US embassy cable - 03ZAGREB2453

C O N F I D E N T I A L  ZAGREB 002453 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, HR, Political Parties/Elections 
SUBJECT: CROATIA'S ELECTIONS: ANOTHER IMPORTANT STEP 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph Frank, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) Voters head to the polls this Sunday, November 23, in 
what will probably be the closest general election in 
Croatia's short history.  The only result we're ready to 
predict is that the overwhelming majority of voters will cast 
ballots for candidates who back integration into 
Euro-Atlantic institutions and favor continued economic 
reform.  But regardless of whether the right or left wins, 
the next government will be a coalition which will include 
parties which do not fully share that consensus.  That means 
that Croatia's next government -- no matter how positive its 
intentions -- could have many of the characteristics we found 
most exasperating in its predecessor.  All expectations are 
that the poll will be carried out properly and that 
preliminary, unofficial results should be available by the 
end of election day.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) In Croatia's last general election nearly four years 
ago, voters were faced with clear choices: isolation or 
Europe, stagnation or reform.  When they return to the polls 
this Sunday, their options -- as they have been presented -- 
are far less distinct.  Both PM Racan's SDP and Ivo Sanader's 
HDZ have pledged to continue to lead Croatia toward 
integration in the EU and NATO, even if it means making 
unpopular choices, like cooperation with ICTY and 
accommodating the return of Serb refugees.  Both claim that 
they will continue to move forward with economic reforms, 
although both will probably have to step back from a few 
populist campaign promises. 
 
3.  (C) Perhaps the most important achievement of the past 
three years is the emergence of this solid consensus among 
the majority of voters as to where Croatia should be going. 
No matter what the outcome, our initial post-election 
response should be to welcome voters' affirmation of 
Croatia's European vocation -- and all the reforms that 
entails -- and to encourage the next government to make 
faster progress toward this goal. 
 
4.  (C) Observers here continue to predict that this election 
will be the closest in Croatia's short history.  But it is 
clear that neither the HDZ nor the SDP will win enough seats 
to form a government on its own.  That means they will have 
to reach out to parties which do not fully share this 
mainstream, pro-Europe, pro-reform consensus.  There are also 
serious questions about whether the HDZ's commitment to this 
consensus is anything more than a respectable facade 
concealing the nationalist, corrupt elements still strong in 
Sanader's HDZ.  Certainly, the HDZ leadership has significant 
reservations about full cooperation with the ICTY. 
 
5.  (C) All polls indicate that the HDZ will be the single 
largest party in the next parliament.  To assemble the 
additional votes needed for a center-right government to come 
to power, Sanader will look first to the HSLS/DC as a 
coalition partner.  While the leaders of this coalition have 
made pro-Europe noises, HSLS leaders have made it clear that 
unconditional cooperation with The Hague War Crimes Tribunal 
is a price they are not willing to pay to get to Europe.  If 
Sanader needs to reach beyond the HSLS/DC, he will have to 
engage with the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), an extreme 
right-wing party which still carries historical baggage from 
Croatia's WWII-era fascist state. 
 
6.  (C) For a center-left government to return to power, 
Racan's SDP can rely on the progressive Croatian People's 
Party (HNS) as a solid partner which shares the mainstream 
consensus.  They should also be able to count on the support 
of most of the eight parliamentary seats which by law are 
allotted to Croatia's many ethnic minorities.  But even in 
their most optimistic election scenarios, this grouping will 
need help from the Croatian Peasants' Party (HSS).  While the 
HSS shares the goal of membership in the EU, its leadership 
claims it will oppose some economic reforms (like 
privatization) and are arguing for a stronger state role in 
directing the economy. 
 
7.  (C) In January of 2000, the coalition led by Racan's SDP 
came to power with only a single shared goal: get rid of 
Tudjman's HDZ.  Lack of consensus within that coalition often 
meant the Government was paralyzed and conflicted every time 
it faced a tough decision.  Unfortunately, the likely lack of 
consensus within either of the lineups expected to succeed 
after Sunday's poll will produce either an unstable 
government or -- more likely -- one that, like its 
predecessor, seems indecisive and misses key opportunities. 
The only formula that seemed to work for the previous 
Government was to move slowly, blame tough choices on 
external factors and logroll coalition partners which would 
otherwise block progress.  We should expect to see some of 
this behavior in the next government as well.  In practical 
 
terms, that means major policy changes will be difficult to 
achieve.  Issues that would require a two-thirds majority -- 
like deploying troops to Iraq -- will be a tough sell for any 
government. 
 
8.  (C) We expect at least preliminary results to be 
available late on election day, November 23.  Final results 
may not be published for a few days, but because the process 
of tabulating results in Croatia has in the past been so 
transparent, reliable results of parallel vote counts 
conducted by NGO's and party observers will likely be 
available by November 25. 
 
9.  (C) The next step after elections is up to President 
Mesic.  The leader of the party which gets the most votes is 
not automatically given first chance to form a coalition 
government.  Croatia's constitution grants the president a 
high degree of flexibility in identifying who should make the 
first attempt at forming a government.  Mesic will grant this 
mandate to the leader of whichever grouping convinces him 
that they have the votes in the new parliament to form a 
government.  That individual will then have thirty days to 
form a government and receive a vote of confidence in the new 
Sabor. 
FRANK 
 
 
NNNN