US embassy cable - 03ANKARA7229

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SCENESETTER FOR TURKISH JUSTICE MINISTER CICEK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

Identifier: 03ANKARA7229
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA7229 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-11-20 12:08:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL PHUM CASC EFIN IZ TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, CASC, EFIN, IZ, TU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR TURKISH JUSTICE MINISTER CICEK'S 
VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
 
 
(U) Classified by CDA a.i. Robert Deutsch; reasons (1.5 b and 
d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Justice Minister Cicek's visit to Washington 
allows us to raise high-profile global issues with one of the 
Turkish cabinet's most influential and outspoken figures. 
Our priorities for his visit should be: 1) to urge continued 
GOT progress on EU-related human rights reform, and 
underscore U.S. support for Turkey's EU candidacy; 2) to 
encourage GOT follow-through on combating trafficking in 
persons (TIP); 3) to urge better cooperation on child 
abduction cases; 4) to urge the GOT to adopt more effective 
laws against terrorist financing; and 5) to brief Cicek on 
our latest thinking on Iraq and further U.S.-Turkish 
cooperation;.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (C) Justice Minister and government spokesman, Cemil Cicek 
is a mainstream conservative Anatolian who brings ballast and 
common sense to PM Erdogan's cabinet.  He has Erdogan's ear 
on matters of state.  For instance, we know he faithfully 
passed on to Erdogan our caution against Erdogan's planned 
trip to Tehran; Erdogan subsequently put the trip off.  Cicek 
can sometimes be a difficult interlocutor; he is prone to 
complaining to us about what he perceives as U.S. policy 
mistakes.  Moreover, in the classic mode of those who adhere 
to a nationalist-religious line, he will blandly assure his 
interlocutors that everything is in order, all problems are 
being solved.  Once he has vented, however, he can be a 
careful listener and appreciates nuts-and-bolts solutions. 
The key is to slow down the pace of the meeting; when he 
senses he is under pressure or sees that someone is openly 
disputing a point with him, he goes deaf. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
Human Rights, Religious Freedom 
------------------------------- 
 
 
3. (U) Cicek has been among the GOT's most outspoken 
defenders of the EU-related human rights reform process. 
When high-level generals from the TGS and NSC have criticized 
pending reform legislation as threats to national security, 
Cicek has often issued strong, public rebuttals.  He has even 
publicly criticized police for abusing their authority.  He 
also understands the need for wholesale reform of the 
sclerotic and ideologically one-sided justice system.  We 
should applaud Cicek's overall efforts in favor of reform and 
make it clear to him that the USG will continue to back 
Turkey's EU candidacy. 
 
 
4. (C) Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew has told us that 
attorneys for the Ecumenical Patriarchate have found Cicek 
willing to discuss new approaches for improving 
GOT-Patriarchate relations, though they remain cautious about 
how far he will go to back efforts to remove restrictions on 
the Patriarchate, especially reopening of Halki Seminary.  We 
should emphasize to Cicek that reopening of Halki in advance 
of the NATO Summit would strongly bolster Turkey's image in 
the U.S.  It is also important to remind Cicek that having a 
healthy Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey rather than having 
the Russian Orthodox Church dominate is directly and 
materially in Turkey's interests. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
State Security Court Reform 
--------------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Despite sweeping human rights reforms, the GOT has 
made no significant changes to the widely criticized State 
Security Court (SSC) system.  SSCs have the authority to hold 
closed hearings and admit testimony obtained during police 
interrogation in the absence of council.  A large portion of 
defendants in SSC cases face charges in relation to illegal 
speech, usually for allegedly "insulting the State" or 
advocating "separatism."  The EU has repeatedly called on the 
GOT to bring the SSCs in line with European standards,  and 
EU officials have alleged pro-prosecution bias on the part of 
the Ankara SSC hearing the  high-profile retrial of Leyla 
Zana and three other Kurdish former MPs.  A few members of 
the Turkish Parliament have said the SSCs should be 
abolished.  SSC reform could help loosen restrictions on 
expression, and would bolster Turkey's EU candidacy. 
----------------- 
Human Trafficking 
----------------- 
 
 
6. (U) Thanks to a recent series of initiatives, the GOT 
earned a last-minute promotion from Tier III to Tier II in 
the 2003 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report.  However, GOT 
officials have been slow to acknowledge the trafficking 
problem in Turkey, and slow to provide information on arrests 
and prosecutions under anti-TIP legislation, as well as on 
anti-TIP programs.  We should continually emphasize to Cicek 
the need to follow up on anti-TIP initiatives in order for 
Turkey to maintain its Tier II status and continue to 
progress.  We should also encourage greater collection and 
sharing of data on TIP-related issues. 
 
