: PREL, LI, NI SUBJECT: TAYLOR: MIXED SIGNALS BREEDS PROBLEMS REF: ABUJA 1937 Classified by CDA Roger Meece. Reason 1.5 (b/d) 1. (C) Summary: MFA Permanent Secretary Hart told the CDA November 20 that the GON appreciated USG clarifications regarding Charles Taylor and the recent measure authorizing $2 million related to the SLSC indictment against him. Nonetheless, Hart observed the issue is getting a good deal of ongoing play in Nigeria, and he is concerned that perceptions of a growing rift between the USG and GON regarding Liberia poses risks for the Liberian peace process and regional affairs in general. Indeed, he noted that a "series of measures" that appear to signal divergence between the two countries could create problems in the general bilateral relationship. While the CDA reiterated that the USG continues to feel that Taylor should ultimately answer for his actions, the CDA and Hart concurred that that the GON and USG share a common goal, i.e., ensuring Taylor does not undermine Liberian peace nor regional stability generally, and that close cooperation between the two governments should be maintained. Hart confirmed FM Adeniji is prepared to discuss Taylor during requested meetings in Washington next week. End summary. 2. (C) In a November 20 meeting with MFA Permanent Secretary Amb. Daniel Hart, CDA sought to ensure that there were no misunderstandings regarding recent legislation authorizing $2 million in relation to Sierra Leone Special Court (SLSC) indictee Charles Taylor. CDA noted widespread press reports, much of it misreporting the measure as a $2 million "bounty" in violation of international law, and an overt challenge to Nigerian sovereignty. CDA emphasized that while the USG continues to believe that Taylor will need to answer for his actions in Liberia and the region, we also very much appreciated the GON's leadership and continuing contribution to resolve the conflict in Liberia. The USG in no way wants to encourage illegal actions in Nigeria. Hart expressed appreciation for the explanation, also welcoming the public USG statements in Washington and Nigeria following the initial press reports about the measure. He stated that the lack of any official GON comment or protest about the matter was in fact attributable to the USG public clarifications, and the GON's own understanding of the Congressional initiative. Expanding, Hart observed that the U.S. and Nigeria share a common agenda, specifically to ensure that Taylor does not undermine the Liberian transition government, nor continue to contribute to regional instability. Hart courteously but pointedly observed that Nigeria had much involved, and thus a great deal to lose (comment: by implication, arguably more than the U.S.), should Taylor succeed in playing a destabilizing role. 3. (C) Hart mused that the issue continues to garner a great deal of attention and comment. He said that in fact he had been listening to a Nigerian radio talk-show early the same morning which featured the $2 million authorization as the principle topic. The GON welcomed close cooperation with the U.S. which had been invaluable to unblock the Liberian peace process; however, many Nigerians are confused by "mixed signals" coming from the U.S. This, he asserted, begins to create the impression of divisions between the USG and the GON, and that in turn creates problems for the GON and potential new risks for the Liberian peace process. Taylor sympathizers could, in fact, exploit such perceived divisions. The CDA concurred that the US and Nigeria share a common goal. Taylor undoubtedly continues to have the will and capacity to create major problems in Liberia and the region. He must not be allowed to do so. 4. (C) The CDA advised that there are additional Congressional initiatives related to Taylor. While details and draft text are not yet available, there could be implications for USG assistance programs. Hart asked if measures being discussed proposed reductions or suspension of aid. The CDA affirmed that could be the case, but cautioned that any language included in new legislation would warrant careful review to determine actual impact and options. Press reporting would, however, undoubtedly seize on the headline value of any new legislation. Hart nodded, saying that this would be a very unfortunate development, as a "series of measures" in Washington would be widely seen as a further divergence of USG and GON policies, problematic for the bilateral relationship and for regional affairs. He repeated that USG and GON interests relative to Taylor are essentially the same. Strong cooperation is needed between our governments, not apparent public widening differences. CDA agreed that effective cooperation is important, and pledged a close continuing dialogue whatever might emerge from the legislative process. 5. (C) In the course of the discussion, Hart mentioned that FM Adeneji had already left for New York, with the hope of continuing on to Washington for meeting(s). CDA confirmed that we are checking possibilities regarding appointments for the Minister and the accompanying Attorney General. Information about the Washington schedule could be passed via the Nigerian mission in New York. In response to a question, Hart acknowledged that Adeniji anticipates that Taylor and Liberia would arise as subjects in any discussion, and is prepared to talk about them. Hart also said at different points that bringing Taylor to Nigeria was not a widely supported move in the country, and that Nigeria would not want to hold on to Taylor without end. He did not respond, however, to the CDA's invitation to comment about any GON thinking about moving Taylor out, or responding to a Liberian request in that regard. He confined himself to saying that he had heard no discussion on the subject, and observing that Bryant's government in Liberia has said nothing about Taylor to the Nigerians much less signaling a desire for any particular action. 6. (C) Comment: While Hart professes that he, FM Adeniji, and President Obasanajo have understood USG actions and policy regarding the $2 million measure, he appeared very concerned by the prospects of what could be seen as a growing USG/GON rift over Taylor. The Nigerians maintain a strong a continuing military and political engagement in Liberia, and an active if not dominant political position in many regional issues. It will be very much in our interests to maintain a close and collaborative relationship. End comment. MEECE
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