 
--------------- 
Child Abduction 
--------------- 
 
 
7. (C) Turkey became a signatory to the Hague Convention on 
Child Abduction (parental kidnapping) in August 2000.  Since 
that time, no child has been successfully returned from 
Turkey to any country without the consent of the abducting 
parent.  There are several systemic problems.  The court 
system is very slow and Hague cases last a minimum of 2-3 
years.  Kidnapping by a parent is not considered a crime in 
Turkey, and police therefore have no authority to get 
directly involved in locating missing children in abduction 
cases.  The law only permits police to notify abducting 
parents that they have seven days to turn over the child. 
Abductors face only a small fine for failing to comply.  Most 
judges are unfamiliar with the Hague Convention.  The Justice 
Ministry recently began preparing a new law for implementing 
the Convention -- we do not know whether Cicek is aware of 
this.  Turkish M.P.s with whom we have discussed the issue 
seem keen to press for Turkey to adhere to its commitments. 
In contrast, in the past, Cicek has made verbal commitments 
to assist in abduction cases, but has not followed up.  We 
have heard from good AK party contacts that Cicek is 
prejudiced against the taking of children from a Turkish 
(i.e., Muslim) abducting parent because he sees the return of 
a child abroad as the loss of a "Muslim child". 
 
 
8. (U) There are currently 16 cases involving 19 Amcit 
children who have been abducted and taken to Turkey.  Of 
these, six involve applications for return and two involve 
applications for visitation under the Hague Convention.  The 
other eight are pre-Hague cases filed under local Turkish 
law.  Cicek's visit provides an opportunity to emphasize our 
concern about the lack of GOT progress on Hague compliance. 
Increasing numbers of children are being abducted and taken 
to Turkey because abducting parents know the Hague Convention 
is not being enforced.  Ultimately, judges in other countries 
will deny visitation to Turkey under the Convention out of 
fear that the children will not be returned. 
 
 
------------------- 
Terrorist Financing 
------------------- 
 
 
9. (U) Turkey's efforts to combat terrorism have been 
hampered by inadequate laws, insufficient training, and 
limited cooperation among agencies.  Both the EU and 
State/DOJ are planning programs to address these problems; 
however, without top-level GOT support, we can expect only 
limited results.  In particular, the GOT needs to pass laws 
that will: 1) criminalize the financing of terrorism; 2) 
resolve jurisdictional disputes between courts; 3) make it 
easier to seize terrorists' assets; 4) improve the 
functioning of MASAK (the Turkish financial intelligence 
analysis unit); and 5) strengthen the Suspicious Transaction 
reporting regime. 
 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
 
10. (C) In recent meetings, Cicek has clearly had a couple of 
axes to grind regarding the war in Iraq and its aftermath. 
He has accused the U.S. of siding with "two clan leaders" 
(PUK leader Talabani and KDP leader Barzani) over Turkey, 
despite 57 years of alliance and friendship.  He has said the 
GOT appreciates U.S. economic support, but warned that 
Washington should not assume that support guarantees Turkey's 
unlimited, unconditional loyalty.  His public comments have 
mirrored this approach.  Nevertheless, Cicek has said he 
believes Turkey and the U.S. should move beyond their 
differences over Iraq.  His visit provides an opportunity to 
emphasize our desire to forge a cooperative relationship with 
the GOT on Iraq, and to encourage Cicek to adopt a more 
supportive public line. 
 
 
--------- 
Uzan Case 
--------- 
 
 
11. (C) Cicek may raise the possibility of a GOT extradition 
request for members of the Uzan family, if they are located 
in the U.S.  Several members of the family of Motorola 
deadbeat and Genc Party leader Cem Uzan face charges of bank 
fraud.  The USG is working with the GOT on the issue, however 
the Uzans have not been located.  We should assure Cicek that 
if the Uzans are located in the U.S. the USG will follow 
through on an extradition request in accordance with the 
extradition treaty. 
DEUTSCH 

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